University of Missouri-St. Louis

Explaining Foreign Policy Change: The Case of U.S. International Population Policy

A dissertation submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

December, 2000

by

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my parents, Carl and Janet Schuler, for their unending support. I also want to thank everyone else in my family, blood relatives and friends alike.

Thank you St. Jude (patron Saint of Lost Causes) and Watty Piper (author of The Little Engine That Could)

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Abstract

This research explores the sources of change in U.S. foreign policy. A refined version of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is used to examine the changes that occur in U.S. international population policy (IPP) between 1965-1995. The ACF is refined by developing the systemic factors as well as subsystemic factors that lead to policy change. Denoting the types of policy change that occur (i.e., strategic and structural) enhances the framework's ability to define the key factors that lead to policy transformation.

An historical analysis showed that political sovereigns like the President and Congress dominated the IPP process, but were influenced by important interest groups and intellectual beliefs. The IPP subsystem was small enough to be subject to the influence of external factors such as the low priority placed on foreign aid and economic downturns. The policy process vacillated between the strategic aspects that determined priorities and goals, and structural aspects that transformed goals into actions. Changes in strategic policies came from partisan changes in governmental institutions. Changes in strategic policies led to mostly minor changes in structural policies. Bureaucratic predispositions made it nearly impossible to make extreme structural changes. Policies changed over the long haul as technology and knowledge bases changed. The transformation of IPP was evolutionary as long as there was a consensus over the knowledge base. More significant changes occurred when the knowledge base and political institutions became fractious.

Two models were developed to fully portray the ideas contained in the ACF. Model One was a regression model that measured the role of systemic factors in accounting for the changes in the amount of money obligated for IPP. Overall, the systemic model accounted for nearly 69% of the variation in the IPP budget. The amount of the gross federal debt and the establishment of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act were statistically discernible. However, the role of the institutional variables was insignificant, perhaps due to the fact that they were based on party rather than ideological differences. Model Two was a qualitative model based on a content analysis of public documents. The cluster analyses show how the change in the belief systems of one actor can profoundly change the tone and level of activity within a policy subsystem. The clusters indicate that the level of discussion in the policy subsystem focuses on political factors rather than on the structural aspects of IPP.

1
Introduction

Into the midst of things
(Horace: Ars Poetica)

Purpose of Study

The purpose of this study is to improve our understanding of U.S. foreign policymaking and the factors that lead to its transformation by extending the pre-eminent theoretical framework used to analyze policy change. Practitioners of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), like Paul Sabatier (1993) and Hank Jenkins-Smith (1988), have failed to fully develop the ACF by overemphasizing the role of policy subsystems, the importance of subsystem actors' belief systems, and the influence of policy learning in explaining policy change. The role of systemic factors like economic conditions and partisan control of the Presidency and the Congress provide a better explanation of policy change.

Understanding policy change is important, because it reveals how the policy process works and can help us understand the constraints and opportunities surrounding decision makers. This study will contribute to the field by being the first to apply the ACF to foreign policy making. Changes in U. S. foreign policy with regards to international family planning (what I will refer to as international population policy or IPP) are examined as a case study focusing on the thirty-year period from 1965 to 1995. . Applying the ACF to international population policy revealed several shortcomings that required a revision of the framework. The analysis had to break new ground by clarifying the dependent variables of policy change, by differentiating between several types of foreign policy processes, and by analyzing the causal factors associated with each type of policy change. The rest of Chapter One briefly lays out an introductory framework that provides some basic assumptions about the policy process and serves as a context for the historical, theoretical, and empirical analyses of IPP that follows. The organization of the rest of the paper is outlined at the conclusion of this chapter.

Patterns and Determinants of Policy Change

Patterns of Foreign Policy

This study posits that there are three foreign policy decision making processes at work in the U.S. First, *crisis decision making* is centered around the President and his immediate staff. Second, *strategic foreign policy decisions* deal with the broad foreign policy stances of the political system. It is assumed that the executive branch dominates strategic decision making, but agencies within the executive branch compete and bargain to gain approval from the President (Ripley and Franklin 1980). Congress will often be a supportive reactor to strategic policy initiatives, and, at times, may be independently active in such issues. Finally, *structural foreign policies* are aimed at transforming strategic decisions into concrete actions. Policy subsystems, decentralized decision making and low levels of conflict characterize structural decision making. Congress, interest groups, and the executive agencies are the primary players in this mode of decision making.

This study suggests that the IPP process vacillates between strategic and structural processes. Clearly, there will be some overlap between strategic and structural policies, but the distinction is worthwhile. Strategic policies are about ideas and priorities that guide human actions, while structural policies are concerned with the means by which goals are achieved. Initiating IPP, rendering periodic oversight, and articulating the positions of the United States at international conferences represent times when policy making is primarily strategic in nature. Budget submissions, bureaucratic reorganizations, and annual reports are examples of structural policy making. This study will focus on both the strategic and structural changes in international population policy. Examining change in strategic policy will include a review of the changes incoming presidents have sought upon taking office and the positions they have advocated at the United Nations conferences on population in 1984 and 1994. Examining structural changes in U.S. IPP will entail outlining the budgetary, programmatic, and organizational changes that occurred between 1965 and 1995.

Determinants of Change

Several factors will determine how decisions are made: the nature of the issue, the institutions involved, and non-institutional factors (e.g., technical factors, and social and economic conditions).

The Nature of the Issue

The nature of the policy is important, because it determines what decision making process is likely to be used. Generally, there are six policy making models used to describe how foreign and domestic policies are made (distributive, regulatory, redistributive, structural, strategic, and crisis).[1] The first three models describe domestic policymaking and the latter three describe foreign policymaking. The models are distinguished from each other by the different issues raised and by the actors involved and their interrelationships. For example, it is commonly believed that the President and his immediate staff are most likely to make changes in strategic policy. When the nature of the issue is different, however, both public and private institutions can be important to policy change (especially in distributive and redistributive policies). Regulatory issues (e.g., auto emission regulations for automobiles) are likely to be decided by bureaucratic experts.

The traditional distinction between foreign and domestic policies is becoming increasingly blurred, as the world has become more interdependent. Foreign policy issues have become increasingly contentious because the domestic ramifications are likely to activate more key political decision makers. The convergence of international and domestic concerns is at times referred to as "intermestic" policy (Barilleaux 1985). The term is important because it suggests that foreign policies are subject to wider influences than found in the traditional view that the President dominates U.S. foreign policy. This notion should give way to a multi-faceted approach that will account for varying circumstances.

Institutional Factors

Public institutions (namely the President, Congress, and the bureaucracy) are all potential policy fountainheads. Public institutions are sometimes called political sovereigns, because they have the capacity to

[1]See Chapter Four for a more complete discussion.

initiate and institute public policies. Private institutions (i.e., interest groups) actively seek to advance their own interests in the policy process. Both public and private institutions are examined below.

The President

It is easy to imagine that foreign policy change springs from the President, given the office's widely recognized constitutional authority to make policy in this area. This is especially true with regard to "high" political issues like peace and security. Here, analysts are fond of the rational actor model, which assumes that the President is able to make policy unilaterally, or at least is given wide decision latitude (Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Leng 1983; Wildavsky 1961). Many scholars are skeptical, however, of the President's ability to control foreign policy, especially the minutiae of a relatively "low" political issue like international population policy (Neustadt 1980; Nathan 1983). Still, the President does have the ability to significantly shape public policies. The attention given to the presidency by the media, and its place within the institutional framework account for this ability. As an institution, the presidency has the ability to propose and veto legislation, to appoint key bureaucratic players, and to appeal to the entire public at a moment's notice (Kingdon 1984). The ability to propose and veto legislation makes the President a potent force in policy change. This does not mean that the President controls every situation, since the position has a limited ability to influence Congress (Mouw and MacKuen 1992). Assuming that non-crisis foreign policies tend to be made by a variety of actors requires an explanation as to when the presidency is expected to influence policy transformation.

Valerie Bunce's theory of executive succession attempts to explain policy change amidst incrementalism. Public policy is generally stable over the long haul with minor changes occurring at the margins. The theory of executive succession postulates that leadership change is destabilizing and "sets in motion certain changes in the policy environment—in its participants, agenda, clienteles and pressures—which in turn affect policy outcomes" (Bunce 1981, p. 16). The theory rests on several assumptions regarding executive succession in democratic polities. First, policy change is confined to the honeymoon phase, where new priorities are established and standard operating procedures are modified. Second, policy change is more likely when another party comes to

power and establishes its priorities based on different ideological assumptions. Third, policy will be altered more when the margin of victory in an election is greater. Finally, leftist parties are more change-oriented than rightist ones (Bunce 1981). Thus, policy change is seen to lurch between incrementalism and innovation brought on by new gatekeepers of the public apparatus.

The Congress

Congress is another source of policy change. "Congressmen are in an almost unique position in our system, a position shared only with high-level members of the executive branch. Congressmen possess the power to expedite and influence bureaucratic decisions. This capability flows directly from congressional control over what bureaucrats value most: higher budgets and new program authorizations" (Fiorina 1989, p. 41). Perhaps the greatest power of Congress lies in its ability to maintain, modify or destroy policy subsystems. A policy subsystem can be defined as an aggregation of interests around a narrow set of issues.[2] Subsystems are considered to be relatively stable, because there is a great deal of agreement among the participants (e.g., subcommittee members, special interests, and bureaucratic agencies) as to the definitions, problems and solutions that surround a given policy area. Policy subsystems function within a larger system that will influence, and occasionally dominate policy making in a given issue area. Systemic factors include the structural rules that determine the relationships between policy actors, economic conditions, public opinion, and the decisions made in other policy subsystems (see chapter 4, p. 126). Systemic factors define the resources and constraints of the policy subsystem. In general, the level of understanding among subsystem actors makes change incremental. Policy changes result from the transformation of a policy's image, and from changing the decision venue where policy is made (Baumgartner and Jones 1991).

There are several potential sources of policy change arising from Congress. Herbert Asher's and Herbert Weisberg's model of congressional voting (1978) suggests that changes in voting will occur as an issue evolves

[2]The literature has used other terms like iron triangles and subgovernments to describe this notion about policy making. Iron triangles can be distinguished from subgovernments in terms of the perceived amount of control of interest groups over policy making. Interest groups are believed to dominate policy making in iron triangles, while they are just participants in the process in subgovernments. Policy subsystems are synonymous with subgovernments.

over time. Congressional voting is influenced by a member's belief system, as exemplified by his or her ideology and party. Asher and Weisberg also assert that the characteristics of a member's district are also important in determining the vote. Membership evolution is another source of change. Membership replacement is limited from one election cycle to the next, so replacement will affect policy change slowly. Asher and Weisberg also note that new occupants in the White House will affect how members of Congress vote. They suggest that when there is a partisan shift in the presidency, members of the former opposition are likely to change their vote to correspond to the new President's stand on an issue (Asher and Weisberg 1978). Thus, turnovers in the systemic governing coalition (i.e., the President and Congress) will alter the political environment and lead to certain policy alterations.

The Bureaucracy

Finally, bureaucracies are important to policy change. One way to look at the bureaucracy's position in the policy process is to see all interested parties in a free-for-all struggle, where the bureaucracies represent outposts along the battle lines. Each side is trying to push the battle line in the desired direction, so that the outpost can be captured and moved to the new front line. Some lines are more stable than others are. Thus, the political environment can be potentially hostile and lead to significant changes in policy, if the bureaucracy is unable to keep the scope of the conflict at a manageable level. Bureaucratic agencies are arenas for contending social forces, but they are also collections of standard operating procedures and structures that define and defend values, norms, interests, identities, and beliefs (March and Olsen 1989). The bureaucracy's ability to determine alternatives and implementation procedures gives it an important role in policy change (Kingdon 1984). The bureaucracy's paramount role in administering the resolution of political conflict gives it the ability to determine the degree of adherence to the resolution (e.g., rulemaking). The bureaucracy has technical knowledge that gives it the ability to control information flows to the outside combatants. Expertise gives bureaucrats a great deal of influence when alternatives are being specified and can alter the way in which policy is transformed. Finally, the

bureaucracy's connections to the rest of the political system give it the ability to play off the disputes between special interests and other institutions (Kingdon 1984).

Private Institutions

Private institutions, especially interest groups, also influence policy change. E. E. Schattschneider (1960) argued that the major role of the political system is to keep the scope of conflict among organized groups at a manageable level. There is competition between organized interests, because each has a specialized agenda that may come into conflict with another's (Moe 1980; Walker 1983). Varying priorities lead to both conflict and cooperation among interest groups (Salisbury, Heinz, Laumann, and Nelson 1987). The interaction of interest groups is one of the most important factors that structures policy outputs. In general, the level of conflict between interest groups will determine if and how an issue is decided (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).

Other private institutions, namely the media, play an important role in setting the governmental agenda. The media's role is generally portrayed in two ways. First, public policies are subject to the scrutiny of reporters with varying perspectives. Media scrutiny makes any public policy subject to change, because it has the ability to change the bias of political mobilization. For example, embassy funding can seem a pretty bland issue, until terrorist bombings change the way this issue is perceived. Second, the need to generate revenue drives media to search constantly for new and exciting stories that can fuel calls for change by catering to the hopes and fears of people. Hot issues quickly change from famines in Africa to tensions in the Middle East, depending on what will sell more. Public actors will be biased toward taking some form of action to demonstrate that they are in tune and understand how to deal with the issues. Thus, the media, organized groups, and governmental institutions interact with each other to generate policy change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).

Non-Institutional Factors

There are several other sources of policy change. Technical factors can lead to policy changes. Technical factors include elements like technology, information, and institutional capacity. Ideally, policies will be transformed as knowledge and technical capacity improves (Meehan 1981). The development of new forms

of contraception, more accurate demographic data, and rural outreach programs can transform IPPs. In the case of contraceptives, new technologies can improve IPPs in three ways. Improved contraceptive effectiveness will limit the failure rate (e.g., the condom was an improvement over a wine-soaked sponge), improved continuation rates will reduce fertility (e.g., Norplant is a potential improvement over the pill which must be taken daily), and improved acceptance will increase the usage of contraceptives (e.g., new delivery systems can attract new users who would not otherwise use traditional methods (Berelson 1988a)). Thus, public actions will be transformed as experts ("epistemic communities") produce new ideas and as consensual knowledge improves and filters through a political system (Haas 1990).

Social and economic conditions are final factors that can explain policy change. Changes in social and economic conditions can alter policy subsystems by affecting the assumptions of present policies or by affecting the support of key actors. For example, the U.S. IPP is likely to be influenced by conditions such as public opinion and the budget deficit. Public opinion has generally been supportive of an active international role for the U.S., but foreign aid programs have been generally unpopular (Rielly 1988). Supporters and detractors can use these opinions to seek changes in a policy. Adverse economic conditions, such as the budget deficit, can lead political actors to call for cuts in unpopular programs to deal with the problem (LeLoup 1988).

Analyzing Policy Change

The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a sophisticated theoretical construct that seeks to model the patterns and determinants of policy change described above. The studies incorporating the ACF up to this point, however, have failed to include an examination of the systemic factors that can lead to policy changes. The research done by Paul Sabatier and others has focused exclusively on examining the sources of policy change at the subsystem level. This study will account for systemic factors that will affect policy change by demonstrating that turnover in public institutions like the Presidency will lead to changes in strategic policies. The analysis will also show that economic conditions will affect the amount of funding the international population program receives. The findings presented here will show consistency in the belief systems of the

subsystem actors over time. The lack of variation in the belief systems of the subsystem actors calls into question the primary method of analysis used by researchers to explain policy change. Systemic factors like political turnover, economic circumstances, and the outside influences of the political system as a whole will account for more policy change than examining the belief systems of subsystem actors over time.

The ACF also needs to be refined to include the types of policy change that can occur. Different actors will be active in strategic policy making than are active in structural policymaking. This research will demonstrate that the executive branch will dominate strategic policies. In terms of structural policies, it will be shown that budgetary changes will result from a bargaining process with many actors involved, programmatic policies will be dominated by the bureaucracy with occasional outside inputs, and organizational changes will spring from executive and bureaucratic sources. Dividing policy changes into various types will allow for a more accurate and robust explanation of policy change.

Conclusion

In sum, the nature of the policy, the institutions involved, and non-institutional factors are at work when policies change. These factors are illuminated in Chapters Two and Three where the evolution of U.S. IPP is traced. Chapter Two will survey the early origins of the program and examine policy developments during successive presidential administrations up to President Ford. This period covers the bipartisan consensus that developed around the need for an international population policy and how the program became an institutional mainstay within the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). Chapter Three traces the conflict that began to appear in the Carter Administration and examines the changes instituted by the Reagan Administration that led to the partisan battles in the population policy subsystem through the Bush and Clinton Administrations. The overview will focus specifically on the strategic and structural changes in international population policy. The sources of each type of policy change will be noted where possible, and will set the stage for the subsequent formal analysis.

Chapter Four summarizes the theoretical literature regarding the dynamics of the policy process. Refinements in theory led to the development of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) that provides the basis for this study. The analysis of the ACF will reveal shortcomings in the recent methodologies used to analyze policy change. This research will argue for the differentiation between various policy types to determine how public policymaking occurs in different contexts. This investigation will also suggest that incorporating the ACF requires consideration of systemic factors, instead of focusing exclusively on the workings of the policy subsystem as is currently done in the literature.

Chapter Five develops two methods to analyze changes in U. S. international population policy. First, a regression analysis will be used to explain the budgetary changes in IPP. Second, a cluster analysis will be used to examine the policy changes that occurred between the United Nations (UN) population conferences in 1984 and 1994. The first model will measure the effects of systemic changes on the IPP budget to underscore the overall role they play in policy change. The second model will conform to the current techniques used by proponents of the ACF to analyze changes in a policy subsystem. Chapter Six will review the analysis and argue for the revisions to the ACF introduced here and detailed in Chapter Four.

2
U.S. International Population Policy From Truman To Ford: Establishing the Consensus

If government knew how, I should like
to see it check, not multiply the population.
(Emerson: The Conduct of Life VII)

Program Origins—Early Activism

In order to understand the strategic and structural budgetary, programmatic, and organizational changes in IPP it is important to understand how population growth became an issue requiring public intervention. The prevailing logic throughout recorded history was that population growth was a positive circumstance. Population size was an important factor that affected the economic and military strength of a nation.[1] Overcoming the prevailing logic was necessary before a consensus could be reached that the U.S. should do something to check the size of the human population.

After World War II, many demographers noted that declining death rates and high birth rates were resulting in rapid population growth. The human population has more than doubled since 1950, increasing from 2.5 billion to 6.0 billion in 1999 (*New York Times* (NYT) 1999). During the same period, the annual addition to the world's population has changed from 38 million in 1951, to 78 million in 1997 (U.S. Census Bureau 1998). Projections for the future suggest that this trend will continue. The U.S. Census Bureau (1998) has estimated that the global population will reach 8.2 billion by 2030, before the growth rate levels off.

The anticipated social implications of this rapid growth led population activists, including individuals such as Margaret Sanger, William Vogt, and Julian Huxley, and organizations such as Planned Parenthood, the Population Council, and the Ford Foundation, to advocate a public response immediately following World War

[1]Throughtout history writers, like Plato (1983), Niccolo Machiavelli (1950), and Paul Kennedy (1987), reflect this notion. For example, Machiavelli wrote: "Those who desire a city to achieve great empire must endeavor by all possible means to make her populous; for without an abundance of inhabitants it is impossible ever to make a city powerful" (1950, p. 288).

II. The activists suggested that environmental and human degradation would result from the ever-increasing numbers of people being born. For example, William Vogt suggested that

> by excessive breeding and abuse of the land mankind has backed itself into an ecological trap. By a lopsided use of applied science it has been living on promissory notes. Now, all over the world the notes are falling due. Payment can not be postponed much longer . . . It will certainly be more intelligent to pull in our belts and accept a long period of austerity and rebuilding than to wait for a catastrophic crash of our civilization. In hard fact we have no other choice." (Vogt 1948, p. 148).

Dire predictions like these were brushed aside by many agronomists who were imbued with the optimistic notion that science and technology would develop new methods to produce sufficient food for a much larger human population. For example, the Interim Commission of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) declared in its first report that "recent discoveries have made it possible for all men and nations to achieve freedom from hunger . . . Indeed, we can now expect to do much more" (Symonds and Carder 1973, p. 36). The optimism of the agronomists continued to sway expert opinion throughout the 1950s, because family planning activists continued to rely on the discredited Malthusian dilemma. The nineteenth century British economist Thomas Malthus argued that while the human population was growing at a geometrical rate, food production could only grow at an arithmetic rate (Malthus 1960). Most experts argued that the European experience had disproved Malthus' assertion.

The European experience can be summed up by the demographic transition theory. The theory asserts that socioeconomic development will lead couples to have fewer children. Urbanization, education, increased standards of living, and changing family relationships including changing women’s roles are all part of the transition process. The extended family becomes the nuclear family as educational and business institutions expand individual opportunities that were previously unavailable. "Economic variables of importance include the reduced labor value of children, the increased cost of raising children, the emergence of competing consumer goods, and the money value of the wife's labor outside the home" (Beaver 1975, p. 8). In addition, the advent of

social security systems throughout Europe eliminated the need for parents to have enough children to support them in their old age. In short, economic development led families to have fewer children and there was no need to worry about population. The prevailing logic held that foreign aid programs should focus on economic development and let the demographic transition take its natural course.

The optimism of the 1950s was eventually overtaken by the tension between economic development and population growth. Ansley Coale and Edgar Hoover argued against the prevailing logic that population growth was supportive of and compatible with economic development. The Coale and Hoover study of India asserted that a reduced rate of population growth would release additional capital for investment, because fewer dependents reduced consumption and the need for public infrastructure. They concluded that "per capita consumer income would attain a level about 40% higher by 1986 with reduced fertility than with continued high fertility." (Coale and Hoover 1958, p. 126). The Coale-Hoover thesis provided a new justification for activists to argue for U.S. involvement in population control.

The Transformation of U.S. Foreign Aid

U.S. foreign assistance aimed at economic development was initiated during the Truman Administration. Proposals in the nineteenth century to alleviate foreign disasters (e.g., the Irish Famine of 1845 and the Russian Famine of 1881) were rejected on the grounds that they would be ruled unconstitutional. The view that the federal government had a limited purview prevailed through the inter-war period. The U.S. did not have foreign aid of any type until the Lend-Lease Act of 1941. In 1948, Congress created the Economic Cooperation Administration to facilitate the goals of the Marshall Plan (Ruttan 1996). The Cold War and the Marshall Plan insured that foreign aid would be primarily military in nature. Some U.S. Senators, however, believed that the program relied too heavily on military aid and asked President Eisenhower to review U.S. foreign aid priorities.

The President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program (more commonly known as the Draper Committee) spotlighted the population issue in 1959. The committee, directed by General William H. Draper, was composed of men whose experience was solely military and economic. Despite the

backgrounds of its members, the committee came to support the Coale-Hoover thesis. The final report of the committee recommended that the U.S. should: (1) assist countries in the formulation of plans designed to deal with the problem of rapid population growth when requested, (2) increase assistance to local maternal and child welfare programs, and (3) strongly support research leading to the availability of relevant information in the formulation of practical programs to meet the serious challenge posed by rapidly expanding populations (Piotrow 1973).

Roman Catholic opposition to birth control led many prominent public officials to shy away from the issue. The Roman Catholic Church responded to the population activists and the findings of the Draper Committee by declaring its opposition to the use of public money to "promote artificial birth prevention for economically underdeveloped countries," and referred to the efforts of the activists as a Malthusian scare campaign (Symonds and Carder 1973, p. 94). President Eisenhower was privately concerned about the population issue, but publicly opposed government intervention to avoid the acrimony his support would create: "I can not imagine anything more emphatically a subject that is not a proper political or governmental activity . . . This government will not, as long as I am here, have a positive political doctrine in its program that has to do with the problem of birth control" (Symonds and Carder 1973, p. 95). Candidate John Kennedy was unwilling to support publicly-financed birth control for the same reason, but tried to distance himself from the Roman Catholic Church by arguing that his judgment was based on his understanding of the national interest (Symonds and Carder 1973).

A shift in U. S. policy began to appear during Kennedy's administration however. In his first message to Congress on the U. S. foreign aid program, Kennedy echoed the sentiment of the Coale-Hoover thesis by suggesting that less developed countries (LDCs) were being hampered by rapid population growth (U. S. Department of State 1961). Several officials in the State Department and the Agency for International Development (AID) construed the President's statements literally by taking actions that formed the basis of U.S. IPP. For example, in 1961, George McGhee (a member of the Draper Committee) was appointed director of the

Policy Planning Council of the State Department. Under McGhee's direction, the Policy Planning Council issued a widely circulated report (PPC-61-3) which indicated support of the Coale-Hoover thesis and made several important recommendations. PPC-61-3 called for the National Institute of Health (NIH) to issue a report summarizing current research in reproductive physiology, the creation of a full-time State Department population officer, encouraging more UN action, research by AID on the social and economic factors involved in population growth, and quiet encouragement of foreign governments to provide birth control (Piotrow 1973).

The Kennedy Administration responded coyly to the population issue generally, and the recommendations of PPC-61-3 specifically. For example, note Kennedy's response to a question raised about his support for a recommendation for more governmental research by Dr. John Rock of Harvard University:

> If your question is, can we do more, should we know more about the whole reproduction cycle, and should this information be made more available to the world so that everyone can make their own judgment, I would think it would be a matter which we could certainly support. . . . Whether we are going to support Dr. Rock's proposal, which is something different, is another question. (Piotrow 1973, p. 75).

The bureaucratic experts responded coyly as well to PPC-61-3. For example, despite Secretary of State Dean Rusk's rejection, the NIH prepared a report summarizing the ongoing birth control research. Second, Robert Barnett was named the deputy director of the Foreign Economic Advisory Staff. Barnett's title disguised the fact that he was the first full-time population adviser in the State Department. In addition the U.S. supported the UN efforts to develop a population program, but abstained on votes that were deemed too controversial (Piotrow 1973). Nevertheless, the Kennedy Administration expanded foreign aid with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which created the Agency for International Development (AID). AID would provide an environment in which U.S. international population policy could develop (Ruttan 1996).

For its part, Congress moved the process along by prodding AID to move forward. In 1963, Senator J. William Fulbright (D.-AK) offered an amendment authorizing AID to research the problems associated with population growth and to provide technical assistance to the population control programs of other countries. The

technical assistance provision was dropped, however, during a conference committee meeting in which some House members raised objections. Members like Clement Zablocki (D.-WI), Edna Kelly (D.-NY), and James Fulton (R.-PA) were openly opposed to birth control. Nevertheless, the amendment did break new ground when it was signed into law, because it gave AID, in the words of Fulbright, a "broad mandate" to act in the field of family planning. The assassination of President Kennedy and the election of 1964 pushed the population issue off the government's agenda until 1965 (Piotrow 1973).

Population Policy Under Johnson

Strategic Policy: Initiating International Population Policy

The establishment of U.S. international population policy came as a result of the actions taken primarily by special interest groups, President Johnson, and Congress.[2] Outside interest groups (e.g., the Rockefeller Foundation) actively courted the administration to do more on the population issue. The efforts of John D. Rockefeller and William Draper were instrumental in nudging the administration to act. Despite Secretary of State Dean Rusk's concerns about a Roman Catholic backlash for moving too fast, President Johnson moved the policy process forward by referring to the population issue in the State of Union Message for 1965. President Johnson said he would "seek new ways to use our knowledge to help deal with the explosion in world population and the growing scarcity in world resources" (Symonds and Carder 1973, p. 48). This statement, and numerous others made by Johnson in 1965 and 1966, provided the political cover needed by family planning proponents in Congress, AID, and interest groups to initiate an IPP:

Table 2.1 **World Population**

Year	Mid-Year Population	Avg. Annual Growth Rate	Avg. Annual Change
1965	3,345,410,699	2.07	40,623,555

[2]Tables 2.1, 2.3, 3.1, and 3.2 identify the mid-year world population, average annual growth rate and average annual population change in approximately ten-year increments, corresponding to the United Nations Conferences on Population. They show the population growth that occurred over the course of the thirty years of this study (U. S. Census Bureau 1998).

> The willingness of a chief executive at last to involve his own prestige and influence by talking about population did reinforce the population activists in AID. The president's words did help to bring the issue out from the bowels of a nervous and insecure agency into the open where programming could be measured against policy, where political pressures could be measured against economic benefits, and where, in continuing sequence, the level and timing of the population program could be measured against the level and timing of comparable programs (Piotrow 1973, p. 100).

This description calls to mind the earlier discussion about agenda setting, specifically, the role of interest groups in the pre-decisional phase of the policy process, and the role of the President in setting the government's agenda.

Congress was active in establishing the structural aspects of IPP. Special interests may have influenced Johnson to speak out about the issue, but Congress was responsible for making the decisions to implement the strategy. Senator Ernest Gruening (D-AK), along with six Senate and two House co-sponsors, introduced a bill (S. 1676) to provide for certain reorganizations in the Department of State and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). The bill would have created an Office of Population Problems under an assistant secretary in both departments, and called for a White House Conference on the subject. The Gruening Hearings (1965-1968) were held to discuss S. 1676, and contributed to establishing an IPP within the foreign aid program during the Johnson Administration. The Gruening Hearings contributed by changing the shape of political discourse, and by prodding reluctant bureaucrats to move forward faster. Before the hearings, the issue was primarily portrayed as an exclusively private issue that was outside the public sphere. Senator Gruening used multiple approaches to support the establishment of domestic and international family planning programs. The Senator's arguments included the economic benefits of smaller families, resource conservation, personal health and welfare, the need for fewer abortions, the food imbalance in the developing world, freedom of information, and freedom of choice. These arguments served to change the nature of the political discourse surrounding the issue (Piotrow 1973).

Despite President Johnson's forty-one statements supporting increased family planning between 1965-1967, Gruening was miffed by the lack of follow through in the administration. Both the Director of AID, David Bell, and the Secretary of HEW, John Gardner, opposed the passage of S.1676. Director Bell argued that AID already had the authority to act in the population field, which was derived from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law 480, and the Food For Freedom Act. Bell's primary opposition to S. 1676 stemmed from a provision that would have earmarked funds for population activities and reduce AID's freedom to act (U.S. Senate 1966). Bureaucratic foot-dragging was even more evident in Secretary Gardner's testimony:

> Secretary Gardner. Perhaps in my testimony I did not express how strongly I feel about the disadvantages of a formal designation of duties for the Assistant Secretaries. . . . I believe that if we lodged in the title of each Assistant Secretary to the full range of his duties we would seriously limit flexibility.
>
> Senator Gruening. There is absolutely no evidence from your words and actions that you are really concerned about the population problems.
>
> Secretary Gardner. That is a matter of record. . .
>
> Senator Gruening. The difficulty with this whole problem is that people are afraid of it and your Department is still afraid of it. Instead of facing it frankly and forthrightly, you are continuing to do it under the table. You say we are doing these things in very vague terms, but you do not state positively and definitely that you are going to tackle this with the kind of enthusiasm that it seems to the President of the United States in his repeated messages demands (U.S. Senate 1966, p.356).

Bureaucratic support could only be found in the State Department, which announced the creation of a special assistant for population activities in the office of the under-secretary (U.S. Senate 1966).

White House and Congressional prodding of the bureaucracy was given added urgency by the famine that occurred in India and other regions in 1966 (Piotrow 1973). The famine spurred several initiatives by the political sovereigns that led to a major increase in expenditures for international population activities. First, there were two White House conferences held that included panel discussions on family planning. The panel at

the White House Conference on the International Cooperation Year recommended a dramatic increase in the IPP budget. The AID Administrator, David Bell, reported that AID spent $2 million in 1965 and about $5.5 million in 1966 (U.S. Senate 1966), but the actual number in 1966 was $3.9 million (Piotrow 1973).[3] The conference panel, loaded with population activists, recommended spending $100 million in the next three years (Piotrow 1973). Second, congressional hearings over the renewal of Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) were used to press the population issue. The Food for Peace program began in 1954 and allowed the "soft" foreign money used to purchase surplus U.S. food to be used by the U.S. or the purchasing country for development programs. The renewal of Food for Peace included an amendment that earmarked a certain percentage of this "soft" money for family planning activities (Piotrow 1973).

The bureaucracy became more responsive to the pressure applied from above. First, the State Department named Philander Claxton as the new special assistant to the Secretary for population matters. Claxton focused his efforts on lobbying within the bureaucracy to educate and to spur further action. Second, William Gaud, Bell's successor at AID, responded to the stimulus by consolidating all activities related to hunger, population, and nutrition into a new Office of the War on Hunger in 1967. The Office of the War on Hunger included the creation of the Population Service, headed by Dr. Reimert T. Ravenholt (Piotrow 1973). The IPP budget increased only moderately in 1967, however, up to $4.4 million (U. S. AID 1971).

Ravenholt had two major priorities when he took over the Population Service. First, Ravenholt sought to organize a staff to carry out the responsibilities of the new organization. Ravenholt had great difficulties staffing the Population Service. AID had only 13 employees devoted to the population issue, compared to 1,100 for agriculture. Dr. Ravenholt even had trouble finding a secretary, which led him to conclude that the then Population Branch was "not a Branch; it's a twig" (Piotrow 1973, p. 125). Second, the director sought to have

[3]Table 2.2 depicts the budget numbers for U. S. IPP from 1965-1995. The table includes figures for presidential requests; proposed and actual House and Senate authorizations; proposed and actual House and Senate appropriations; and AID obligations. Obligations are higher than appropriations because AID obligations include population activities funded outside of the earmarked funds represented by congressional appropriations.

Table 2.2

IPP Presidential Requests, Congressional Bills, and AID Obligations, 1965-1995

Fiscal Year	Presidential Request	House Authorization	Senate Authorization	Actual Authorization	House Appropriation	Senate Appropriation	Actual Appropriation	AID Obligation
1965	No Line Item	No Line Item	No Line Item	No Line Item	No Line Item	No Line Item	No Line Item	2.1
1966	No Line Item	No Line Item	No Line Item	No Line Item	No Line Item	No Line Item	No Line Item	3.9
1967	No Line Item	No Line Item	No Line Item	No Line Item	No Line Item	No Line Item	No Line Item	4.4
1968	No Line Item	20	50	35	No Line Item	No Line Item	No Line Item	34.75
1969	No Line Item	50	50	50	No Line Item	No Line Item	No Line Item	45.44
1970	No Line Item	(100) 75	(100) 75	75	No Line Item	No Line Item	No Line Item	74.57
1971	No Line Item	(100) 100	100	100	No Line Item	No Line Item	No Line Item	95.87
1972	No Line Item	(125) 125	125	125	50	125	125	123.27
1973	110.00	125	125	125	125	145	135	125.55
1974	125.00	(150) 145	(145) 145	(145) 145	150	130	135	112.45
1975	135.00	165	(145) 165	(145) 165	115	145	125	109.98
1976	230.00	165	136.48	162.85	135	105	134	102.99
1977	275.00	187	158.25	184.65	200	228	214	144.35
1978	177.00	181	160	167	161	155	155	166.54
1979	155.00	225	225	224.75	195	180	185	191.44
1980	185.00	216	194	201	∅	∅	185	194.98
1981	225.22	255	208	238	238	238	238	208.45
1982	188.84	(238) 211	211	211	211	190	211	237.75
1983	211.00	211	211	211	∅	∅	211	243.08
1984	211.00	∅	∅	∅	∅	∅	240*	264.24
1985	240.29	320	∅	∅	290	250	290	317.70
1986	290.00	320	290	290	261	250	250	295.55
1987	250.00	320	290	290	239.5	230	234	286.60
1988	234.63	223.72	∅	∅	197.94	197.94	197.94	248.07
1989	197.94	223.72	∅	∅	∅	∅	197.94	257.58
1990	197.94	202	∅	∅	220	220	220	287.13
1991	222.00	206.04	∅	∅	250	250	250	353.79
1992	250.00	300	300∅	∅	∅	∅	250	325.64
1993	249.32	350∅	300∅	∅	330	350	350	447.85
1994	400.00	395	∅	∅	392	392	392	471.77
1995	392.00	∅	∅	∅	450	450	450	544.70
'65-'95	4,904.24	5,196.48	3,518.73	3,000.25	4,060.44	4,230.94	5,374.64	6,325.47

Numbers in Black represent regular requests, authorizations, and appropriations, as well as supplemental appropriations.
Numbers in parentheses are superceded authorizations
Numbers in Green represent 2-year authorizations
Numbers in Red represent Continuing Resolutions
∅-No Bill *Money added in Conference

Sources: Piotrow (1973); Statutes at Large (1967; '68; '69; '72; '73a-c; '74; '75; '77; '78; '79a,b; '80; '81a,b; '82; '83; '84a,b; '85a,b; '86; '87; '88; '89; '90a,b; '91; '92; and '93); U.S. House of Representatives (1973a; '74c; '75a,b; '76a,b,e; '77a-c; '78c,d; '79a,b; '80a,b; '91; '92; and '94); U.S. Senate (1966; '73; '74c; '76; '78; '79; '80; '90; '91); Office of Management and Budget (1973-1995); Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1991a,b; '92a; '94b).

the ban on the exportation of contraceptives lifted. Contraceptives had been on the prohibited list for commodity assistance since 1948. Ravenholt made a recommendation to Administrator Gaud, but he would not approve it. It is ironic, then, that Gaud was directly responsible for having the ban lifted in subsequent months. Gaud suggested that the ban might need to be lifted while he was being questioned about future AID activities during a hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (U.S. House of Representatives 1967). Gaud mentioned lifting the ban as a trial balloon, and no one shot it down. The ban was officially lifted with issuance of an internal memorandum in May 1967 (U.S. AID 1967).

There are at least two ways to interpret this change. One way, perhaps, is to presume that the pressure exerted within AID by Ravenholt had an effect on the AID director. Another way to interpret this is to consider the possibility that Gaud saw the political support in the White House and Congress as a means to insure AID's position within the bureaucracy. Gaud was fearful that Department of Agriculture might play a larger role in distributing foreign aid than AID. This spurred Gaud to call for a "War on Hunger," change the organizational structure of the agency, and elevate the importance of family planning (Piotrow 1973). I believe that both elements were at work in this case.

Structural Policy: Title X to the Foreign Assistance Act

Many population activists viewed the changes by Gaud as window dressing and continued to pressure the bureaucracy to expand family planning programs. In 1967, Elmo Roper (the public opinion analyst) hosted a lunch meeting of twelve Senators including Joseph Clark (D.-PA), J. William Fulbright (D.-AR), and Ernest Gruening (D.-AK). The meeting also included William Draper (who had become an independent lobbyist), who came with a rough draft of legislation that earmarked $50 million for family planning. This meeting led Fulbright to introduce S. 1264, which proposed a new Title X to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that would earmark funds for family planning programs. While he was introducing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967,

Fulbright noted how the actions of AID were running far behind the words of President Johnson and the efforts of Congress:

> Despite last year's mandate from Congress, many statements by President Johnson on the issue, and the success of family planning programs both here and abroad, the Agency for International Development plans to spend only about $10 million this fiscal year on assistance related to population problems. . . . AID officials have not given this problem the high priority it deserves (U.S. Senate 1967, p. 6493).

S. 1264 enjoyed bipartisan support as was evidenced by the co-sponsors of the bill (12 Democrats and 6 Republicans).[4]

Congressional processing of the 1967 Foreign Assistance Act revealed how much had changed from the first one in 1961. Witnesses and members alike had a more conciliatory tone supporting family planning. For example, the Roman Catholic Church backed away from its harsh criticism it had issued in the wake of the Draper Committee. Dr. Louis K. Dupre, a member of the Catholic Committee on Population and Government Policy, argued that the traditional Roman Catholic view portrayed to that point in the hearings was not the only perspective in the Church: "Human procreation is not a lot that befalls a family without planning. . . . One consideration of a more general nature is that one family must not expand beyond the responsibility one owes the family itself and the world" (U.S. House of Representatives 1967, p.36). Even traditional skeptics like Representatives Clement Zablocki (D.-WI) and John Dent (D.-PA) were persuaded to acknowledge that family planning programs were necessary, as long as they were voluntary in nature (Piotrow 1973).

There were some difficulties in passing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967. First, there was the issue of how much money to earmark for family planning. Proposals ranged from Gardner's $100 million, Representative Paul Findley's (R.-IL) $75 million, Draper's $50 million and Gaud's $20 million. The Foreign Relations Committee reported a bill to the House floor with $50 million, but Representative James Fulton (R.-

[4]The co-sponsors were Clifford Case (R.-NJ), Frank Church (D.-ID), Joseph Clark (D.-PA), Peter Dominick (R.-CO), Ernest Gruening (D.-AK), Phillip Hart (D.-MI), Mark Hatfield (R.-OR), Bourke Hickenlooper (R.-IA), Thomas Kuchel (R.-CA) Gale McGee (D.-WY), Lee Metcalf (D.-MT), Wayne Morse (D.-OR), Thurston Morton (R.-KY), Frank Moss (D.-UT), Charles Percy (R.-IL), Joseph Tydings (D.-MD), Ralph Yarborough (D.-TX), and Stephen Young (D.-OH).

PA) was able to pass an amendment that reduced the number to $20 million, when he cited a letter by Gaud to Fulbright that stated any additional amount would be wasted. Second, other members were concerned that the language of the bill was so vague that it allowed money to go to any organization for any purpose in the population field. Finally, there were members of Congress who believed that family planning was not only unnecessary, but that there needed to be between 500 to 750 million Americans to compete with the communist world (Piotrow 1973).

The differences between the House and Senate versions of the bill were worked out in a conference committee. The Senate version earmarked $50 million and allowed AID to issue grants instead of just loans to foreign countries. The final version of the bill split the difference between the Senate and House versions by earmarking $35 million for family planning programs, despite AID's continued objections. The final draft also retained the authority to provide grants (not just loans) to foreign countries, which had originally been a suggestion made by the State Department (Piotrow 1973).

AID Administrator Gaud continued to resist earmarking during the appropriation process for two important reasons. First, Gaud believed that AID was genuinely incapable of spending that much money, despite Ravenholt's bold assertions. Gaud was receiving reports from the AID missions overseas that negotiations between AID and foreign countries would be impossible given the limited timeframe (i.e., between November 14, 1967 and June 30, 1968). Second, Gaud believed that Congress was unjustified in earmarking so much money for population activities when considered in relation to the overall AID budget. The Johnson Administration had requested $243 million for all AID activities but were appropriated only $180 million with 20% going to one purpose (i.e., population activities).

In addition to clear differences of opinion on policy, there seemed to be a clear institutional antagonism between the Congress and AID over how policy was set. Administrator Gaud shared a basic sense of rivalry with the legislative branch. Although Senator Gruening preceded and outlasted HEW Secretary John Gardner in office and Senator Fulbright long preceded . . . Administrator Gaud, neither Gardner nor Gaud would admit the

senators to genuine partnership in setting policy or priority. . . . From an administrator's point of view almost any proposal offered by Congress—aside from providing additional unlimited funds or personnel—represents some restriction of authority or flexibility (Piotrow 1973, p. 140). Despite bureaucratic resistance, political sovereigns used their statutory and fiscal powers to dictate the outcome.

Congressional earmarking of funds had important ramifications on how population policy was set within AID. First, earmarking allowed the population activists within AID to control a significant percentage of the money available. Under normal circumstances, the Office of Procurement within AID would have determined how money was spent (See Organizational Charts 1 & 2 in the Appendix). The Population Service was required to go through an annual budget review, but earmarking rendered the process largely irrelevant (Piotrow 1973). The disbursement of funds flowed through two channels. Some of the funds were disbursed through AID missions in each country, and the rest through programs centrally-funded by the Office of Population (U.S. AID 1971). Second, earmarking funds allowed the Population Service to be able to circumvent some legal and procedural requirements enforced by the Office of Program and Policy Coordination. The development of population policy was hindered, however, by central control over personnel. This circumstance prevented the Population Service from hiring experts in the area. There was an increase in the number of personnel working on population issues, but they were forced to learn on the job. The number increased from 3 in 1965, to 84 in 1968, to 149 by 1972 (Piotrow 1973).

Setting the Structure of IPP

By the end of Johnson's administration, Congress had established a broad mandate for AID to act in the population field. The main task remaining was to transform this broad mandate into an actual plan of action. For his part, Gaud became more responsive to congressional will by issuing a cable to the AID missions abroad:

> It is my purpose to see that the Congressional intent is carried out to the fullest while avoiding any form of coercion. Unusually rapid project and program formulation and action will be necessary. All practicable steps will be taken . . . to facilitate development and approval of projects and programs. . . .

> Assistance can take many forms and be programmed through a variety of non-government as well as government institutions and organizations. Consideration will be given to all proposals for useful action including large-scale activities involving substantial commodity assistance. . . . Adequacy of all key program components, such as demographic data, technical facilities, trained personnel, contraceptive supplies, communication services, and transportation should be ensured. Family planning will be a continuing major preoccupation of AID (Piotrow 1973, p. 150).

The Director of the Population Service, Remiert T. Ravenholt, played a large part in drafting Gaud's cable.

The real credit for developing and articulating the plan of action should go to Ravenholt and his superior, Joel Bernstein. Ravenholt argued that the basic goal of the program would be to "improve the health, well-being, and economic status of the peoples of the developing countries by improving the conditions of human reproduction in these societies" (Ravenholt 1969, p. 125). Achieving this basic goal required several types of actions that were articulated in the early phases of program development. Ravenholt listed six areas of emphasis: 1) project and program grants to qualified non-governmental organizations (NGOs); 2) basic support for university research centers; 3) grants to foreign governments' family planning programs; 4) purchases of commodities, especially contraceptives; 5) contributions to the newly created United Nations Population Fund; and 6) funds for policy evaluation (Ravenholt, 1968).

These activities were further refined between 1970-1971 by Bernstein, who transformed Ravenholt's list of activities into basic programmatic goals. These six basic structural goals are important because they have represented the core of U.S. IPP throughout its existence and are worth delineating here (U.S. AID 1971-1995).[5] The first programmatic goal has been to increase the amount of demographic and social data available. Activities to achieve this goal have included demographic data collection, demographic and economic research and evaluation, family planning program management evaluation, demographic and family planning data and

[5]The accounting and reporting procedures of AID changed during this time frame, so these six goals are not always clearly stated as they were in early reports. A review of the line item budget submissions does reveal, however, the continuity that is being claimed here. This conclusion was reached by tracing the corresponding program numbers from one year to the next after the headings were dropped in 1982 and by categorizing any new programs initiated after 1982.

dissemination, and commercial contraceptive distribution analysis. A good example of data collection was to provide seed money for the World Fertility Survey (WFS) in 1972 and 1973, which sought to carry out nationally representative, internationally comparable sample surveys of human fertility (U.S. AID 1973).

The second goal has been to develop adequate population policies. AID has worked with other countries through four stages of population policy development: pro-natalist, start-up, intermediate, and self-sustaining. The U.S. developed various actions to fulfill this goal. AID has disseminated information to decision makers on the negative effects of rapid population growth to stimulate action. AID provided funds to study and publicize information on the social and economic determinants of fertility. The U.S. funded research to study the status and implications of laws bearing on family planning. Various country studies and conferences were financed to further understanding of population policies (U.S. House of Representatives 1978a).

The third goal of U.S. IPP has been to improve the means of fertility control. AID has been actively involved in developing new means of fertility control that are appropriate for developing countries. Efforts in this area have led to numerous advances in contraceptive technology including safer and more effective sterilization procedures, low-dose oral contraceptives, vaginal contraceptives, improved intrauterine devices (IUDs), subdermal implants, progesterone-only contraceptives for lactating women, several barrier methods, and improved natural family planning. This goal has also included studies to test the safety, effectiveness, and acceptability of these various methods (U.S. AID 1989).

The fourth goal has been to develop systems for delivering family planning services. The goal seeks to ensure adequate availability of contraceptives and program services, promote the development of improved delivery systems for family planning supplies and services, and provide technical consultation in problem areas. To achieve this goal AID has bought contraceptives and provided other services through grants to NGOs like the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), the Pathfinder Fund (PF), and the Association for Voluntary Sterilization (AVS). Funds have been provided to the IPPF and used to operate family planning clinics, distribute contraceptives, and train program personnel and the public. The Pathfinder Fund has been

active in helping to establish family planning programs in numerous countries. Finally the Association for Voluntary Sterilization has promoted the idea of sterilization and provided training and equipment for safe procedures. Sterilization has been one of the most popular methods of fertility control (U.S. House of Representatives 1978a).

The fifth goal has been to develop adequate information, education and communication (IEC) programs. IEC activities have been designed to expand public knowledge and interest concerning the problems of high rates of population growth, stimulate program action, and to provide information on family planning methods and program services. AID has used radio, television, posters, pamphlets, newspaper articles, and films to spread the word about family planning. Educational curricula have been developed and disseminated widely. Funding for IEC programs has been channeled through numerous sources like the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), IPPF, East-West Institute, and the International Confederation of Midwives (U.S. House of Representatives 1978a).

The final goal of U.S. IPP has been to develop adequate manpower and institutions. A large amount of the funds for this goal have been disbursed to universities, public and private organizations, and other organizations to train professionals in areas related to family planning. For example, the Johns Hopkins Program for International Education in Gynecology has provided training for obstetricians, gynecologists, and other surgically qualified physicians (U.S. House of Representatives 1978). Literally tens of thousands of midwives, nurses, physicians, health educators, and community workers have received training as a result of the efforts to achieve this goal (U.S. AID 1989).

Population Policy Under Nixon

Strategic Policy: The Nixon Doctrine

The election of Richard Nixon in 1968 initiated a process to establish new relations between the actors in the policy process. Clearly, Nixon had larger issues looming than population, notably the Vietnam War. This was a period of loosened bipolarity, détente, and balance of payments deficits. These factors led Nixon and his

foreign policy staff to hold different international outlooks and priorities from their predecessors. The Nixon Doctrine represented the basic foreign policy strategy of the administration. The doctrine argued that the U.S. could no longer afford the luxury of being everything to everybody, but would continue to play a significant role in world affairs (Nixon 1971). The Nixon Doctrine was a call for greater self-help by other countries and a more selective disbursement of foreign aid. The Nixon Doctrine inevitably led to changes in foreign aid.

Population activists, namely William Draper and John Rockefeller, were searching for channels to the President's ear. These channels were gained through Nixon's chief domestic affairs adviser, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and the new AID Director, Dr. John Hannah. Moynihan led the charge to get the federal government to do more at the domestic level. There was a flurry of activity at the domestic level, including bills in Congress to do things like create a population institute in the National Institute of Health, a National Center for Family Planning in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and other actions authorizing nearly one billion dollars in expenditures (Piotrow 1973). The U.S. also devised a plan to stabilize the domestic population through voluntary means (U.S. Senate 1971). The actions in the domestic arena helped to keep IPP high on the government's agenda.

There were several indications that IPP would be emphasized in the foreign aid program, but transformed in light of the Nixon Doctrine. For example, the first public expression of Nixon's views on foreign aid came with the Presidential Message on Foreign Aid. The message emphasized innovative technical assistance in the areas of agriculture, education, and family planning. Hannah had a great deal of influence on the President's statements on foreign aid. Hannah argued that development required institution building with an eye on alleviating social problems, coupled with long-term economic plans and capital development. The government's role was to facilitate these activities by promoting the work of the UN, universities, qualified NGOs, and private businesses dealing with this issue (Piotrow 1973). The Nixon Doctrine shaped the early growth of IPP in a couple of ways. First, it reaffirmed the importance of family planning within the foreign aid program. The limiting focus of the Nixon Doctrine was clearly evident in the direction of the foreign aid program. Second, the

doctrine meant that the U.S. government would not be in the business of directly providing foreign aid, but would be active by assisting the various organizations that were.

Another indication of the strategic emphasis placed on IPP was the structural reorganization that occurred in 1969. The Population Service was upgraded to the Population Office. The Population Office was placed under a new Bureau for Technical Assistance that replaced the Office of the War on Hunger (See organizational chart 1). Upgrading the Population Service to the Population Office meant that there would be additional personnel assigned to the problem. The number of AID personnel working on population issues grew from 50 in 1968 to 84 in 1969 and 144 in 1970 (Piotrow 1973).

The final indication that IPP would be emphasized was the President's first message on population issued on July 18, 1969. The message emphasized that population growth was an issue that could not be ignored, both in its domestic and international aspects. In terms of foreign policy, Nixon noted that the U.S had a responsibility to provide leadership and praised the earlier efforts of AID. The message also echoed the themes established by the Nixon Doctrine:

> I have asked the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development to give population and family planning high priority for attention, personnel, research and funding among our several aid programs. . . . It would be unrealistic for the Federal Government alone to shoulder the entire burden. . . . our programs should give further recognition to the important resources of private organizations and university research centers. . . . It is our belief that the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and other international bodies should take the leadership in responding to world population growth (U. S. Department of State 1969).

Consequently, the Nixon Doctrine represented the cornerstone of U.S. strategic policy, which, in turn, shaped the general direction of foreign aid during this period. Population issues would be a priority, but within a period of retrenchment.

Strategic Policy: The Peterson Report

International population policy was caught between the Nixon Doctrine and congressional calls for an entire reexamination of foreign aid. Both the Democratically held House and Senate increasingly challenged the President over Vietnam. It is important to remember that Vietnam was absorbing a substantial proportion of the total foreign aid budget. Nicholas Eberstadt (1988) notes that AID became intimately linked to Vietnam through its participation in the 'strategic hamlet' and 'civilian relocation' programs. "As distrust between the executive and legislative branches deepened over the conduct of the war, foreign aid became a battleground for a most unfortunate sort of guerrilla warfare. Frustrated by the direction of foreign policy in general, Congress resolved to restrict the government's ability to move economic policy in any direction whatsoever" (Eberstadt 1988, pp. 35-36). Congressional critics of foreign aid came in two forms during this period, Democrats who opposed the war, and Republicans who believed that foreign aid was a waste of money. These forces, combined with his own doctrine, led Nixon to agree to a full review of the aid program in the form of the Peterson Task Force on International Development in 1969.

The Peterson Task Force released its report in March 1970. The report had six recommendations that would radically transform foreign aid. The task force advocated that (1) developing countries should be allowed to establish their own priorities, (2) multilateral lending institutions should be primary channels for development assistance, (3) development and military assistance programs should be separated, (4) private sector initiatives should be expanded, (5) greater popular participation should be encouraged, and (6) the negative trend in foreign assistance should be reversed. The Peterson report also recommended the abolishment of AID and the creation of three new institutions. The International Development Bank would handle development loans, the International Development Institute would provide technical assistance and conduct research, and the International Development Council would coordinate trade, investment and financial policy (Ruttan 1996). This

report marked a significant departure from the previous foreign aid strategy that emphasized aid for general purposes. Foreign aid would now be focused on meeting basic human needs of developing countries.[6]

Efforts were made to implement the Peterson report, but it was easier to develop the strategies than it was to implement the structural components it outlined. Nixon used the report as the basis for two draft bills (the International Development and Humanitarian Assistance Act and the International Security Assistance Act) that were sent to Congress in April 1971 (Ruttan 1996). The legislation barely got out of the starting blocks because it came very late in the fiscal year. AID was opposed to the proposals and had no incentive to lobby for the bills. The Oval Office did little to promote the legislation, so it is no surprise that the House Foreign Affairs Committee only partially reviewed the bills, and the Senate gave them even less consideration (Piotrow 1973 and Ruttan 1996).

The findings of the Peterson report were rehashed by AID's director and resubmitted the following year. In addition, members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee were urging the President to make changes in the foreign aid program. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 incorporated many elements of the Peterson report. For example, the act transformed the foreign aid program from providing general development assistance to focused aid that emphasized meeting the basic human needs of people. Some provisions of the bill were dropped, like changing AID's name and the creation of an Export Development Credit Fund, but it was passed by the legislature and signed into law. In terms of IPP, the legislation further enhanced the stature of population activities by creating a separate Bureau for Population and Humanitarian Assistance (Ruttan 1996; Piotrow 1973; and U.S. Department of State 1972a)(see Organizational Chart 6 in the Appendix and Figure 4.4 in Chapter 4).

Structural Policy: Title X Funding

The issue of earmarking money for population programs continued during the Nixon Administration. To keep in line with the Nixon Doctrine, the overall AID budget was shrinking, which placed pressure on Hannah to

[6]This is called 'New Directions' within government circles and the 'Basic Human Needs Mandate' among academics.

resist continued earmarking under Title X. Thus, Hannah offered an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act in 1969 that would have eliminated Title X earmarking. The resistance was not well received by activists like Draper, or by Congress. For example, Senator Fulbright pressed Secretary of State William Rogers and Hannah on the issue during the Senate authorization hearings:

> The Chairman. General Draper and his associates are very disturbed by the fact that although you give lipservice-you say you are interested-you actually have changed the provision in the bill, which was mandatory . . . and now it is permissive.
>
> . . . Do you object to it being changed back to the same kind of language we had, or not?
>
> Secretary Rogers. No, we will not object. . .
>
> The Chairman. . . . the bureaucracy does not always agree with the Secretary once the bill has passed. Unless there is an inducement to implement the program, even the Secretary of State does not always get his way within the department, I dare say . . .
>
> Secretary Rogers. I am doing better than I thought I would (U. S. Senate 1969, pp. 71-72).

The issue did reach the President's attention and undermined efforts within AID to resist Title X earmarking. In a memorandum to Secretary Rogers, Moynihan indicated that Congressman Robert Taft (R.-OH) had raised the issue to Nixon during a briefing on population issues.

> The President thereupon said, 'As far as I'm concerned, I am for earmarking.' Throughout the briefing the President indicated that this subject has his strongest support. In repeated comments and interventions, he made clear that he sees little progress for the world if we do not seriously attend to the issue . . . (Piotrow 1973, p. 169).

With the issue of earmarking settled again, attention turned to funding levels. On the House side, Taft was able to gain support for an amendment earmarking $100 million dollars for fiscal year (FY) 1970. The House Foreign Affairs Committee later agreed to a two-year $100 million authorization that was passed by the full House. The Senate version of the bill was a one-year authorization at $100 million. The conference

committee reconciled the two bills by authorizing the first two-year earmarking for population activities, $75 million for 1970, and $100 million for 1971. There were provisions to increase staffing and appoint an assistant administrator for population, but they were dropped (Piotrow 1973).

Earmarking was again an issue when the question of funding came up for FY 1972. AID officials again tried to end Title X because Congress was calling for further cutbacks elsewhere in foreign aid. AID received some support, but they were not able to hold sway over the issue. On the House side, Pierre DuPont IV (R.-DE) succeeded in gaining a motion to earmark $125 million for 1972. On the Senate side, Republican Foreign Affairs Committee members passed a motion to end earmarking, but this was later overturned by a successful floor amendment offered by Senator Robert Taft which restored Title X language and earmarked $125 million for 1972 (Piotrow 1973).

It seemed that AID and Title X were assured of another year, but the entire foreign aid bill was rejected in the Senate over issues related to military assistance and the Vietnam War. AID was forced to function on continuing resolutions and could not obligate any new money for about a month. The next Senate foreign aid bill maintained the $125 million earmarked for population activities, but AID was able to persuade Robert Packwood (R.-OR) to offer an amendment to end earmarking. There was a brief debate in which significant support was recorded for earmarking. The vote was 50 to 33 in favor of Title X funding.[7] Problems continued during the appropriation process. The House Appropriations Subcommittee cut the population funds to $50 million. The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, chaired by William Proxmire (D.-WI), supported the $125 million figure. The conference committee agreed to the Senate version that guaranteed the earmarked funds. This was the first separate appropriation of money for population activities, which meant that AID would not be forced to use funds authorized for other purposes to pay for IPPs (Piotrow 1973).

By 1972, IPP had gained an important status within AID. "Where once a birth control program had seemed to threaten the life of the agency, by 1972 that very program seemed the only popular activity in the

[7]The authorizing legislation was for FY 1972 and FY 1973. The legislation earmarked $125 million for both years.

agency, untinged by partisan conflict and unrelated to controversial military and economic problems" (Piotrow 1973, p. 185). Even though Congress separately appropriated money for population, the overall AID budget continued to decline. The cutbacks that came forced AID to reorganize, which raised the status of the Population Office again. The reorganization was important to the Population Office, because it gave the office greater control over the budget process within AID and the regional population staff assigned to population activities. The elevated status of the Population Office was recognized through a meritorious unit citation that acknowledged the vigorous, effective, and positive leadership of the office (Piotrow 1973).

In 1973, Congress established a new budget process for AID funding. In previous years, AID funding was based on broad categories such as "technical assistance", "development loans", and "Alliance for Progress." The new budget was based on functional categories, among them including "health and population activities." The House version appropriated only $125 of the $145 million authorized for health and population activities (U.S. House of Representatives 1973a).[8] The Senate version of the appropriations bill restored the full authorization, but the number was reduced to $135 million in the conference report that passed both houses of Congress (U.S. Senate 1973).

Structural Policy: The Helms Amendment of 1973

The matter of abortion became an issue within the IPP domain in 1973. Senator Jesse Helms (R.-NC) offered an amendment to the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act restricting international population funds from being used for abortions. Helms argued that Ravenholt was advocating the use of money to research abortion methods and that the restriction would place IPP on a par with domestic laws. The original amendment was offered in a bill (S. 2335) that did not go to conference. Senator Helms obtained unanimous consent to vacate a roll call vote after receiving assurances from Hubert Humphrey (D.-MN) that the Democrats supported the amendment and he would vigorously pursue the matter in conference. However, the final language of the amendment was much

[8]The category does not distinguish between population and health activities, which makes it impossible to clearly state how much money is being appropriated specifically for population activities. The best source of information on population funds can be found in Table 2.2.

shorter and more ambiguous than in the original. The original amendment read: "None of the funds made available to carry out this part shall be used in any manner, directly or indirectly, to pay for abortions, abortifacent drugs, or devices, the promotion of the practice abortion, or the support of research designed to develop methods of abortion" (U.S. House of Representatives 1973b, p. 32292). Instead the final wording read: "None of the funds made available to carry out this part shall be used to pay for the performance of abortion as a method of family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions" (Statutes at Large 1973a, p. 716). Despite receiving further assurances that the language was sufficient, in practice the language allowed AID to fund organizations, like the IPPF, that funded abortions abroad, as long as the money was kept in separate accounts.

Structural Policy: The UN Fund for Population Activities

The Nixon Doctrine led to an increased emphasis by the United States on multilateral efforts to deal with the population issue. One way to achieve this goal was through the UN, which had been involved in the issue from its inception. Programmatic development within the UN mirrored the pace of the activities occurring in the United States. For example, the Population Branch within the Secretariat was upgraded to division level in 1966. Twenty-five states offered and were able to unanimously pass Resolution 2211 in the General Assembly calling for more action in this area. The major sticking point for the financially strapped UN was to find revenue for these activities. The UN had only a limited number of funds to deal with development issues, which made it difficult for the organization to increase population activities without taking money from some other area of the UN Development Program (UNDP) (Symonds and Carder, 1973).

The U.S. was instrumental in the creation and expansion of the UN Fund for Population Activities. First, the U.S. was a sponsor of Resolution 2211 that created the fund. The Coale-Hoover thesis had already influenced the Johnson Administration and played a role in American sponsorship of the UN Population Trust Fund in 1967. Second, political activists like William Draper publicized multilateral approaches during congressional hearings in 1967 (Piotrow 1973). A discussion panel of the United Nations Association of the

USA (UNA) issued a report that called for the expansion of the trust fund and the creation of a Population Commissioner within the UNDP.[9] Third, the passage of Title X funding created a need within the Population Office to find ways to disburse these funds to justify the initiation and expansion of IPP. Clearly the UN was an important avenue for people like Ravenholt to disburse these funds. By 1969 the U.S. began to provide large sums of money for UN population efforts. This infusion of revenue prompted UN officials to respond by transforming the Population Trust Fund into the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) under the direction of the UNDP as suggested by the UNA. The Nixon Administration was instrumental in initiating the UNFPA because it conformed to the Nixon Doctrine. During the Nixon years (1969-1974) the U.S. provided $76.5 million dollars to the fund (USAID 1973; 1976).

Strategic Policy: The UN World Population Conference

The U.S. was also instrumental in gaining international attention for family planning by prompting the UN to declare 1974 as World Population Year. In 1970, the U.S. delegation worked through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to propose a resolution designating a World Population Year (Symonds and Carder 1973). The proposal received a mixed reception in the General Assembly that reflected the growing North-South division; the South came to be represented by the Group of 77 within the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and other bodies. The Group of 77 increasingly rejected the postwar economic order and called for a redistribution of economic resources that favored the South (Krasner 1985). This same group looked suspiciously upon calls by developed countries to control the populations of the developing countries. Delegates from Senegal and Chile suggested that the population problem was a ploy by the developed world to ease their guilt of not providing enough development aid. A lot of the opposition was aimed at recent statements made by Robert McNamara, the President of the World Bank, who argued that the population explosion was a "drag" on economic development. Many delegates argued that their countries were underpopulated, and offered

[9]The panel included a Who's Who of activists, academics and government officials. John D. Rockefeller III was the chair and George Woods, former President of the World Bank, the vice-chair. The other panelists were: David Bell, who had moved on to the Ford Foundation, Ansley Coale, Frank Notestein, and Richard Gardner, noted academics, William Rogers, Secretary of State under Nixon,

various modifications to the resolution. The measure did pass 53 votes to 9, but there were 33 abstentions (Symonds and Carder 1973).

As part of the World Population Year, the UN planned a World Population Conference to be held in Bucharest, Romania. The purpose of the conference, held in August, was to gather governmental leaders to review and make recommendations on world population issues (USAID 1973). The Nixon Administration supported the conference in several ways. First, the U.S. provided a substantial portion of the money given to the UNFPA that funded the conference. Second, high level support was given from the President down through the UN delegation. The UN ambassador, George Bush, also emphasized the importance of and U.S. support for the conference when he spoke to the General Assembly (U.S. Department of State 1972b). For his part, Nixon issued Executive Order #11763 that established a National Commission for the Observance of World Population Year. The commission's purpose was to "create within the U.S. a better understanding of the causes, nature, scope, and consequences of the problem of population growth" (U.S. Department of State, 1973, p. 153). It is not clear what the commission accomplished, but the government did publish a pamphlet to bring public attention to World Population Year and the conference.[10] The pamphlet highlighted the problem and responses by the UN and the United States. The pamphlet concluded by offering advice on how to ameliorate the problem to educational institutions, professional organizations, the media and individuals (U.S. Department of State 1974a).

Table 2.3 **World Population**

Year	Mid-Year Population	Avg. Annual Growth Rate	Avg. Annual Change
1965	3,345,410,699	2.07	40,623,555
1974	4,012,917,169	1.81	73,474,190

There were no hearings regarding the composition and positions of the U.S. delegation to the World Population Conference. Some concerns were raised about the lack of discussion during hearings for the November World Food Conference in Rome, but there was little controversy in Congress over the issue (U.S.

David Hannah, AID Director, and William Thorp, former chairman of the Development and Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

House of Representatives 1974a). A review of the Congressional Record did not show any signs that Congress was perturbed by the seeming lack of consultation. Perhaps this is because there was a general consensus between Congress and the President.[11] If so, then Congress was willing to let the President set the strategic positions of the delegation without interference. There was overall support for the conference expressed by members that spoke about the conference. Representative John Dent (D.-PA) did enter a position paper by the U.S. Coalition for Life that was very critical of the conference.[12] The paper argued that population growth was necessary for economic growth. Population control would lead to economic stagnation, promoted "all manners of sexual deviations", implied that sex was only for "fun and recreation", and promoted abortion (U.S. House of Representatives 1974b, p. 16221). The U.S. delegation contained several important administration officials and members of Congress.[13] The Secretary of HEW, Caspar Weinberger, headed the delegation to Bucharest. Other members of the delegation included Philander Claxton from the State Department, Russell Peterson from the Council on Environmental Quality, Christian Herter, Jr. who was the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Environmental Affairs, and Senator Charles Percy (U.S. Department of State 1974; U.S. Senate 1974a).

The tone of the conference reflected the divisions in the world at the time. Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu opened the conference that was attended by 135 countries. Ceausescu stressed national sovereignty in determining population policies by stating that, "every country has the right to promote that demographic policy and measures that it considers most suitable, consonant with its national interests, without any outside interference" (NYT 1974a, p. 1). Romania's position was not surprising given its extreme pro-natalist policies (Bereslon 1988b). Developing countries questioned the efficacy and advocacy of the conference. The

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[10]In fact, the commission was not convened until the year was more than half over (July). Sen. Charles H. Percy (R.-IL.) expressed that he had concerns that the U.S. was not doing enough, but changed his mind as the conference drew near (see U.S. Senate, 1974).

[11]The administration may have also been preoccupied with Watergate. Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974. This could also explain why the delegation to the conference was announced so late.

[12]Dent said that he did not necessarily agree with everything in the position paper, but thought it was important to include in the dialogue.

[13]A list of the entire delegation could not be found. The Department of State did issue press release 327 on August 9, 1974, but it was not published.

Argentinean delegation questioned the premise of the Coale-Hoover thesis, and the Indian delegation argued that fertility control would be superfluous if the developed countries continued to promote "superconsumerism" that wasted natural resources (NYT 1974b). Communist countries like China and the Soviet Union denounced the West's concerns about overpopulation as an "imperialist myth" that served the purposes of neocolonialism (NYT 1974c).

The main product of the World Population Conference was the Plan of Action. The action plan was based upon fifteen principles and eight objectives, and reflected the turmoil at the conference. The principles and objectives of the plan were broadly phrased in order to gain wide acceptance. One principle of the plan argued that the aim of social and economic development was to improve the quality of life of the people. Another principle noted the interrelationship between population and development as outlined by the Coale-Hoover thesis. The family was portrayed as the basic unit of society. In terms of family planning:

> All couples and individuals have the basic right to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education and means to do so; the responsibility of couples and individuals in the exercise of this right takes into account the needs of their living and future children, and their responsibility towards the community (UN 1974, p. 77). [14]

The plan also stressed the right of women to "complete integration" in the development process through equal access to educational, social, economic and political resources. The action plan even reflected the calls by members of the Group of 77 for developed countries to adopt population, consumption, and investment policies that were more mindful of international equity. In terms of recommendations, the plan did not set specific targets for population growth rates, but there were specific targets for infant mortality and life expectancy levels (UN 1974). Population activists like William Draper and government officials like Philander Claxton made efforts to get firm targets established (2 percent growth in the developing countries and .6 percent growth in the

[14]There seems to be a contradiction between the right of individuals to decide freely the size of their families and their responsibility to their progeny and the rest of the community. It seems that some communities (i.e., governments) have made the determination that a family's responsibility to the rest of society outweighs an individual's right to determine his/her own family size. This may account for some of the coercive policies that have been reported in countries like India, China, and Peru.

developed countries by 1985), but they were unsuccessful, and were viewed by some as being counterproductive (Donaldson 1990). The action plan also made recommendations in the areas of migration, data collection and research, training and education (UN 1974).

Population Policy Under Ford

Strategic Policy: Continuing the Nixon Doctrine

The ascendancy of Gerald Ford to the presidency, following the Watergate scandal, did little to change the overall thrust of U.S. IPP. The deteriorating economic situation in the U.S. and a consensus on population policy prevented any changes in the strategies relating to IPP. There were no major changes in the composition of the President's foreign policy staff, and Ford was a supporter of the consensus surrounding international population activities. President Ford's message to the World Population Conference stated that rapid population growth would "remain one of our primary mutual concerns for the remainder of this century" (U.S. Department of State 1974c). Other top officials like Henry Kissinger argued that Ford's foreign aid programs emphasized a multilateral approach by funneling money to institutions like the IMF, the IDA, and the UNDP (U.S. Department of State 1975a). These factors accounted for the continuation of the Nixon Doctrine and the Basic Human Needs Mandate during Ford's tenure.

Structural Policy: Control of the Foreign Aid Budget

The struggle for control over governmental priorities between Congress and the President, caused by the Vietnam War and Watergate, was fought on many levels, including foreign aid. The issue came to a head over the foreign appropriations for FY 1974. The House worked on H.R. 17234 that appropriated $150 million for health and population activities, and the Senate version (S. 3394) earmarked $130 million. Most of the action occurred in the Senate, where an amendment was passed raising the appropriation to $150 million. There was a flurry of other amendments offered that substantially changed the legislation drafted by the Committee on Foreign Relations. Many of the amendments dealt with the beleaguered military assistance program. The first effort to recommit the bill failed, but the speech by Frank Church (R.-ID) assured its recommital. Senator

Church argued that "as presently constituted, the foreign aid program acts not only as a drain on American resources and tax dollars, weakening our own country, but also in many cases as an impediment to the positive political and economic evolution of the very countries it is alleged to assist" (U.S. Senate 1974b, 33525). Church argued that the U.S. should expend its foreign aid primarily through multilateral institutions like the UNDP, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the International Development Association (IDA). Congress did pass legislation authorizing $145 million for population activities in December, but no appropriations bill was passed (U.S. House of Representatives 1974c; U.S. Senate 1974c). Congress' inability to pass a foreign aid appropriations bill forced AID to rely on continuing resolutions for its survival in Ford's first year.

The 1974 elections substantially changed the composition and outlook of the Congress. The Democrats added 43 seats in the House and 4 seats in the Senate. The freshman class in the House was unusually large with 92 new members. The new Congress constantly challenged the President, especially in foreign affairs. Efforts to pass foreign aid legislation for FY 1975 were beset with controversy. The House passed H.R. 4592 (212 to 201) that appropriated $3.5 billion for foreign aid, which was $2.5 billion less than Ford had requested and even less than funds disbursed through continuing resolutions. The bill reduced funding for health and population activities to $115 million after a voice vote struck down an amendment that would have restored the authorized funding (U.S. House of Representatives 1975a). On the Senate side, the Appropriations Committee recommended $130 million for health and population activities. The report of the committee also contained an amendment that increased the amount to $145 million and was agreed to by the full Senate. The Conference Committee that met to reconcile the two versions of H. R. 4592 compromised and set the final appropriation at $125 million (U.S. House of Representatives 1975b). President Ford signed the bill, but was not happy about the outcome. "I have signed H. R. 4592 with considerable misgivings. The considerable reductions in overseas assistance programs could prove detrimental to American interests at home and abroad. . . . The significant

reduction in population planning funds will hamper initiatives related to this important factor in the long-term global food and health situation" (U.S. Department of State, 1975b, p. 512).

Political forces battled over the foreign aid budget again in FY 1976. There were several authorization bills offered in the Senate (S. 2977, S. 3331, and S. 3461), but all of them languished in the Foreign Relations Committee (U.S. Senate 1976). Congress was able to pass authorizing legislation in May, but President Ford vetoed it. The House had to waive the rules in order to consider the foreign aid appropriations bill for FY 1976 (H. R. 12203). The bill, which passed 214 to 152, placed a ceiling of $135 million for population activities, but members like Stephen Solarz (D.-NY) were disappointed that the figure was not higher. The measure also included a section that prohibited AID from obligating funds unless it notified the House and Senate Appropriations Committee fifteen days in advance. The section was removed when John Buchanan (R.-AL) objected to the provision under House Rule XXI that prohibits legislation in an appropriations bill (U.S. House of Representatives 1976a). The Senate version earmarked not less than $105 million for population activities. The Conference Committee report that was passed by both Houses contained $146 million for health and population activities, of which not less than $103 million dollars were to be earmarked for IPP. It is important to note that the budget process was changing in FY 1976 and included a transition quarter so that the fiscal year would run from October 1-September 30 instead of July 1-June 30. If the funds for the transition quarter are added to the rest of FY 1976 the sum for IPP was actually $134 million (U.S. House of Representatives, 1976b).

The 94th Congress was hard pressed to pass two appropriations for foreign aid in 1976. The House began consideration of the foreign aid bill (H.R. 14260) for FY 1977 in June 1976, which was before the conference report for FY 1976 had been enacted into law. The bill earmarked $200 million for population and health programs (U.S. House of Representatives 1976c). During the deliberations in the House, Clarence Miller (R.-OH) offered an amendment that would have reduced non-mandated expenditures between five and ten percent. A five-percent reduction would have equaled nearly $250 million dollars, which was on top of the $551 million already cut from the President's request by the House Appropriations Committee. The amendment was

defeated, but by a fairly close margin (214 to 187) (U.S. House of Representatives 1976d). The Senate version of the bill contained $320 million dollars in amendments, offered by the President, that were not considered by the House when it passed H. R. 14260. The total difference between the two versions of the bill was more than half a billion dollars. The Senate bill included a proposal for $228 million for health and population (U.S. Senate 1976). The conference report that was agreed to split the difference between the two versions of the bill and appropriated $214 million for health and population activities (U.S. House of Representatives 1976e).

Conclusion

The transformation of the population issue into a matter of public policy exemplifies many of the theoretical elements discussed in Chapter One. First, a couple of non-institutional factors combined to make the establishment of an international population policy possible. The first factor was the increasing technical capacity to control fertility. The second factor was the confluence of important political actors within Congress, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, and interest groups. The second element exemplified was the partisan turnover of the Presidency vis-a-vis the Congress. International population policy was initiated at a time when a single political party dominated Congress and the White House. The rancor that affected the AID budget process in the Nixon and Ford Administrations came during a period of divided government. Finally, the bureaucracy was resistant to change and sought to maintain as much freedom of action as possible (e.g., Title X funding). AID was able to shape the development of the program by setting concrete policy initiatives to deal with the issue. The consensus that grew around limiting population growth established a policy subsystem with strong support that translated into marked growth in the IPP budget. Chapter Three will show how an active minority was able to influence the IPP agenda and challenge this consensus.

3
U.S. International Population Policy
From Carter to Clinton: Cracks in the Consensus

There is a cracking sound in the political atmosphere:
the sound of consensus breaking up.
(Anthony Sampson: British Labour Politician)

Population Policy Under Carter

Strategic Policy: The Basic Human Needs Mandate Continues

President Carter's administration supported the consensus that had developed around IPP. Statements made by Carter and other government officials demonstrate that the basic human needs strategy was continued into the late 1970s. Early in his administration, Carter emphasized the role population growth was having on the environment, food shortages and economic development.

> Rapid population growth is a major environmental problem of world dimensions . . . Without controlling the growth of population, the prospects for enough food, shelter, and other basic needs for all the world's people are dim. Where existence is already poor and precarious, efforts to obtain the necessities of life often degrade the environment for generations to come. . . . [The U.S. stands] ready to cooperate through international organizations, through private voluntary organizations, or through direct contacts with other governments (U.S. President 1977, p. 972).

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance emphasized the Basic Human Needs Mandate when he spoke about foreign aid. During a speech before the Asia Society of New York, Vance argued that the U.S. was continuing its lead role in meeting the basic human needs of people. These needs were being met through programs designed to foster development in the rural areas of the Third World, increase food production, nutrition levels, preventive medicine, human rights, family planning, prenatal care, education, and female involvement (U.S. Department of State 1977). Vance followed this speech up by telling the diplomatic corps that the U.S. would expand its international population programs (U.S. Department of State 1978a).

The Global 2000 Report to the President was an important strategic document produced during the Carter Administration. Carter directed the Council on Environmental Quality and the Department of State and other agencies[1] to conduct a study of the "probable changes in the world's population, natural resources, and environment through the end of the century" (Council on Environmental Quality and the Department of State 1980 (CEQ)). The Global 2000 Report painted a bleak picture of the future: "Already the populations in sub-Saharan Africa and in the Himalayan hills of Asia have exceeded the carrying capacity of the immediate area, triggering an erosion of the land's capacity to support life . . . Unless this circle of interlinked problems is broken soon, population growth in such areas will unfortunately be slowed for reasons other than declining birth rates" (CEQ 1980, p. 3). The report concluded that the world in 2000 would have severe water shortages, forty percent less forest cover in the LDCs, serious deterioration in agricultural soils, a polluted atmosphere, and increased rate of animal and plant extinction. The report urged vigorous actions in line with the basic human needs mandate to achieve sustainable development (CEQ 1980).

Structural Policy: Cracks in the Consensus

The Carter Administration attempted to back up its public pronouncements regarding the basic human needs mandate by requesting more foreign aid funds for FY 1978. It is ironic that Carter requested fewer IPP funds, despite requesting more overall foreign aid. Carter requested only $177 million for population programs, as opposed to Ford's last request of $275 million for FY 1977 (Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 1977; 1978).[2] The economy was still in good shape relative to the downturn that came late in 1978, so it is not the explanation. One possible explanation is that Congress appropriated more money than AID could spend in FY 1977. Congress appropriated $214 million for FY 1977, which was a substantial increase over the $134 million for FY 1976. In FY 1978, the House authorized $181 million and the Senate authorized $160 million. The

[1]The federal departments and agencies included the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, and the Interior, AID, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Environmental Protections Agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Science Foundation, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

[2]The U.S. government began distinguishing between health and population programs in FY 1978. See footnote 7.

Conference Committee agreed to $167 million and the sum was accepted by the full House and Senate (U.S. House of Representatives 1977a; 1977b). The amount was again reduced to $160.6 million in the House and $155 million in the Senate during the appropriation phase of the 1978 budget. The Conference Committee accepted the Senate version, so the appropriation was $22 million less than the administration requested and $59 million less than was appropriated in FY 1977 (U.S. House of Representatives 1977c).

There were other notable developments in IPP in 1977. The first deals with an amendment to H. R. 6714 offered by Robert Young (D.-MO) that prohibited the U.S. from providing any funds for sterilizations. The amendment was offered in the wake of reports that India was forcing its people to be sterilized. Paul Findley (R.-IL) offered a substitute amendment that prohibited funds for involuntary sterilizations. The language of the Findley amendment was adopted 255 to 158 (U.S. House of Representatives 1977a). A second development was the introduction of two bills (H. R. 1566 and H. R. 2917), which restricted U.S. population assistance to countries that did not make "reasonable and productive efforts" in family planning. Both bills were referred to the House Committee on International Relations where they died (U.S. House of Representatives 1977d).

Congressional hearings in 1977 also began to challenge the consensus that had developed regarding population policies. The population panel was highly critical of U.S. IPP and the Population Office. First, Dr. Kingsley Davis, Chairman of International Population and Urban Research at U.C. Berkeley, argued that the U.S. international population policy was too simplistic because it almost exclusively emphasized family planning. "In other words, as the sole approach to birth-rate reduction, family planning overlooks the positive incentives for having children--incentives built into existing social structures. To offer people contraceptives and tell them that small families are better will fall on deaf ears unless changing conditions have already produced disincentives for large families, but in that case it is changed conditions, not the policy, that has induced couples to lower their fertility--and it is precisely the purpose of deliberate policy to avoid the slow and wasteful procedure of waiting for social and economic conditions to do the job" (U.S. House of Representatives

1977d, p. 367). Dr. Justin Blackwelder of the Environmental Fund was also critical of the population program for lacking specific goals to limit population growth.

The congressional panel even rebuked the leadership in the Population Office:

Mr. Long. Do you feel that the population planning leadership that we are now providing is the proper leadership, or should it be changed?

Dr. Tinker. I think it was Dr. Ravenholt. Ravenholt is there still. I am talking about Dr. Ravenholt.

Mr. Blackwelder. He is indestructible.

Mr. Long. Could you explain that?

Mr. Blackwelder. The fact that he is there I would say pretty well explains it. The Congress some years ago decided that there should be an Inspector General of Foreign Assistance, you may remember, and Webster Todd, I believe was the first one. Webster Todd's report in short order was indicative of his work done in the population division and was nonsense. But, you notice, Webster Todd is not there anymore. Ravenholt is there.

Mr. Long. I have had some experience of my own in the area of demography. Dr. Ravenholt presented a series of charts to this committee that were to be evidence that this population program was working.

Never in my life have I seen such an incompetent performance than was put on by Dr. Ravenholt that day. I should hope that we could get some better leadership for this program.

Dr. Tinker. I would just like to say that I think his weaknesses were his strengths when he started the program, and I think that in 1960 the kind of single-minded focus which I am afraid he continues was probably the only way to get the population program going (U.S. House of Representatives 1977d, pp. 401-402).

The panel concluded that substantial changes were necessary to justify any increases in IPP. Dr. Irene Tinker of the American Association for the Advancement of Science argued that increasing women's literacy should be

stressed to give women more control over their lives. Dr. Blackwelder argued funds should only go to countries that were serious about population control (U.S. House of Representatives 1977d).

Structural Policy: Bureaucratic Reorganization

The most important development in IPP, however, was the reorganization of population programs that occurred in November 1977. The 1972 reorganization led to resentment by the regional bureaus responsible for delivering population programs (see Figure 4.4 and Organizational Charts 5 and 6). The 1972 reorganization centralized all of AID's population activities and staff within the Office of Population. This meant that the Population Office was the only entity in AID with both line and staff authority. Personnel from the regional bureaus were upset with this arrangement because they believed the centrally funded programs did not specifically relate to the countries that they were supposed to help. There were various efforts within AID to change the organizational dynamics, but they were unsuccessful. Critics of the Population Office finally succeeded in 1977 after intense infighting in AID. The Assistant Administrator for Asia, John Sullivan, started by circulating a memorandum to the other regional administrators that argued "the approval of population projects and allotment of population funds for bilateral programs reside in regional bureaus-and not in the population office" (Donaldson 1990, p. 81).

The staff of the Office of Population did not like the ideas forwarded by Sullivan and responded vigorously to his proposal. In a memorandum to Director Ravenholt, Carl Hemmer argued:

> The draft memorandum that Jack Sullivan is currently circulating to the regional [assistant administrators] is a clear and simple effort to balkanize the . . . program . . . i.e., breaking the offending . . . parts into fragments which the regional bureaus can then digest. Sullivan's plan, if adopted, would eviscerate the central population unit. If its operation were confined, as proposed, to research and technical advisory services, [the Office of Population] would have little resemblance to an effective operational unit. It could think and suggest, but it couldn't do anything (Donaldson 1990, pp. 81-82).

The Population Office elicited support from members of Congress and from supportive interest groups. The Chairman of the House Select Committee on Population, James Scheuer (D.-NY), wrote to AID Director John Gilligan saying that the reorganization would mark "a lessening of U.S. commitment to international population assistance," and diminish "the U.S. ability to provide effective leadership and funding for international population activities" (Donaldson 1990, p. 82). The Population Crisis Committee (PCC) argued that the reorganization would have a detrimental impact as well. The PCC believed private and voluntary organizations (PVOs) would be overlooked by the AID missions overseas. Some of the staff in the Office of Population even made a rare complaint to the AID's Director but to no avail. The reorganization created a division between bilateral programs that were administered by the regional bureaus and the interregional programs administered by the Office of Population (Donaldson 1990).

The Office of Population did not take the reorganization lying down. Ravenholt argued with his boss, Sander Levin, over the meaning of the functional statement drafted by Sullivan. Ravenholt and Levin exchanged memos on the issue that became rather coarse. In one memorandum, Ravenholt complained: "To object to our voicing indignation over the grossly inappropriate way in which the functional statement has been prepared and handled rather than correcting the basic disorder is analogous to deprecating the screams of a woman being raped rather than protecting her from the assailant" (Donaldson 1990, p. 84). These efforts led to the consolation of a revised functional statement stating that the Population Director would "participate with the geographic bureaus, [the Bureau of Program and Policy Coordination,] and the Department of State in the development and strategies and policies concerning the direction and content of the AID population/family planning programs" (Donaldson 1990, p. 84). One byproduct of the reorganization was the transfer of some personnel out of the Office of Population (Donaldson 1990).

Attacks on the Office of Population and Director Ravenholt continued throughout the Carter Administration. One assault came from John Sullivan who wrote a memorandum in August 1979 to the acting AID administrator, entitled "The Smell of Burning Rubber." The memorandum stated:

the supply mentality of the Office of Population as it has been run has resulted in huge inventories of contraceptives—pills and condoms—in recipient countries. Some of these inventories are reaching the end of their shelf life and must be destroyed. For example, the Nepal mission has just requested $50,000 to monitor the burning of condoms at various locations in the country. The Agency has no real alibi, since the [Auditor General] has warned of excessive inventories for years. While we can't repeal the past, we can help prevent future such situations by maintaining the recently completed delegation of population authorities to the regional bureaus" (Donaldson 1990, p. 85).

Another attack came from the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination (PPC), which argued that the Office of Population almost exclusively relied upon family planning as the means to control fertility. The PPC staff believed that greater attention had to be paid to "the interdependent variables which influence the cost and consequences of demographic change as related to economic and social and political development and find and carry out more suitable strategies to encourage and facilitate . . . efforts to program and wisely invest . . . scarce resources" (Donaldson 1990, p. 86). The PPC was, however, less than forthcoming in providing these alternatives.

Ravenholt's way of conducting business had created a lot of enemies who sought to pull in on the reins. Ravenholt believed that Sander Levin, John Sullivan and Representative Clement Zablocki (D.-WI) were the primary agitators. During an interview Sullivan described (Rei) Ravenholt as too powerful. "I wanted when I went in there to take Rei and do like the Lilliputian and Gulliver. I was going to pin him down with a thousand little pieces of string . . . and keep him pinned to the earth. I didn't want, didn't think we could get rid of him. I just wanted to slap him into these bureaucratic modes until he got like a cage and not let him do what he wanted to do . . . I had one mandate; it was a self-mandate and it was to get those population programs into the regional bureaus . . . That would take care of Rei" (Donaldson 1990, pp. 87-88).

Several examples serve to note that Ravenholt supplied the rope to hang himself. First, Ravenholt caused a public stir during the annual meeting of the Population Association of America in 1977. Ravenholt provided

an interview to a reporter in which he recklessly portrayed U.S. efforts to support voluntary sterilizations. Ravenholt suggested that U.S. IPP could potentially lead to a twenty five percent sterilization rate worldwide, if they followed the pattern in states like the U.S. and India. Seeking a twenty five percent sterilization rate may have seemed only a little Draconian, but Ravenholt tied U.S. actions to motives that heightened this impression. The U.S. was seeking to sterilize a quarter of the planet's women not just because it would increase standards of living, but it would also maintain the "normal operations of U.S. commercial interests around the world," and avoid revolutions caused by deteriorating conditions that might threaten the national interest. "The self interest thing is a compelling element," Ravenholt asserted (Donaldson 1990, p. 89). The newspaper article raised the ire of Ravenholt's critics. Sander Levin believed "the article brought to a new administration a barrage of protest from members of Congress, letters from the public and coverage by the press in other parts of the world" (Donaldson 1990, p. 89). Levin tried twice but failed to get Ravenholt to resign from his position.

Levin responded by formally filing a letter of adverse action against Ravenholt in order to justify outright dismissal. The letter contended that Ravenholt was unsuited for his position for several reasons. First, Ravenholt was accused of writing an inappropriate letter to Imelda Marcos, the chief executive of the Philippine family planning program, for failing to improve their program. In addition, Ravenholt allegedly berated Egyptian demographer Saad Gadalla as a "dumb shit" for failing to reduce fertility in Egypt. Ravenholt was also cited for failing to develop non-family planning methods of reducing fertility. Levin's efforts failed again because Ravenholt successfully used the civil service appeal process. Levin finally succeeded in ousting Ravenholt by demoting him in 1979. Ravenholt's appeal to Robert Nooter, the acting AID administrator, was unsuccessful (Donaldson 1990).

U.S. IPP began to be criticized more widely after the 1977 hearings. Representative B. F. Sisk (D.-CA) argued that population programs did not deserve their ever-increasing funding levels based on the hearings discussed above. Sisk quoted an Appropriations Committee report that asserted the U.S. should selectively disburse population aid only to countries that demonstrate a "positive and active concern" for their population

growth problems. Sisk concluded: "These programs must be designed to give people the incentive to reduce their family size. This can be done as it has been in Sri Lanka and Singapore. Both of these countries have provided greater economic and social benefits to those couple who have limited their size to less than three children. It is time AID got the message: the Congress will not fund unworkable programs" (U.S. House of Representatives 1978d, p. 36492). Criticism also began to be heard in the press. Secretary of State Vance was asked about a television report critical of AID for sending developing countries unneeded and unwanted contraceptives during a question and answer session before the national convention of the League of Women Voters. Vance replied that everybody makes mistakes, but that the administration was working to get on top of the problems (U.S. Department of State 1978b). It seems that the burning rubber memorandum had filtered its way through to the media.

The policy review and AID's internal struggles led to structural changes in international population policy in FY 1979. First, there were changes in the language of the 1979 Foreign Assistance Act (H.R. 12222 and S. 3074). The Basic Human Needs Mandate was still the basic strategy, but there were refinements. In terms of the act's language, the Basic Human Needs Mandate emphasized four goals: alleviation of poverty, promotion of self-sustaining growth, encouragement of civil and economic rights, and integration into an open international economic system. Second, the wording of the legislation was changed to reflect the varying needs of developing countries. Some countries needed large-scale assistance to just to keep afloat, while countries at higher stages of development needed better access to private capital markets. The new language also placed greater emphasis on the role of PVOs to accelerate the development process. Third, the language regarding population issues was changed to stress the need for more programs to change the social and economic conditions that lead to high birth rates (U.S. Senate 1978). The authorizing legislation earmarked $225 million for population programs (U.S. House of Representatives 1978c). In terms of appropriations, the House version appropriated $195 million, while the Senate appropriated $180 million. The conferees on H. R. 12931 agreed to $185 million (U.S. House of Representatives 1978d).

Structural Policy: The Foreign Aid Budget Process

The government began to have problems passing foreign aid legislation in the last years of Carter's presidency. In FY 1980, Congress was able to pass authorizing legislation (H.R. 3324 and S. 588), but failed to pass an appropriations bill primarily over the controversy surrounding World Bank Loans to states like Vietnam and Cuba (NYT 1979a). There were vast differences in the House and Senate versions of the bill with regard to population programs. The House version contained a two-year authorization for population activities, $216 million for FY 1980 and $255 million for FY 1981 (U.S. House of Representatives 1979a). The Senate version earmarked only $194 million for IPP for FY 1980 (U.S. Senate 1979). The conferees agreed to a one-year authorization of $201 million (U.S. House of Representatives 1979b). Congress' inability to pass an appropriations bill meant that AID was funded though continuing resolutions at the FY 1979 funding levels.

The authorizing legislation also reorganized the foreign aid structure by creating the International Development and Cooperation Administration (IDCA). The legislation was drafted by Senator Hubert Humphrey (D.-MN) and Representative Clement Zablocki (D.-WI) and offered in 1978, but Congress did not act upon it. The purpose of the IDCA was to "ensure a more coherent development strategy, promote the more effective use of the various U.S. bilateral instruments by which the U.S. can encourage economic and social progress in developing countries, and ensure that U.S. bilateral programs and the multilateral programs to which we contribute better complement each other" (U.S. President 1979, p. 644). The IDCA proposal also included a new Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation (ISTC). The ISTC would be responsible for administering the technical assistance programs, including population programs (Ruttan 1996). The proposal was opposed by the Office of Population (Donaldson 1990). Fortunately for AID and the Office of Population, the IDCA lacked the support of the political sovereigns responsible for funding them.[3] The IDCA was criticized for failing to give enough authority to the administrator and doing little to reorganize the various foreign aid programs (see organizational chart) (NYT 1979b; Ruttan 1996).

[3]The IDCA's chief sponsor, Hubert Humphrey died January 13, 1978. In addition, the legislation was passed in the last year of President Carter's beleaguered term.

There was more trouble passing foreign aid legislation for FY 1981. Congress was able to pass authorizing legislation, but not an appropriations bill. The Senate worked on S. 2714 that would have authorized $208 million for population programs (U.S. Senate 1980), but instead passed H.R. 6942 that earmarked $238 million for IPP (U.S. House of Representatives 1980a). The conference report that was adopted maintained the $238 million dollar figure, but it contained new language directing AID to place more emphasis on natural family planning methods (U.S. House of Representatives 1980b; 1980c). The appropriations process dragged on to the point that it became impossible to pass the legislation until after the presidential election in November. The $238 million figure was maintained when Congress finally passed the foreign aid appropriation after President-elect Ronald Reagan gave the bill his blessing to Senator Howard Baker (R.-TN) (NYT 1980). Despite his intentions, President Carter was unable to fulfill his 1976 campaign pledge to double the foreign aid budget in five years (NYT 1979c).

Thus, Congress dominated the foreign aid budget process, but had difficulties passing foreign aid appropriations. Congress was unable to pass appropriations bills during this period for several reasons. First, the economy was doing poorly and the budget deficit was increasingly a major political issue. It was difficult for members of Congress to spend money on foreign aid when it was easy for some of them to say that the foreign aid budget accounted for most of the budget deficit. Second, the Senate was becoming increasingly conservative, which made it more difficult to pass foreign aid legislation (NYT 1979c). Conservative senators like Orrin Hatch (R.-UT) and John Danforth (R.-MO) were elected in 1976, and Roger Jepsen (R.-IA) and Gordon Humphrey (R.-NH) were elected in 1978. Finally, the new budget process made the foreign aid budget more susceptible to political attacks. Frank Ballance (1979) argued that even though foreign aid was a popular target, ninety three percent of the foreign aid budget was accounted for by assistance to countries like Israel that were largely immune from cuts. The last seven percent of the foreign aid budget was for development assistance programs like IPP. In FY 1980, Congress mandated a $600 million reduction in foreign aid, which would have meant eliminating all development assistance programs. The appropriations committees wrestled with the

foreign aid budget until the overall budget ceiling had been reached. Congress voted to raise the budget ceiling, but that only made room for the other programs that were still in line at the money trough. In this case foreign aid was pitted against state revenue sharing, and it was next to impossible for a member of Congress to vote for money to go to Dacca rather than Oklahoma City. Ballance concluded that the budget process "has diminished the role of the authorizing and appropriating committees, raised the cost of being at the end of the funding line, made supplemental appropriations for foreign aid more difficult to pass, placed aid in competition with domestic programs and raised the amount of political capital necessary to pass controversial measures" (Ballance 1979, p. 3).

Population Policy Under Reagan

Strategic Policy: The Last Cold Warrior

The Reagan Administration changed the tone and tenor of the foreign aid program. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had reaffirmed the original purpose of foreign aid. Overall, foreign aid's purpose was to enhance the national security of the United States according to the new administration. National security would be achieved by providing military assistance and promoting the liberal international economic order established by the U.S. after World War II. The strategic foreign aid policy of the Reagan Administration was set during the 1980 campaign by M. Peter McPherson, who became Reagan's AID Administrator. McPherson drafted a memorandum that established "four pillars" of foreign aid designed to "foster self-sustaining development by using initiative and creativity to help people help themselves while at the same time stimulating international trade and aiding the truly needy" (Ruttan 1996, p. 122). The four pillars were (1) a policy dialogue with recipient countries to reform and improve the development process; (2) decentralizing the institutions responsible for administering aid, especially through PVOs; (3) increasing technology transfers in areas like biomedical research, agriculture and family planning; and (4) relying more on private sector development (Ruttan 1996).

Seemingly, the Reagan Administration was seeking to combine the security elements that led to the Marshall Plan and the Basic Human Needs Mandate. In reality, the Reagan Administration was more interested in using foreign aid to help countries that supported U.S. security interests (e.g., El Salvador, Sudan, Honduras, and Pakistan), than working on the Basic Human Needs Mandate. An emphasis was placed on military and economic assistance to these countries rather than development assistance programs. For example, more funds were disbursed through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) because the money had fewer strings attached and allowed the executive branch to use foreign aid funds for the purposes it deemed most important (Ruttan 1996). In addition, President Reagan's own words stressed the importance he placed on military assistance over economic assistance. Reagan expressed doubts about economic assistance to developing countries during a speech to the American Legion on February 22, 1983. In the speech Reagan argued:

> The fact is that massive infusions of foreign aid have proven not only ineffective in stimulating economic development in the Third World; in many cases they've actually been counterproductive. That kind of foreign aid is nothing more than welfare payments on a global scale and is just as ineffectual and degrading. Our economic assistance must be carefully targeted and must make maximum use of the energy and efforts of the private sector (U.S. President 1983, p. 269).

Structural Policy: The Budget

The population problem lost its prominence as a top priority when Reagan came into office. Donaldson (1990) suggests that there were no longer any top officials who emphasized problems associated with rapid population growth. The Office of Management and Budget even suggested an end to earmarking funds for population assistance in the foreign aid budget. The suggestion was turned aside after Secretary of State Alexander Haig had the earmarked funds restored (Donaldson 1990). It is unlikely that supporters in Congress would have agreed anyway, but it seems clear that the body would be the major source of support for the population program during the Reagan years.

The Reagan Administration took advantage of the congressional budget process described at the end of the last section to achieve its foreign aid goals. The basic strategy of the executive branch was to bypass the authorization process where congressional strings were attached to the money and force foreign aid into funding through continuing resolution. Bypassing the authorizing committees made it easier for the Reagan Administration to establish its foreign aid priorities because it limited the number of congressional sovereigns that had to be lobbied. Foreign aid appropriations were dominated by only four people during this period: Clarence Long (D.-MD) and Jack Kemp (R.-NY) in the House and Robert Kasten (R.WI) and Daniel Inouye (D.-HI) in the Senate. The Republicans supported most of the administration's objectives and the Democrats tended to agree after gaining concessions for continuing development assistance programs, especially Inouye's favorite the International Development Association (IDA). The State Department's under-secretary for security assistance, William Schneider, was responsible for the success of this strategy (Ruttan 1996).

The strategy was unsuccessful in Reagan's second term, however. Congress recognized the presidential ploy and reacted to it. The Congressional Research Service pointed out the problem in a report to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. "The executive branch achieved its major objectives, mainly sharply increased spending in selected areas, especially security assistance programs, through continuing resolutions, while avoiding many congressional conditions and limitations that would likely have been attached to regular foreign assistance statutes, particularly authorization measures" (Ruttan 1996, p. 117). Another inhibiting factor was the election of David Obey (D.-WI) to the chair of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee for House Appropriations. Obey was a more formidable political opponent than Long had been. Obey used his power to hold the foreign assistance package hostage until the Reagan Administration conceded ground on slower growth in the defense budget and higher taxes. In terms of foreign aid, Obey sought to bring more attention to and resources for the international debt crisis and the Basic Human Needs Mandate (Ruttan 1996).

Population programs diminished in budgetary terms because of the administration's different strategic focus. Others have argued that the passage of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act

(Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) in 1985 and successive budget deals led to diminished funding. The act set decreasing annual ceilings on the budget deficit until the budget was to be balanced in 1993. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (G-R-H) required the government to sequester money from programs, if the estimated deficit ceiling for a given year was exceeded. Representative Obey (D.-WI) argued (1988) that G-R-H had a major influence over the foreign aid budget process. Obey argued that G-R-H increased the rigidity of the appropriation process and made it more difficult for the U.S. to meet its obligations at home and abroad. There were also monetary consequences to G-R-H. In 1986 (the first year of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings), the foreign aid budget was slashed by thirteen percent. A downward trend was established with a two percent reduction in 1987 and 1988 (Obey and Lancaster 1988). Foreign aid and IPPs were funded through continuing appropriations bills in fiscal years 1983-1989. IPP appropriations grew some until the passage of G-R-H. In FYs 1982 and 1983 the IPP appropriation was $211 million, rose to $240 million in 1984, and peaked at $290 million in 1985 (Statutes at Large 1981; 1982; 1983; 1984). After the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings act the IPP appropriation fell to $250 million in FY 1986, $234 million in 1987, and $198 million in 1988 and 1989 (Statutes at Large 1985b; 1986; 1987; 1988).

The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings act not only made the appropriation process more rigid; it destroyed the authorization process. Congress finally passed its first foreign aid authorization bill in four years in 1985. Both the House (H.R. 1555) and Senate (S. 960) versions were for two year authorizations that froze spending levels in FY 1987 at the FY 1986 levels. There were differences between the two bills in terms of IPP; the House version earmarked $320 million and the Senate version earmarked $290 million for both years respectively. The conference report that passed both branches of Congress used the Senate figure of $290 million. That was the last authorization bill to become law that could be found in the time period under study. The House passed authorization bills on an irregular basis, but the Senate failed to act on any of them. The next authorization bill to pass was H.R. 2404 in 1993 that earmarked $395 million for population activities, but the Senate did not

consider the legislation (U.S. House of Representatives 1993). There really was not much point in passing authorizing legislation given the confines of G-R-H and subsequent budget deals.

Strategic Policy: The International Conference on Population

There was a great deal of turmoil surrounding the U.S. delegation and the positions it took at the International Conference on Population, which met in Mexico City during August of 1984. First, the executive branch unilaterally selected the delegates to the conference.[4] The delegation was headed by James L. Buckley, a conservative former senator from New York and then head of Radio Free Europe (Donaldson 1990). The delegation also included the economist Julian Simon of the Heritage Foundation who challenged the assumptions of the Global 2000 Report, including overpopulation. Simon argued that the

> government should *not* take steps to make the public more 'aware' of issues concerning resources, environment, and population. We consider that the public has been badly served by having been scared by a very large volume of unfounded and/or exaggerated warnings about these matters. . .Recommendations to other countries-and even more so, pressure upon them-to institute and carry out policies with respect to their population growth rates are not warranted by any facts about resources and population, and they constitute unjustifiable interference in the activities of other countries, because such policies must necessarily rest upon value judgments (Simon and Kahn 1984, pp. 42-43).

The administration failed to include the State Department's population officer Richard Benedick, or any members of Congress in the delegation to the conference (NYT 1984).

Second, the administration unilaterally set the positions of the delegations without consulting Congress. There were several draft statements prepared for the U.S. delegation to the Mexico City conference. The White House draft de-emphasized the Coale-Hoover thesis and repudiated the Global 2000 Report. The statement argued that "population growth is, of itself, a neutral phenomenon . . . Population control is not a panacea. It will not solve problems of massive unemployment. Jobs are not lost because there are too many people in a given

[4]I was unable to find a complete list of delegates. AID Administrator M. Peter McPherson, William Draper of Export-Import Bank and Ben Wattenberg of the American Enterprise Institute were also delegates.

area. Jobs are created by the conjunction of human wants and investment capital. Population growth fuels the former; sound economic policies and properly directed international assistance can provide the latter. Indeed, population density may make the latter more feasible by concentrating the need for both human services and technology." (U.S. Senate 1984, p. 16891).

It was argued, in short, that the combination of counterproductive socialist economic policies in the developing world and an epistemic community dominated by a "pseudo-scientific" pessimism provoked a demographic overreaction in the 1960s. The pessimism of the Global 2000 Report was repudiated by the Reagan Administration because it called for "more governmental supervision and control" (U.S. Senate 1984, p. 16892). Technological advance and economic expansion were the keys to prosperity and stability in the world.[5] By downgrading the relationship between rapid population growth and economic development, the administration was forced to provide another justification for supporting international family planning. The three primary justifications for an IPP under Reagan were to provide families the ability to determine the size and spacing of their family, to improve survivability for the mother and child, and to reduce the need for abortion (U.S. Department of State 1986). The document also stressed the importance of the human right to decide family size and opposition to abortion as a method of family planning. Hence, under what became known as "the Mexico City Policy," the United States would not contribute funds to NGOs and PVOs that used abortion as a method of birth control or make abortion referrals except in the case where the mother's life was threatened.

The State Department and the Agency for International Development also prepared draft statements. Both reflected the administration's emphasis upon economic growth and opportunity, but maintained ties to the Coale-Hoover thesis and the Basic Human Needs Mandate. For example, in conjunction with the Coale-Hoover thesis, the State Department draft asserted that an international consensus had emerged that economic policies and population policies were mutually reinforcing. In terms of the Basic Human Needs Mandate, the State Department draft stated: "The basic objective of all U.S. assistance, including population programs, is the

[5]This strategic outlook will be herein referred to as the "Cornucopian Outlook."

betterment of the human condition, improving the quality of life of mothers and children, of families, and of communities for generations to come" (U.S. Senate 1984, p. 16893). The State Department's attitude toward the Reagan Administration's positions can best be described as ambivalent.

The AID draft more closely mirrored the White House draft. The AID draft emphasized the roles of technology and the private sector, and parroted a quote of Reagan found in the White House draft: "Trust the people, trust their intelligence and trust their faith, because putting people first is the secret of economic success everywhere in the world" (U.S. Senate 1984, p. 16894). The AID draft statement did conform to the Coale-Hoover thesis by stating "the impact of the current rapid population growth is to sorely strain the resources of LDCs which could be used for investment for economic growth, but are needed for basic infrastructures and services for burgeoning populations" (U.S. Senate 1984, p. 16894).

AID also commissioned a critique of the White House policy statement by Peters Willson of the Guttmacher Institute. Willson argued that the White House draft statement "virtually dismisses the importance of family planning. Instead of discussing the enormous unmet need for family planning services around the world, the paper focuses exclusively on the need to deregulate developing nations' economies. It leaves the impression that if only developing nations would encourage free market economies, they would experience rapid economic development that would take care of their population growth" (U.S. Senate 1984, p. 16895).

The White House draft formed the basis for the delegation's position at the International Conference on Population (ICP). Members of Congress were upset by the lack of consultation and rejected the arguments of the White House statement on population. In one move, nearly sixty members of the House, including eleven Republicans, sent a letter to President Reagan opposing the new policies. The Senate considered, but failed to pass, Senate Concurrent Resolution 135 that also rejected the new policies.[6] Daniel Inouye (D.-HI) argued that

[6]There was bipartisan support for the resolution. The co-sponsors were: Robert Packwood (R.-OR); Bill Bradley (D.-NJ); Charles Percy (R.-IL); Alan Cranston (D.-CA); Gary Hart (D.-CO); Lowell Weicker (R.-CT); William Cohen (R.-MN); Robert Stafford (R.-VT); John Chafee (R.-RI); Carl Levin (D.-MI); Charles Mathias (R.-MD); Donald Riegle (D-MI); Daniel Evans (R.-WA); John Glenn (D.-OH); H. John Heinz (R.-PA); Daniel Inouye (D.-HI); Paula Hawkins (R.-FL); Howard Metzenbaum (D.-OH); Spark Matsunaga (D.-HI); Quentin Burdick (D.-ND); Christopher Dodd (D.-CT); Jeff Bingaman (D.-NM); Ted Kennedy (D.-MA); and Ernest Hollings (D.-SC).

twenty years of bipartisanship "is in danger of being subverted by an isolated band of ideologues in the executive branch." The U.S. position at the conference "reflected a fundamentalist, know-nothing political philosophy . . . In sharp contrast to congressional policies, which have guided U.S. activities and assistance programs in population and development, the U.S. position at the conference relied on misplaced analogies and a specious reading of the economic history of the western world to arrive at the nation [*sic*] that 'population growth is, of itself, a neutral phenomenon' and that economic development alone can solve the world's population problem" (U.S. Senate 1984, p. 27671)

Many members of Congress were upset with the new language regarding rules for funding NGO population programs. Representative Ted Weiss (D.-NY) argued that "the final policy paper reiterates that the United States will no longer contribute to family planning programs that use non-U.S. moneys for abortion. This policy will inevitably lead to a need for more abortions, to an increase in human suffering, and a general decline in the quality of life in Third World countries" (U.S. House of Representatives 1984a, p. 14).

The Subcommittee on Census and Population held hearings to examine the positions of the U.S. delegation. The head of the delegation, James Buckley, declined to appear, but Julian Simon was there to defend the White House positions. One interesting aspect of the hearings dealt with the Coale-Hoover thesis and the White House draft statement calling population a neutral factor in economic development. The administration's position was clarified during an exchange between Representative Sander Levin (D.-MI) and Julian Simon.[7]

> Mr. Levin. I believe that in many developing nations today, high population growth is one of the major barriers, or can be one of the major barriers, to socioeconomic development.
>
> Mr. Simon. I think it is not unfair to interpret from that that you are saying that faster population growth, all things being equal, has a negative impact upon economic growth . . .
>
> Mr. Levin. One of the factors.
>
> Mr. Simon. That has been the tenor of all the literature on this subject for at least 15 years.

[7]Levin left AID and was elected to the House of Representatives in 1982.

Mr. Levin. OK. As long as you don't overstate it, I agree with you . . .

Mr. Simon. Ronald Lee at the University of California at Berkeley reviewed all the existing empirical studies on the relationship of population growth to economic growth, and he found that they all confirm the fact that there is no observed relationship. That is what is fundamental, not the particular anecdotes which only illustrate that . . .[8]

You are interested in helping people get the family size they want.

Mr. Levin. OK.

Mr. Simon. Let me be as clear as I can. I agree with you. I could not agree with you anymore on anything than that, and to suggest that I don't is quite wrong.

But if we are interested in helping people get the family size we want, why is there so much emphasis on population growth rates and on resources and on economic development? If we are simply trying to help people get what they want, what is all of the rest of this about? So there are two messages, and I don't see them as being consistent. (U.S. House of Representatives 1984a, pp. 22-23)

Almost all of the representatives were critical of the White House positions, despite assurances that no funds would ultimately by subtracted from population issues. The lone exception would be William Dannemeyer (R.-CA). Dannemeyer argued that the Mexico City policy regarding abortion was consistent with the Helms Amendment passed in 1973. Numerous interest groups testified against the White House positions during the hearings. Of the eight interest groups that took a position on the White House draft, six were opposed.[9]

The positions of the U.S. delegation were controversial at the ICP. At the conference Buckley declared that the United States "rejects the notion that we are caught up in a global population crisis," and would cut all funds to private organizations that "perform or actively promote abortion," and any government "which engages

[8]Other writers at the time, like Amartya Sen (1981) argued that while there may not be a shortage of food, increased populations and the process of economic development could lead to severe famines even when enough food existed.

[9]The interest groups opposed were the Population Crisis Committee, the United Church of Christ, the National Wildlife Federation, the United Methodist Church, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and the National Audubon Society. The interest groups that favored the White House draft statement were the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of U.S. and Canada and the American Life Lobby, Inc.

in forcible coercion to achieve population goals" (*Washington Post* 1984, p. 1). Most of the criticism was leveled against the economic arguments made by the delegation. The Spanish delegation asserted the U.S. position would lead to complacency. The Chinese delegation declared the American economic argument was inappropriate and that it would not have policies imposed upon them (*Washington Post* 1984). Six members of Congress, including James Scheuer (D.-NY) and Pat Schroeder (D.-CO), attended the conference on their own and voiced their opposition to the U.S. positions.

The U.S. delegation had a minor impact on the outcome of the conference. First, the U.S. delegation was able to reach an agreement with the director of the UNFPA, Rafael Salas, to restore $19 million in U.S. funding after gaining assurances that no funds would violate the Mexico City policy (*Washington Post* 1984). Second, the World Population Plan of Action adopted in Bucharest in 1974 was reaffirmed and revised without reflecting the controversial positions of the U.S. delegation. The Mexico City Declaration noted that the global population growth rate declined from 2.03 to 1.67 percent per year and noted the international consensus realized since Bucharest. The Plan of Action contained seventy-six recommendations for action in five areas. The five areas were (1) the relationship between socioeconomic development and the environment; (2) the role and status of women; (3) the development of population policies; (4) population goals and policies; and (5) the promotion of knowledge. The plan of action maintained the Coale-Hoover thesis, the parent's right to decide family size, rejected abortion as a means of birth control, and stressed the importance of raising the status of women. It is important to note that, despite containing a section on population goals, the plan of action refrained from setting specific growth rate targets. Instead the plan recommended that governments pursue "relevant demographic policies within the framework of socio-economic development" (UNFPA 1985, p.230).

Table 3.1 **World Population**

Year	Mid-Year Population	Avg. Annual Growth Rate	Avg. Annual Change
1965	3,345,410,699	2.07	40,623,555
1974	4,012,917,169	1.81	73,474,190
1984	4,769,993,531	1.68	80,690,582

The Structural Ramifications of the Mexico City Policy

The delegation's position concerning funding for PVOs and NGOs that support abortions changed U.S. policy. Congress was willing to accept the Mexico City policy, despite the objections and efforts of some vocal congressional population activists. First, Senate Concurrent Resolution 135 was withdrawn after Jesse Helms (R.-NC) was able to pass a substitute amendment that affirmed the Mexico City Policy (U.S. Senate 1984). Second, the authorizing legislation that passed the House of Representatives (H.R. 5119) contained wording that reflected the Mexico City policy. Chris Smith (R.-NJ) offered an amendment to H.R. 5119 that would have required the President to certify that non-governmental entities receiving U.S. funds were in compliance with U.S. abortion restrictions. Henry Hyde (R.-IL) and Dante Fascell (D.-FL) offered a substitute amendment that required the AID administrator to certify compliance with the Mexico City policy. The substitute amendment was passed by voice vote, but the Senate did not take up the bill (U.S. House of Representatives 1984b). The Mexico City Policy led to the end of contributions to organizations that were not willing to adhere to the policy. The International Planned Parenthood Federation, one of the largest NGOs devoted to family planning worldwide, refused to adhere to the abortion restrictions and had its funding cut off.

The Mexico City Policy also led to funding cuts for the UNFPA. AID Administrator McPherson postponed a payment to the UNFPA in February 1985, after expressing fears that some funds might support coerced abortions in China (NYT 1985a). A proposal by Jack Kemp (R.-NY) to restrict AID from funding "any organization which includes as part of its population planning programs involuntary abortion," was passed into law in the 1984 foreign operations appropriations bill (Statutes at Large 1984b, p. 1888). The Director of the UNFPA assured AID that no U.S. funds would be used for abortions, which led McPherson to only reduce the yearly total from $46 million to $36 million (NYT 1985b; NYT 1985c).

Members in Congress like Representatives Chris Smith (R.-NJ) and Jack Kemp (R.-NY), and Senators Jesse Helms (R.-NC) and Daniel Inouye (D.-HI) were able to strengthen the statutory language in 1985 with the Kemp-Inouye-Helms Amendment to the 1985 supplemental appropriations for foreign operations (a.k.a. the Kemp-Kasten Amendment). Senator Helms argued that McPherson had violated the law by not cutting funds to

the UNFPA (U.S. Senate 1985). The House passed the Kemp-Inouye-Helms Amendment in June and the law was enacted in August. The statute now read: "None of the funds made available in this bill nor any unobligated balances from prior appropriations may be made available to any organization or program which, as determined by the President of the United States, supports or participates in the management of a program of coercive or involuntary sterilization" (U.S. Senate 1985, p. 30571). AID Administrator McPherson tried to argue that the U.S. could continue to fund the UNFPA if it stopped participating in the management of the Chinese program. According to Helms, this interpretation ignored the constant aims of Mr. Kemp and others by gutting the portion of the language prohibiting funds going to organizations that support coercive abortions or involuntary sterilizations (U.S. Senate 1985). Funds for the UNFPA were cut off in FY 1986, a ban that lasted until 1992. China protested the decision and said that it was based on false information (NYT 1985d).

There was vocal opposition to the policy but not enough votes. Representatives like Peter Kostmayer (D.-PA) and James Scheuer (D.-NY) condemned the new policy. Those who opposed the policy change argued that no U.S. money was used in China's program and that any UNFPA funds were used for purposes consistent with UN declarations and U.S. law. Representative Scheuer argued that "the UNFPA projects in China involve demographic research and training, maternal and child health services, contraceptive development, family planning education and training for program staff and managers. I have no intention of defending the coercive activities reportedly taking place in China . . . But I will oppose efforts to eliminate funds for UNFPA" (U.S. House of Representatives 1985, p. 17225). Those opposed to the policy tended to argue that none of the money was used for coercive purposes, while proponents of the policy argued that the argument was based on the false distinction that funds could be separated. Opponents also argued that the new policy would lead to a cut in funds for population activities, despite assurances that any funds diverted from the UNFPA would be used elsewhere (U.S. AID 1987).

By the end of the Reagan Administration there were two camps with different priorities for U.S. international population policy. In one camp there were the traditional supporters of U.S. IPP based on beliefs

like the Coale-Hoover thesis and the need to achieve sustainable development as outlined by the Global 2000 report. The other camp was dubious of the effects of population on economic development and more concerned with human rights issues like abortion and coercive family planning practices. Population control skeptics were more interested in promoting natural family planning, which was added to the statutes in 1987 (Statutes at Large 1987). Despite these differences, the U.S. maintained its support for international family planning. It seems clear that this division partially accounts for the diminished funding in the IPP budget, because the skeptics held sway in the Executive Branch.

Population Policy Under Bush

Strategic Policy: No Direction

President Bush continued the Reagan foreign aid policies, but international circumstances dictated the need to overhaul the strategies behind the foreign aid program. The end of the Cold War reduced East-West tensions and created pressure to provide aid to the emerging democratic regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Pressures to aid the former communist countries created a competition with development assistance funds used elsewhere. The result of this pressure was the deemphasis of development assistance programs like food aid and population activities. One reason AID was unable to assert much, if any, autonomy over foreign aid was the lack of leadership. "From early 1989 until the end of the Bush Administration, AID was plagued by ineffective and, at times, incompetent leadership" (Ruttan 1996, p. 459). Alan Woods, who replaced M. Peter McPherson in 1987, died in 1989. The Deputy Administrator for AID, Mark Edelman, replaced Woods on an interim basis and was, in turn, replaced by Ronald Roskens in March 1990.

The quick turnover in administrators, coupled with a dominant Secretary of State, James Baker, made it difficult for AID to maintain its autonomy. During his swearing in ceremony in March 1990, Secretary of State Baker outlined five major challenges for AID (known in the agency as "Baker's Charge"): (1) consolidate the trend toward democracy; (2) build free-market economies; (3) strengthen the hand of regional actors committed to peace; (4) address transnational threats (e.g., environmental degradation, drug trafficking and terrorism); and

(5) respond to the needs of the developing world (Ruttan 1996). It was no mistake that the developing world was last on the list.

> A committee of top AID staff was asked to draft an agency mission statement based on Baker's Charge. The priorities that emerged-the family, democracy, environment, and business partnership-reflected the priorities of an ideologically motivated staff who were critical of the continuing commitment to building scientific and technical capacity in developing countries and of commitments to assist in meeting the basic human needs of the poor in the poorest countries. Agriculture and family planning were de-emphasized. The early drafts omitted any mention of human resource investment or even economic development" (Ruttan 1996, p. 460).

Other factions within AID worked hard and were able to gain a concession to include an objective in the mission statement regarding U.S. concern for economic development to improve the quality of life of individuals in the developing world. Ruttan (1996) argued that Baker's Charge marked the official death of the Basic Human Needs Mandate and led to a new rationale for foreign aid. The new purpose of foreign aid was to serve U.S. commercial interests. Overall, however, there was no clear consensus on what to do with the foreign aid program, which largely floundered under Bush.

There were failed attempts to study and fix the strategic drift in foreign aid during the Bush Administration. For example, AID administrator Woods completed "Development and the National Interest: U.S. Economic Assistance into the 21st Century" shortly before his death. The Woods Report failed to precipitate needed changes in the foreign aid program, because it reflected partisan biases and lacked concrete plans for improvement. As the previous administration had, Woods denigrated AID's development assistance programs in helping spur economic development:

> Where development has worked, and is working, the key has been economic growth. And this is largely the result of individual nations making the right policy choices and making the most of internal human and material resources. A strong expanding American economy, a healthy trade climate, and the

development assistance provided by profit-based and nonprofit organizations are critical elements. Direct U.S. development assistance, overall, has played a secondary role and has not always succeeded in fostering growth-oriented policies among recipient states (Woods 1989, pp. 112-113).

The Woods Report's vision of foreign aid emphasized the role of free markets to spur the economic development and prosperity needed to ensure a safe world for the United States. Foreign aid would continue to be offered by the U.S., but would play a limited role. Woods believed that the issues facing developing countries were different than the countries of Western Europe who were the initial recipients of foreign aid with the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan was concerned with reconstruction, while contemporary foreign aid programs were about construction. The Woods Report concluded: "This kind of development is long-term work, and most of the work, while it can be marginally assisted by friendly outside agencies, must be done by the governments and the people of the countries themselves" (Woods 1989, p. 120).

The report's lack of vision can be seen in the fact that little effort was expended by the administration to push for policy reforms (Ruttan 1996). Bush did propose to overhaul AID in 1991, with the International Cooperation Act of 1991 (H.R. 1792), but the act called for an unrealistic plan to hand over to the President the authority to set foreign aid funding levels (*Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (CQA) 1991). Congress was not about to give up its power of the purse and did not even bother to consider H.R. 1792. It is safe to assert the Bush Administration used a business as usual approach with regards to foreign aid.

There was also an attempt by Congress to redefine the strategic elements of foreign aid. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs appointed a bipartisan task force co-chaired by Lee Hamilton (D.-IN) and Ben Gilman (R.-NY). The task force was created because members of the committee were frustrated by their inability to exercise any control over the foreign aid program and by its lack of direction. It is important to note that the House Foreign Affairs Committee is responsible for passing authorizing legislation and that it had passed only two bills in the 1980s. The task force argued that foreign aid was plagued by too many objectives, and spread out over too many countries. The report concurred with AID's pet peeve that it was overburdened by

endless reporting requirements, earmarks and restrictions. The task force made several recommendations including: drafting a new international economic cooperation act to replace the Foreign Assistance Act, creating a new agency to replace AID, and making economic growth, environmental stability, and political and economic pluralism the principal objectives. The four objectives were reminiscent of the Basic Human Needs Mandate. The new organization would have greater flexibility, be more accountable, and improve coordination with other U.S. international economic policies (Ruttan 1996).

The report led to the International Economic Cooperation Act of 1989 (H.R. 2655). The bill contained many elements of the task force report including the four objectives for foreign assistance, and a revamped IDCA that included a Trade and Development Agency to promote private sector development strategies. The new IDCA would also contain centers to increase cooperation between the government and universities and PVOs. The legislation also reduced the reporting requirements, but did not eliminate earmarking of country and program funding by functional accounts. H.R. 2655 reversed the trend of increasing Economic Support Funds and increased funds devoted to development assistance. However, the level of funding authorized would not have been enough to fulfill the lofty goals it set. The act contained a total of $6.6 billion for bilateral assistance including only $2 billion for development assistance programs (Ruttan 1996). This was less than the $5.5 billion requested for the B-2 bomber by the President for FY 1991 (Congressional Budget Office 1990). The bill passed the House by an overwhelming margin (314 to 101), but the Senate failed to act. The Senate failed to act because Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D.-MN.) was concerned that efforts to contain Senator Jesse Helms (R.-NC) from amending the bill on the floor would be fruitless. There was also a lack of consultation between the House task force and Senate Foreign Affairs Committee (Ruttan 1996). Neither the Congress nor the President was able to alter the vision or basic structure of foreign assistance during the Bush Administration.

Structural Policy: The Mexico City Policy Hearings

During the Bush Administration the IPP subsystem became a major political battleground over the issue of the Mexico City Policy. There were numerous attempts by Congress to overturn the policy set during the

Reagan years. The initial attempt to change the policy came during hearings held by the Subcommittee on International Operations in September 1989. The hearings demonstrate the division that had grown in the IPP subsystem. The opposition to the Mexico City Policy is best represented by the words of Olympia Snowe (R.-ME).

> For the past four years. . .funding for population assistance has been slashed and U.S. contributions to the two leading non-governmental international population organizations [UNFPA and IPPF] have been suspended. Private organizations have proved the most cost-effective, flexible, innovative, and culturally sensitive channels of assistance. Because of these restrictions on private organizations, the United States places greater emphasis on bilateral assistance directly to governments. This is unfortunate, since such bilateral programs are often less cost-efficient than the private sector programs they replaced. It is also ironic, because government programs are specifically exempted from Mexico City restrictions relating to abortion. Within this country, family planning policy is based in law upon the principles of voluntary participation and informed consent. But with the Mexico City Policy, and with its censorship of important medical information, we have deliberately developed a double standard-one which ensures a lower standard of care for women in developing countries. I believe that this policy is misguided and seriously undermines the effectiveness of one of our most important international programs (U.S. House of Representatives 1989a, p. 2).

Representative Snowe, along with Chester Atkins (D.-MA), proposed the International Family Planning Protection Act (H.R. 720), that would prohibit the President from placing restrictions on IPP beyond those imposed on domestic programs.[10]

There was support expressed for the Mexico City Policy by Representative Chris Smith (R.-NJ). Smith argued that the Mexico City Policy effectively separated abortion from family planning and should be maintained.

[10]Similar legislation (H.R. 4270) was offered in 1988, but the bill died in committee.

At its core, the policy reflects the thinking of President Reagan who said: "What single issue could say more about a society's values than the degree of respect shown for human life at its most vulnerable--human life still unborn?" The policy is both pro-family; and pro-life. And according to the Agency for International Development (AID), not one dime--not one penny--has been cut in U.S. family planning expenditures as a result of this policy (U.S. House of Representatives 1989a, p. 8).

The crux of the debate in the hearings came in an exchange between Chris Smith, Olympia Snowe, and Bill Green (R.-NY):

Mr. Smith. What I'm suggesting is that according to the Warwick study, local statutes, in several countries appear to have been violated by these different organizations. But again U.S. law did not reach that particular activity until the promulgation of the 1984 Mexico City Policy.

Ms. Snowe. Yes, but the Mexico City Policy is much broader than that.

Mr. Smith. The point was that money is fungible.

Ms. Snowe. Well we can run that as infinitum in here. That's right. On a number of things that we don't accept or we do fund, Chris—I mean, we could say everything is fundable (*sic)*, everything we provide in our budget.

Mr. Smith. But if an organization is involved, for example, in the Philippines, and monies from the U.S. government are commingled or even segregated, we are still helping to advance the cause they are promoting . . .

Ms. Snowe. Do you think that mentioning-that as a doctor in a clinic, do you think that mentioning the legal availability of abortion is promoting abortion? If a mother's life is in danger?

Mr. Smith. If it is cast in a referral that could very well end in the death of the child . . .

Ms. Snowe. So you don't think that a doctor has a right in a clinic to mention the legal availability of abortion?

Mr. Smith. No, I don't . . . [But the] life of a mother is covered by the Mexico City Policy.

Ms. Snowe. Do you think the Mexico City Policy, since that time, has increased the incidence of abortion worldwide?

Mr. Smith. I think it cannot be said with certainty either way, what has happened worldwide with regards to abortion. The fact of the matter is that monies have flowed unabated, the Mexico City Policy did not diminish funding.

I would suggest to my colleague and friend from New York that the diminution of funding for the population account is more a function of Gramm-Rudman and the difficulty we had in the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations in providing funding aid in general. We have seen a lessening of those funds and it has been a very difficult process of setting priorities that we've had to go through. But it has not been a function of the Mexico City Policy.

Mr. Green. In fact, I think the record should be clear that in the summit agreement between successive presidents and the successive Democratic leaderships the Foreign Affairs account in fact has been a protected account, so I refuse to accept as a fact that it's because of Gramm-Rudman that the family planning level has declined. The fact of the matter is, of course, that the overall federal budget has grown and grown very substantially since fiscal 1985 (U.S. House of Representatives 1989a, pp. 18-20)

Almost all of the interest groups that testified supported H.R. 720, including the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, the IPPF, the Population Crisis Committee, and the Pathfinder Fund. The only interest group that supported the Mexico City Policy was the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. The legislation failed to advance, however, even with interest group support, largely because the President threatened to veto any legislation that changed the Mexico City Policy (U.S. House of Representatives 1989a).

Structural Policy: The Budget

The lack of consensus on foreign aid in general and the divisions over population policy affected the budgetary process in the Bush Administration. The House appropriations bill (H.R. 2939) worked its way through Congress at the same time as the authorization bill (H.R. 2655). The House passed the $14.3 billion

foreign operations appropriations bill on July 1, 1989. David Obey (D.-WI), the chair of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, insisted that the foreign aid program share in the government's efforts to control the budget deficit. Couple this with President Bush's campaign pledge to not raise taxes, and it led to a showdown between Obey and Bush. Obey expressed his position during committee hearings on H.R. 2939: "Last year we had a total bill before this committee of $14.3 billion . . . This year the administration has asked for . . . a budget of $14.7 billion . . . They are going to get $14.3 billion because I have read Mr. Bush's lips in slow motion and I believe there are going to be no new taxes" (Ruttan, 1996, p. 632). The bill included $201.6 million for population activities (U.S. House of Representatives 1989b). The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations passed a $14.4 billion foreign aid measure in September (Ruttan 1996). The legislation called for $220 million for population activities and included an amendment by Senator Barbara Mikulski (D.-MD) that earmarked $15 million for the UNFPA if the funds were kept in a separate account (U.S. Senate 1989a). The committee passed the Mikulski amendment 15 to 12. Senator Robert Kasten, Jr. (R.-WI) offered an amendment on the Senate floor to change the language back to the Kemp-Inouye-Helms Amendment, but the measure failed in a very close vote (48 to 50). The appropriations bill later passed by the Senate by a wide margin (89 to 11) (U.S. Senate 1989b). The conference committee process was held up by Obey in an effort to get the Senate to pass an authorization bill, but to no avail. The final version of the legislation earmarked $220 million for population activities and reflected the Basic Human Needs Mandate more than it did the Reagan/Bush agenda.

President Bush made clear his objections in his veto message to the Congress:

> Let me restate my strong support for international family planning programs, and my view that the United States should support such efforts so long as they do not violate Kemp-Kasten or other established policies of the United States. Unfortunately the Congress has inserted in the bill the so-called Mikulski Amendment, which would fatally weaken the integrity of Kemp-Kasten anti-coercion provision by earmarking funds for the United Nations Fund. The Fund participates in and strongly defends the

> program of a particular foreign government which relies heavily upon compulsory abortion. This fund has received no United States assistance since 1985, precisely because of its involvement in this coercive abortion policy. The current bill thus represents a radical and unwarranted change in policy.
>
> The Mikulski Amendment is rendered no more acceptable by a clause which requires the Fund to keep its books in a manner so as to prevent the direct flow of United States assistance to the particular government. . .The bookkeeping provision would clearly place the United States in the position of supporting a program that is inconsistent with American values. Such support would undermine our position that family planning must be voluntary and would contradict the human rights character of our foreign policy around the world (U.S. House of Representatives 1989c, p. 30114).

The President's veto forced Congress to rework the bill to be more in lines with his priorities. H.R. 3743 raised the foreign aid figure to $14.6 billion, dropped the Mikulski Amendment, but maintained the $220 million for family planning assistance for FY 1990 (Statutes at Large 1989). The legislation also included $40 million for Poland and $60 million for Hungary. There was enthusiastic support for aiding former communist countries such as Poland, which made foreign aid legislation easier to pass in 1989. The President and members of Congress looked to capitalize politically on the end of the Cold War by extending aid to countries formerly under the Soviet yoke. It was also politically popular to provide funds to countries from which many Americans emigrated and to hob nob with labor leaders like Lech Walesa, who just happened to be visiting the United States when the foreign aid bill was being considered (Ruttan 1996).

There was less controversy over foreign aid appropriations for FY 1991. Several efforts at passing an authorization bill failed, but the appropriations process lacked the acrimony of the previous year. The House and Senate passed appropriations bills earmarking $250 million for the population account (U.S. House of Representatives 1990a; U.S. Senate 1990). William Lehman (D.-FL) and John Porter (R.-IL) made another effort to amend the Mexico City Policy to allow the U.S. to provide population assistance to Romania through IPPF. The Lehman-Porter Amendment was dropped after Chris Smith was able to pass substitute language that

maintained the Mexico City prohibition (U.S. House of Representatives 1990b). The final appropriation of $250 million was higher than $222 million requested by the Bush Administration, suggesting that Congress was the political sovereign responsible for maintaining and expanding the IPP budget during this period (OMB 1990).

For FY 1992, the budget process followed the familiar course it had in previous years. Congress failed to pass authorizing legislation, attempted to overturn the Mexico City Policy, and could only pass two 6-month continuing appropriations. H.R. 2508 was a two-year authorization that earmarked $300 million for FY 1992 and $350 million for FY 1993 when it passed the House (274 to 138) on June 20, 1991 (CQA 1991a; U.S. House of Representatives 1991a). The Senate had been working on S. 1435 that contained a two-year authorization of $257.7 million for both years, but it was dropped in order to take up H.R. 2508. The Senate version of H.R. 2508 passed the Senate in July, and authorized $300 million for population activities in FYs 1991 and 1992 (U.S. Senate 1991). Both bills contained language overturning the Mexico City Policy by earmarking $20 million for the UNFPA. The Mexico City Policy was defeated after one vote (234 to 188) adopted a substitute amendment to Chris Smith's amendment that funded the UNFPA. A second substitute amendment to another Smith amendment was also passed (222-200) that adopted less restrictive language to certify funds for the UNFPA (CQA 1991a). The conference report for H.R. 2508 failed to pass the House (159 to 262) though, because many members were caught up in an "America-first backlash against foreign aid that transcended partisan and ideological divisions" (CQA 1991, p. 470; (U.S. House of Representatives 1991a). It is likely that Bush would have vetoed the measure anyway, given the language overturning the Mexico City Policy.

Separate bills were also offered to specifically allow AID to resume funding the UNFPA. In the House, H.R.s 1110 and 1179 were offered to overturn the Mexico City Policy.[11] H.R. 1110 allowed the U.S. to fund the UNFPA if (1) the United Nations Population Fund maintained the funds in a separate account and not commingle them with any other funds; (2) none of these were made available for programs in the People's Republic of China (PRC); (3) the United Nations Population Fund agreed to refund any money proven to be used

[11]H.R. 1110 had 135 sponsors and H.R. 1179 had 111 sponsors. In the case of H.R. 1110 there were 115 Democrats, 19 Republicans and 1 Independent who sponsored the bill.

for any family planning programs in the PRC or for abortions in any country; and (4) the UNFPA refunded any U.S. funds provided between 1990-1995, if the Population Fund provided more than fifty-seven million dollars for programs in the PRC (U.S. Representatives 1991b). Senator Mikulski offered S. 1028 containing similar language to H.R.s 1110 and 1179, with regards to the Mexico City Policy (U.S. Senate 1991b). H.R. 1110 and S. 1028 also included authorizations for international family planning in FY 1992. H.R. 1110 earmarked $570 million and S. 1028 authorized $470 million for population programs, and each would have earmarked $65 million for the UNFPA (U.S. House of Representative 1991b and 1991c; U.S. Senate 1991b). None of these bills, however, were able to make it past the committee stage.

Congress funded foreign aid through two 6-month continuing resolution (H.J. Res. 360 and H.J. Res. 456) that froze the population account at $250 million for FY 1992 (CQA 1991b; 1992a). The House had passed H.R. 2621 (301 to 102), which included a subcommittee amendment by Republicans Bill Green and John Porter to change the Mexico City Policy. In the full committee, David Obey muddied the political waters by offering an amendment he called "the Hypocrisy Reduction Act of 1991," which provided for UNFPA funding only if the U.S. granted the PRC Most Favored Nation trading status (MFN) (CQA 1991b). Obey argued: "If we're going to isolate China, we ought to isolate them across the board" (CQA 1991b, p. 657). The political reality was framed best by Vin Weber (R.-MN) when he conceded that the linking of the two issues would have created problems achieving the administration's goal of granting China MFN status. The issue never came to a head, because the Senate agreed to defer on H.R. 2621 after an agreement was reached to delay consideration of Israel's request for $10 billion in loan guarantees for the influx of immigrants from the former communist states (CQA 1992).

For FY 1993, Congress passed (297 to 124) a supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 5368) that earmarked $350 million for population activities (Statutes at Large 1992). The continued resilience of the population program in Congress could be seen in the fact that the overall foreign aid budget was reduced by $628 million over the previous year, while the population account grew by $100 million over FY1992. (NYT 1992). There was not much effort in trying to draft authorizing legislation, but H.R. 5368 marked a departure

from previous foreign aid legislation. The influence of David Obey can be seen in the fact that military assistance was cut deeply, while development programs increased. The President's favored ESF account was cut as well (CQA 1992a). The House version of H.R. 5368 earmarked $330 million, of which $20 million was for the UNFPA (U.S. House of Representatives 1992). The Senate version of H.R. 5368 provided $350 million for population activities and contained language that overturned the Mexico City Policy as well. Efforts to change the Mexico City Policy were dropped in conference over H.R. 5368, because the conferees wanted to avoid a veto and were ready to adjourn for the year. The final version of H.R. 5368 maintained the Senate's $350 million for the population account (CQA, 1992b).

Structural Policy: Organizational Change

One side effect of all the efforts to redefine the strategic nature of foreign aid was the AID reorganizations that occurred during the Bush Administration. AID Administrator Roskens implemented reorganization plans in 1991 and 1992. In 1991, Roskens initiated an internal reorganization plan to streamline the organizational structure and greatly simplify operating procedures. AID was divided into two basic parts, an Operations Directorate and a Finance and Administration Directorate. The reorganization plan changed the Bureau for Science and Technology to the Bureau for Research and Development, which contained the Office of Population. The new structure also contained a policy staff that was responsible for strategic planning, policy and budget analysis, and donor coordination, and reported directly to the administrator (Johnson 1991). The 1992 reorganization further insulated Roskens from policy and management decisions and strengthened the hand of Secretary of State James Baker. It is unclear what effects these reorganizations had on the Population Program itself, but the overall changes seem to have been negligible, given the continued calls to redesign the foreign aid program (Ruttan 1996).

The greatest controversy over IPP during the timeframe of this study coincided with the Bush Administration. The Republicans controlled the presidency, but the Democrats controlled both houses of Congress. The Democratic Congress offered no quarter to Bush when it came to setting foreign aid priorities.

Couple this with the vocal and influential conservative interest groups and Republican members of Congress, and you had the recipe for major political warfare. The political battles over foreign aid reflected the differences in vision each side had for foreign assistance. The President's veto power sustained the Mexico City Policy, while Congress' control over the purse strings reversed the downward trend in IPP funding. Despite the political battles, the population program proved its staying power by being an exception to the diminished foreign aid budgets during the Bush years. The staying power of the population program also demonstrated the strength of the consensus created by the Coale-Hoover thesis and the Global 2000 Report.

Population Policy Under Clinton

Strategic Policy: Sustainable Development

(Or the Son of the Basic Human Needs Mandate)

The search for a new foreign aid strategy never stopped during the Bush Administration. For example, the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act of 1991 contained the establishment of the President's Commission on the Management of AID programs (the Ferris commission), but did not inspire the new Clinton Administration. Another study was the 1992 Task Force on Development Assistance and Economic Growth (the Schuh task force). The report of the Schuh task force emphasized the need to invest in human capital where private capital markets were absent. The report by the Independent Group on the Future of U.S. Development Cooperation, however, previewed the priorities of the Clinton Administration. The report by the Independent Group arose from a series of informal seminars sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Overseas Development Council (Ruttan 1996). The Independent Group's report argued that U.S. development assistance programs should be centered on the goal of achieving sustainable development. The report defined sustainable development as "growth that brings with it alleviation of poverty and preservation of the environment for successive generations in a context of government accountability and social justice consistent with the aspiration of all members of a society" (Ruttan 1996, p. 465). The Independent Group called for the U.S. Sustainable

Development Cooperation Agency to replace AID. The new organization's priorities included investing in people, protecting the earth, and strengthening democratic societies.

President Clinton's AID Administrator, J. Brian Atwood, was not satisfied with the assembly line of previous studies, so he commissioned another task force under the direction of the Deputy Secretary of State Clifton Wharton. The Wharton report led to the drafting of the Peace, Development, and Democracy Act of 1994 (H.R. 3765). The Wharton report and H.R. 3765 set sustainable development as their goal to be achieved through six priorities for foreign assistance: (1) protecting the environment; (2) stabilizing population growth; (3) protecting human health; (4) building democracy; (5) encourage economic growth; and (6) aiding people in times of disaster (Ruttan 1996). These priorities were direct descendants of the Basic Human Needs Mandate. The legislation would have deemphasized bilateral aid programs to pursue the broad goals of the program. The administration argued that the foreign aid system was unwieldy with its 100 statutory priorities and 28 sections dealing with development assistance. Foreign aid reform died in 1994, despite the fact that everyone was painfully aware that it was needed.

Two factors accounted for the death of H.R. 3765. First, the legislation contained provisions that ended congressional earmarks and granted the President wide discretion to set funding priorities. Congress would never give up the power of the purse according to Obey: "We will not give to an unelected bureaucracy federal authority to spend dollars any way they want . . . There will be no blank checks" (CQA 1994, p. 453). Second, Congress was working with a full calendar of domestic legislation that was deemed to be more pressing. Thus, foreign aid reform did not occur early in the Clinton Administration.

Even though Clinton did not gain passage of H.R. 3765, it was clear that the President and the 103rd Congress were on the same page in terms of the direction of foreign aid. Congress and President Clinton believed in sustainable development, but were unable to initially codify the consensus. IPP was an important means of achieving sustainable development. Clinton outlined his view on family planning during a speech at the State Department in June 1994.

> Our population policy is rooted in the idea that the family should be at the center of all of our objectives. Therefore, there must be a (*sic*) support for the concept of responsibility of parents to their children, of men and women to one another, and of our current generation to future generations. Progress brings freedom; freedom requires more disciplined responsibility . . . Our policy has always been rooted in ethical principles of compassion and justice and respect for human rights. We have supported every individual's dignity and worth. And we will continue to oppose and condemn all forms of coercion in family planning" (U.S. President 1994, p. 1163).

The consensus between the President and important members of Congress about the strategic direction of development assistance would help the IPP policy process run more smoothly during the 103rd Congress.

Structural Policy: The Mexico City Policy and The Budget

There were two notable structural changes in IPP during the first two years of the Clinton presidency. First, the President moved immediately to discard the Mexico City Policy. Early in 1993, the President proposed ending the ban on money for the UNFPA and a $50 million appropriation for FY 1994. The proposal seemed certain to pass Congress given the support cited for ending the ban during the Bush Administration, but circumstances muddled the situation. The *New York Times* began a series of articles at the end of April tracing the extreme practices of the Chinese family planning program (NYT 1993). Supporters of the Mexico City Policy, such as Chris Smith (R.-NJ), were quick to criticize the proposed change. Representative Smith cited the newspaper articles as a reason for opposing the change. He concluded "Mr. Clinton, seeks to reverse this humane pro-woman pro-child policy, thus making the Clinton Administration an accessory to these crimes against humanity. Mr. Clinton wants to give $50 million to the UNFPA—which would be outrageous" (U.S. House of Representatives 1993a, p. H2060). Despite Smith's work, there was not much political effort expended to maintain the Mexico City Policy. For example, there was no floor fight like the one that occurred in 1992.

The proposal to change the Mexico City Policy was contained in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2295). There were various versions of the language to change the Mexico City policy, but each one

placed restrictions on the money for the UNFPA. The final version of H.R. 2295 contained several important provisions. The legislation earmarked $40 million for the UNFPA; none of the funds could be used for activities in the People's Republic of China, and required the Secretary of State to submit a report to the Committees on Appropriations indicating the amount budgeted by the UNFPA for the PRC in 1994. Any amount more than $10 million spent in PRC in 1994 was to be deducted from the amount of funds provided to UNFPA. The law also required the funds to be kept in a separate account (U.S. House of Representatives 1993b).

Second, there were changes in the FY 1994 foreign aid budget that reflected the changing international circumstances. Most of the attention in the foreign aid bill was devoted to aiding the former Soviet states. Paying for the ex-Soviet aid package required either additional funds or a juggling of current accounts. Increased funding was not a possibility given the drive to balance the budget. In fact, cutting the deficit required cutting the foreign aid budget as well, so the government was forced to rework the foreign aid numbers at a level that was less than previous years. U.S. foreign aid was the same amount in FY 1994 as it was in FY 1990 ($14.6 billion). Overall, there were cuts in both economic and security assistance to help pay for the $2.5 billion ex-Soviet aid package and budget shortfalls (CQA 1993).

While most foreign aid accounts were cut in FY 1994, only a few, such as aid for Israel and Egypt and the population account, were maintained or expanded. In keeping with his remarks made at the State Department, the President proposed expanding the population account by $50 million over the previous year. Both the Senate and House versions earmarked $392 million for population activities. Democratic control over all the major political bodies precluded major conflict over changing the Mexico City Policy and made additional funds available for U.S. IPP.

The population account received another boost in FY 1995, despite the fact that the overall foreign aid budget was reduced to $13.8 billion (CQA 1994b). Both the House and Senate versions of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill (H.R. 4426) increased the population account by $58 million, up to $450 million. When H.R. 4426 came to the House floor, Anthony Beilenson (D.-CA) offered a motion to add $100 million to

the population account. The proposal would have been paid for with a .75 percent across-the-board cut. The Beilenson Amendment was defeated by a wide margin (54 to 371). The version that passed House (337 to 87) contained new restrictions on funds for the UNFPA. The House bill approved the administration's full request for $60 million the UN fund under stricter conditions recommended by David Obey (D.-WI). The House language required $20 million to be withheld from the fund if the UN pending a decision on whether or not to withdraw its support for the program in China. In addition, the threshold for withholding funds from the UNFPA based on its contribution to the PRC's family planning programs was reduced to $7 million. The Senate version of H.R. 4426 earmarked $50 million for the UNFPA and dropped the $20 million Obey provision. The Senate's provisions survived in the conference bill that became law (CQA 1994b; House of Representatives 1994a).

Strategic Policy: The International Conference on Population and Development

The UN's International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in 1994 was an important strategic event early in the Clinton Administration.[15] The events leading up to the conference demonstrate the same divisions, but with different relative strengths, that existed ten years earlier in Mexico City. Most of the pre-conference debate centered on provisions in the Programme of Action concerning abortion. The Roman Catholic Church actively opposed the position taken by the United States during the preparatory meetings for the ICPD. The language in the draft of the Programme of Action could be construed to support abortion and homosexuality according to the Vatican (NYT 1994a).[16] For example, chapter seven of the draft asserted "the right of men and women to be informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods

[15]The conference was held in Cairo, Egypt on September 5-13, 1994.

[16]The Plan of Action was 16 chapters and 113 pages.

of fertility regulation of their choice" (United Nations 1994a, p. 3). Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs Timothy Wirth countered that U.S. policy was to reduce, not promote, abortions (NYT 1994b).[17]

The President and the Vice-President vigorously defended the U.S. position regarding abortion. During a speech in June to the National Academy of Sciences President Clinton stressed:

> Now, I want to be clear about this, contrary to some assertions, we do not support abortion as a method of family planning. We respect, however, the diversity of national laws--except we do oppose coercion wherever it exists. Our own policy in the United States is that this should be a matter of personal choice, not public dictation. And, as I have said many times, abortion should be safe, legal, and rare. In other countries where it does exist, we believe safety is an important issue. And if you look at the mortality figures, it is hard to turn away from that issue. We also believe that providing women with the means to prevent unwanted pregnancy will do more than anything else to reduce abortion (U.S. Department of State 1994, p. 13).

Vice-President Al Gore also deflected the criticism in a speech before the National Press Club at the end of August:

> We do not believe that abortion should be viewed as a method of family planning . . . And we certainly do not regard abortion as morally equivalent to contraception . . . Let me be clear: our Administration believes that the U.S. Constitution guarantees every woman within our borders a right to choose, subject to limited and specific exceptions . . . But let us take a false issue off the table—the United States has not sought, does not seek, and will not seek to establish any international right to an abortion. That is a red herring (U.S. Department of State 1994, p. 14).

The efforts of Clinton and Gore did not allay the reservations of the Roman Catholic Church who sought support from Islamic religious leaders going into the conference (NYT 1994c). The controversy led Saudi Arabia and Sudan to withdraw from the conference (NYT 1994d; 1994e).

[17]Wirth headed the delegation to the Cairo Conference. A list of the other delegates could not be found, but Vice-President Gore attended the conference.

Congressional hearings before the conference also reflected the division that played out in the press. On one hand there was a majority that strongly supported the administration. Numerous House members and interest group representatives spoke favorably about the work done by Undersecretary Wirth and the administration's population policies. For example, the Dean of the School of Public Health at Columbia University, Allan Rosenfield, supported the pro-choice position of the U.S. at the conference. "If we really honor individual freedoms and individual rights, then these types of services should be made available and then people have the free choice to use them or not use them. I think those who oppose such service should not use them but they should not oppose their use by others who believe that they are appropriate to use them" (U.S. House of Representatives 1994b, p. 21). Besides the abortion issue, the majority of the hearing's participants rejected the economic and environmental arguments made by Reagan delegates like Julian Simon. The former President of the World Bank, Barber Conable, argued that there was an international consensus between the developed and the developing world that rapid population growth was adversely affecting economic development (U.S. House of Representatives 1994b).

On the other hand there were critics of the positions of the U.S. at the conference. Representative Smith included materials for the record that were critical of the population movement. Smith included an essay by Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute that argued against the Coale-Hoover consensus. Eberstadt argued that recent research on the relationship between population growth and economic development was inconclusive, which, in effect, negated the stated primary reason for an IPP (U.S. House of Representatives 1994b).

Representative Henry Hyde (R.-IL) suggested that foreign aid funds would be better used for health and nutrition programs rather than family planning.

Dr. Margaret Ogala, a physician and general practitioner in Kenya, reports that birth control pills or the IUD can be found in most health delivery centers throughout Kenya. "Unfortunately but understandably (since the idea is not to save life but diminish it), not the same can be said of the availability of even the

simplest lifesaving antibiotic penicillin. The doctor finds that while he cannot save the life of a woman dying of simple pneumonia because he does not have a vial of penicillin which costs only a few cents, he could have, if he so desired, fit her with as many IUDs as he like in her death throes" (U.S. House of Representatives 1994b, p. 25).

Dr. Rosenfield responded by saying that both programs were integral programs that should not be pitted against each other.

There was also debate over reversing the Mexico City Policy. Representative Smith attacked the Mexico City Policy reversal during the hearings.

The United Nations Population Fund has been the cheerleader and also the whitewasher of these horrendous crimes being committed against women. And our attempts to segregate accounts and play games with bookkeeping, in no way, I think, can consummate these terrible crimes. My point is, China continues today right now with the UNFPA, UN personnel on the ground assisting in these barbaric practices. They will be one of the participants in Cairo, highly esteemed and honored at Cairo, and meanwhile they are oppressing their women. I, for one, would hope that we would stand with the oppressed. These women, these children are being aborted. The number went from 3 to 4 million per year of abortions in China before the one-child-per-couple policy, to anywhere from to 14 million a year. It works. Unfortunately, it works because coercion works (U.S. House of Representatives 1994b, p. 40).

John Porter (R.-IL) countered that Smith was distorting the role of the UNFPA in the Chinese program.

If I could suggest to the gentleman that the money that goes in from UNFPA to China is about $10 million. They are estimated to be spending in excess of $1 billion on their program. It is infinitesimally small amount of money. The money today is spent on maternal and child health. And I might say that while it is a correct moral position for us to say we don't approve of the Chinese program, what we managed to do over the years by cutting off funds to the UNFPA, which did nothing, I might say, to change the Chinese program, we managed to cut off funding through UNFPA to 130 other countries that

were not engaged in any way in coercive practices, which I think was a policy that in its own way was an immoral one. So I suggest to the gentleman, you are putting UNFPA in a light that is not fair. Their participation is very small. Their program is not supportive of coercive practices, and our policy has been one that has simply not worked and has hurt the cause of voluntary family planning worldwide (U.S. House of Representatives 1994b, p. 42).

Family planning supporters carried the day, but the issue continued to be contentious.[18]

Other issues were covered in the hearings. The experts stressed several objectives that needed to be included in future family planning programs. First, Dr. Rosenfield argued that greater resources would need to be devoted to pay for additional educational programs he deemed necessary for success. Mr. Conable pleaded for increased opportunities for women. "You have got to give people the incentives to use it . . . It comes with improved educational levels, with women's access to the economic activity of the country since women are the caregivers and tend to dedicate more of their income to children than others" (U.S. House of Representatives 1994b, p. 18). Second, Dr. Samuel Preston, a demographer at the University of Pennsylvania, argued for more contraceptive research. The President of the Population Council, Margaret Catley-Carlson, agreed with both objectives and suggested further contraceptive research should focus on hormone- and vaccine-based contraceptives for men. Other issues like sustainable development and reducing child mortality were mentioned as well (U.S. House of Representatives 1994b).

The controversy over the language of the Programme of Action continued during the conference. The delegation from Pakistan worked five hours to draft a compromise position that the Vatican representatives refused to support amid a chorus of boos. The Vatican delegation refused to support the wording, noting that "in circumstances in which

Table 3.2 **World Population**

Year	Mid-Year Population	Avg. Annual Growth Rate	Avg. Annual Change
1965	3,345,410,699	2.07	40,623,555
1974	4,012,917,169	1.81	73,474,190
1984	4,769,993,531	1.68	80,690,582
1994	5,607,008,810	1.43	80,590,914

[18]The election of Republican majorities in both houses of the 104th Congress changed the political dynamics and led to more fights over the Mexico City Policy.

abortion is legal, such abortion should be safe," because it violated the sanctity of life (NYT 1994f, p. 1). The Vatican authorities finally conceded the point after a five-day standoff. The final language of chapter 8 of the Programme of Action stated:

> In no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning. All governments and relevant intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations are urged to strengthen their commitment to women's health, to deal with the health impact of unsafe abortion as a major public health concern and to reduce the recourse to abortion through expanded improved family planning services . . . In circumstances in which abortion is not against the law, such abortion should be safe (NYT 1994g, p.1).

It would be unfair to leave the impression that the ICPD was as rancorous as the Mexico City conference in 1984. The overall Programme of Action was a sophisticated one that took into account many factors thought to be related to rapid population growth. At the center of the plan was the family. The action plan urged all countries to work on programs that strengthen the family and noted how family planning programs could contribute. The action plan also stressed the interrelationships between human populations and the environment. The action plan was sensitive to the principles established in "Agenda 21" that were agreed to at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. The plan urged closing the gender gap by increasing educational and political opportunities for women. The Programme also noted the role contraceptives could play in reducing AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). Other subjects in the plan included the development of adolescent programs, urbanization, migrations, and economic investment (United Nations 1994b).

In some respects, however, the plan still failed to establish clear lines between public and private rights and responsibilities, and clear objectives. The Programme maintained the vague language regarding the right of couples to determine their family size, while bearing in mind their responsibilities to their posterity and the rest of society. The plan again failed to set specific targets for countries and was written with broad objectives to

avoid political conflicts (United Nations 1994b). Others expressed doubts that adequate resources would be made available to achieve the goals of the Programme (NYT 1994h).

Overall, however, the beginning of the Clinton Administration and the outcome of the ICPD should be seen as a reconfirmation of the strategic presuppositions that led to the establishment of U.S. IPP in 1965. The combination of the desire to help people with the Basic Human Needs Mandate, the economic rationale delivered by the Coale-Hoover thesis, and the environmental concerns denoted by the Global 2000 Report and notions of sustainable development can all be seen in the words of Undersecretary Wirth:

> The International Conference on Population and Development is a crucial milestone on our long journey toward population stabilization and sustainable development. The challenges before the global community are great, but we are compelled to act by moral imperatives to alleviate human suffering and to safeguard our collective future. There are plenty of sound reasons for hope. For all the difficulties we face, we can still say that in the last 50 years we have made more progress in alleviating human misery than in the previous two millenia . . . The Cairo conference offers an unparalleled opportunity to define and meet those goals. The emerging international consensus on population issues provides a firm basis for action, and the Clinton Administration is poised to take a leadership role in Cairo and beyond (U.S. Department of State 1993, p. 1).

These ideas animated the IPP subsystem and formed the basis of its support over the past thirty years.

Conclusion

The last two chapters have traced the historical development of U.S. international population policy in broad outline from its inception to 1995. Studying U.S. IPP between 1965-1995 reveals several important general features of non-crisis foreign policy making. First, political sovereigns like the President and Congress dominate the non-crisis foreign policy process, but are influenced by important interest groups and intellectual beliefs (ideational factors). Second, the size of a policy subsystem, and its place within the institutional framework, can affect the outcomes it produces. The IPP subsystem is small enough to be subject to the

influence of larger external factors such as the place of foreign aid in the appropriations pecking order and economic downturns. Third, the policy process constantly vacillates between the strategic aspects that determine priorities and goals, and structural aspects that transform goals into actions. Both the executive and legislative branches can make strategic policies. Fourth, changes in strategic policies come from partisan changes in governmental institutions and the conglomerations of interests that elect the government. Changes in strategic policies will lead to changes in structural policies within undefined limits. Bureaucratic predispositions and procedures make it seemingly impossible to make extreme structural changes at any given time. Finally, policy changes do occur, however, under certain circumstances. Policies will change over the long haul as technology and knowledge bases change. The transformation of foreign policies like IPP will be evolutionary as long as there is a consensus over the knowledge base. Changes in a policy will be revolutionary or reactionary when the knowledge base becomes fractious and the political institutions reflect that fracture (e.g., the Mexico City Policy).

It is now necessary to formally develop the theoretical underpinnings that guide this study. Chapter Four will do this by exploring the theoretical literature and by reexamining U.S. IPP in light of that theoretical discussion.

4
Theoretical Review

Observe constantly that all things take place by change,
and accustom thyself to consider that the nature of the
Universe loves nothing so much as to change the things
which are, and to make new things like them.
(Marcus Aurelius: Meditations IV)

Introduction

The purpose of Chapter Four is to extend the discussion on policymaking introduced in Chapter One and to tie the ACF to the historical review of international population policy. The next section traces the development of theoretical literature regarding both domestic and foreign policymaking by looking at six strands of theory. The first five approaches introduce important elements of the policy process, but tend to lack a multi-dimensional approach. The Advocacy Coalition Framework incorporates many ideas found in the first five approaches that provide a fairly sophisticated model of policy change. The problems with the ACF and its utilization are also addressed.

The second section of Chapter Four reexamines U. S. IPP in light of the theoretical discussion. The analysis will suggest that a single policy has multiple settings in which decisions are made. The approach here is broader than the historical review in the previous chapters. Population policy is examined in terms of the strategic and structural changes identified as important. The roles of the relevant policy makers are identified and discussed for each type of policy change.

Six Strands of Theory

There is a rich literature that examines public policy making. Influential early writers, like Max Weber, stressed ways to make rational public policies. Weber argued that public policy making is about the legitimate and rational ordering of social preferences. Any order is considered to be legitimate if the citizens believe that it is based on valid traditions, if they have positive emotional ties to it. and it is recognized as legal (Weber 1947). Legitimate governments attempt to create a rational public order where the body of laws are consistently administered based on abstract rules. This requires an administrative capacity that is hierarchical, functionally specialized, and staffed by competent experts (Weber 1947). Weber argued that a monocratic bureaucracy is

capable of "attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational means of carrying out imperative control of human beings" (Weber 1947, p. 337). However, many public bureaucracies are multiple, overlapping, and subject to outside influences that impinge upon their ability to achieve this ideal type (Anderson 1975). Hence, public policy making should be seen as a complex process in which multiple actors seek to influence the outcomes of political intercourse (Truman 1951).

Several strands of theoretical development have followed in the wake of Weber's analysis.[1] First, *pluralists* view the policy process as the resolution of conflict between organized interest groups. Public institutions resolve conflicts through compromise. The second strand is *institutionalism*. Proponents argue that institutional rules and roles create patterns of behavior that are significant to political outcomes. Third, is the *arenas of power approach*, which suggests that the nature of policies will determine the type of policy process used to reach political outcomes. Fourth, the *funnel of causality* develops five sectors thought to comprise the policy process. The fifth strand is the *multiple streams approach*, which focuses on agenda setting and policy formulation. The last approach is the *advocacy coalition framework* (ACF). The ACF incorporates many of the elements of the other strands, to develop a comprehensive view of the policy process. It is important to examine each of these theories in order to appreciate the theoretical underpinnings of the ACF.

Pluralism

First, pluralism is probably the oldest and most important strand of theory that explains the policy process in democratic systems. At its core, pluralism makes three important assumptions: social diversity and balance; a separation of powers; and subsystem autonomy. Many pluralists argue that all societies are naturally diverse. How the parts of a society are ordered determine the power relations between the groups in a society. Plato advocated a hierarchical structure as the best possible social ordering. Philosopher Kings and the Auxiliaries

[1]This list is not exhaustive, but demonstrates the range of thought in this area. For example, Paul Sabatier argues that the statist approach is another strand of theory (Sabatier, 1993). According to Sabatier, this theory asserts that the state acts as a unified and relatively autonomous actor in the policy process. He cites Skocpol, 1979 and Skowornek, 1982 as sources of this approach. I fail to see how Sabatier assumes this from these sources. First, it is not clear how Skocpol's interest in explaining social revolutions is directly applicable to theories of the policy process. Second, I think that it would be better to classify these writers as institutionalists. Both Skocpol and Skowronek recognize that institutions are important to policy making. For example, Skocpol believes that collective action is based upon "group organization and access to resources (13-14)." She disagrees with the notion that the state is solely an arena for the resolution of class conflict (26). Instead, the state should be seen as a structure with a logic and interests of its own that are separate from the rest of society (27). Skowronek asserts that the growth of bureaucratic institutions is about defining and redefining the power relations of the powerful organizations (i.e., classes) in society (13). These relations are, at least partially, determined by public institutions which have an independent effect upon political outcomes (18). So, I think Sabatier is mistakenly marginalizing these writers, when they both just stress the importance of institutions.

should rule in the best interests of the society. In contrast to Plato, Aristotle argued that a "balance" must be struck between the various social groupings within society. Justice and political stability are achieved through the representation of all major interests in allocating public values. Montesquieu, in the pluralist tradition, argued that individual liberty can only be protected by the separation of powers, which works against the tendency toward the domination of others by a single group. The separation of powers decentralizes power so that ambition will counter ambition (Madison, Federalist No. 51). Madison's notion about ambition is also the reason for subsystem autonomy. Subsystem autonomy refers to the relationships between members of the government; the economy and polity; the Church and State; and the State and individuals. All social groupings have limited autonomy, but they are intermeshed by a political system that determines the scope of that autonomy and how the groupings will interact (Baskin 1971).

Pluralists, like David Truman, assert that groups are central to pluralist theory, because individuals are social creatures, and will naturally form into groups. Many groups will form along functional lines, which can lead to rivalry and conflict. Part of this rivalry is overcome by the fact that there will be an overlap in group membership among individuals, especially in the industrial era. Public policy making is about resolving conflicts that occur during group interaction (Truman, 1951). Groups are important to analyze because they tend to be more politically effective than individuals; their interaction creates a healthy political competition that lends itself to bargaining (which, in turn, creates a barrier against extremism); and they generate an extensive network that facilitates the spread of information and communication (Dahl and Lindblom 1953). In many respects, pluralists portray the policy process as a free market system, in which interest groups compete with each other. Public officials acts as policy brokers that try to bargain with competing interests in order to achieve a compromise (McLennan 1989). Thus, pluralists tend to portray government officials as neutral arbiters in the policy process, who work to achieve an equilibrium in the political sphere (Easton 1953).

Institutionalism

The second strand of theory, institutionalism, basically asserts that organizational arrangements affect individual behaviors and pattern political outcomes. Major writers like Kenneth Arrow, Anthony Downs, Mancur Olson, James March, William Riker, Thomas Schelling and Herbert Simon are among the advocates of this approach. Institutional analysts attempt to explain how individuals reach decisions and carry them out. It is assumed that individuals act to achieve valued outcomes, which means that decision makers must have some

notion of how actions are linked to outcomes (Arrow 1966; Downs 1957). Most institutional models assume individual rationality of some sort, including utility maximizers and satisficers (March and Simon 1965; Simon 1957). How decision makers act depends upon the attributes of the situation. Situational factors includes things like the number of decision makers involved, the type of choices available, the linkages between actions and results, and the types of outcomes available. The situational factors determine the actions and strategies employed by individuals (Olson 1965; Riker and Odershook 1973). Game Theory has shed light on how individual strategies and actions are determined. Institutional arrangements are important because they determine the range of actions and strategies available in a given situation (Schelling 1978).

An excellent synthesis of this approach is offered by Larry Kiser and Elinor Ostrom (1982). Their portrayal of the institutional approach is depicted in Figure 4.1. There are five working parts functioning at three levels of analysis in the institutional approach. Individuals (not groups) are at the center of this model. The other four working parts establish the environment in which individual choices are made. The environment includes the community affected by a choice, institutional arrangements that guide decisions, and the situation at

Figure 4.1 **Three Levels of Institutional Analysis**



the constitutional level, which focuses on how the design of collective choice mechanisms affects political outcomes. Second, the collective choice level explains how values are authoritatively allocated. Third, the

operational level explains how the actions at the first two levels play out in the real world. Each level has institutional and situational elements that may vary in importance from one level to the next. The three levels are linked by the institutional arrangements that join one level of decision making to the next. So, “constitutional decisions establish institutional arrangements and their enforcement for collective choice. Collective decisions, in turn, establish institutional arrangements and their enforcement for action” (Kiser and Ostrom 1982, p. 209).

Arenas of Power

Third is Theodore Lowi’s arenas of power (1964; 1967; 1972). Lowi argues that a distinction should be made between distributive, regulatory, and redistributive policies. Each arena has its own political structure, process, elites and group relations. Distributive policies pertain to governmental decisions that are made "without regard to limited resources," and are often referred to as pork barrel programs. Distributive policies are easily disaggregated, which means that they can be procured in small units without creating a great deal of controversy. Patronage programs like public land and resources, basic research and development, defense procurement, and road improvements are examples of this kind of policy (Lowi 1964). Regulatory policies refer to a body of rules which guide the conduct of actions in a given area. Regulations tend to define the costs and alternatives available for private individuals in a myriad of areas like auto safety standards, hazardous waste disposal, and the allocation of the public air waves. Regulatory policies are not easily disaggregated like distributive policies, and can only be divided into the various sectors to which they relate (e.g., auto standards). Redistributive policies move public resources from one group to another, and include things like welfare programs and the progressive income tax. The redistribution of resources occurs between large aggregates of people, generally at the class level. These three types of policies are referred to as policy arenas.

Each policy arena has certain characteristics which warrant their differentiation, according to Lowi. The distributive arena has a large number of highly-organized interests that petition the government for certain political considerations. Since making a discrimination between building one bridge over another is a dicey business, members of Congress are likely to support proposals made by interests strong enough to muster a measurable amount of pressure, and subscribe to the "you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours" mentality with their fellow members. Lowi argues: "When a billion dollar issue can be disaggregated into many millions of nickel-dime items and each item can be dealt with without regard to the others, multiplication of interests and of access is inevitable, and so is the reduction of conflict" (Lowi 1964, p. 692). The ability to disaggregate large

issues into many lends itself to an arena that is composed of coalitions which operate on the basis of mutual non-interference and is susceptible to log-rolling. Mutual non-interference lends itself to a stable distributive arena over long periods of time. After some translation by Lowi, the regulatory arena is likened to the pluralist model. Given the higher levels of aggregation in the regulatory arena, conflict and compromise are more likely than in the distributive arena. Even though political leaders will attempt to disaggregate issues to avoid conflict, this strategy will not always succeed. Thus, the regulatory arena is viewed as less stable than the distributive arena (Lowi 1964). The redistributive arena is characterized by high levels of partisan and ideological conflict. The aggregation of interests are very stable, but redistributive policies are resolved by political sovereigns instead of policy subsystems (Ripley and Franklin 1980).

Lowi's arenas of power should be expanded to account for distinctions in foreign and domestic policy processes. Chapter One mentioned that many writers argued presidents have wide discretion in foreign policy making. Aaron Wildavsky (1966) argued that foreign affairs afford presidents more opportunities to set policy than in domestic affairs, leading to his "Two Presidencies" hypothesis. Other writers echoed this sentiment, arguing that an imperial presidency had developed in which the abuse of power became rampant and was being extended to the domestic sphere (Schlesinger 1973). Subsequent research, however, has called these postulates into question. LeLoup and Shull (1979) found that the gap between domestic and foreign policy success found in the Eisenhower Administration had narrowed between 1965 and 1975. Additional research further called into question the two presidencies assertion (Edwards 1986; Fleisher and Bond 1988; Sigelman 1979). The view of the imperial presidency has yielded to the plebiscitary and beleaguered presidency views (Lowi 1985; Wildavsky 1991). Regardless of Wildavksky's or Lowi's views, each argued that the president has more leeway in the foreign sphere, given his constitutional mandates as commander in chief and chief diplomat (Lowi 1967). This means that presidential interest and activity is more likely in foreign affairs than in domestic affairs and constitutes a separate arena from domestic policy processes.

In response to this research, Ripley and Franklin (1980) expanded on Lowi's typology by distinguishing between foreign and domestic policy processes. There are three types of foreign policy processes: crisis, strategic, and structural policy types. Crisis decisions are confined to the President and his immediate advisors. Fortunately, crisis decision making is rare, so most foreign policies are subject to strategic and structural policy

processes.[2] The strategic foreign policy process determines the basic positions and approaches a country takes toward another. The structural foreign policy process fleshes out strategic decisions in the form of things like defense procurement, granting most-favored nation status to China, and the exportation of contraceptives. Ripley and Franklin argued that the strategic policy process is similar to the bureaucratically-dominated regulatory process, but the president has more influence in the political outcomes produced. The structural policy process is similar to the distributive process, but changes are more likely the result of presidential initiative instead of congressional initiative as in domestic distributive policies. In sum, the arenas of power literature stresses how policy processes differ based on the type of decision at hand.

The Funnel of Causality

The funnel of causality, developed by Richard Hofferbert (1974), is another important model of the policy process. Hofferbert's model is depicted in Figure 4.2. The funnel is divided into five sectors (a-e), which are closely interrelated. Sector (a) points out that policy outputs are a function of historic and geographic factors. For example, the politics of Massachusetts have been shaped by its proximity to the ocean, its early industrialization and subsequent waves of immigration. Historic and geographic factors have a direct effect on sector (b), a polity's socio-economic conditions. Hofferbert acknowledges that any social or economic condition can be construed as being historical, but these sectors should be distinct to allow for current conditions that are directly relevant to the situation at hand. Sectors (a) and (b) will affect mass political behaviors (c), which, in turn, submit inputs to governmental institutions (d) and the political elites (e). Sectors (d) and (e) convert the inputs into policy outputs. Each sector has direct and indirect effects on policy outputs. Under normal circumstances, what occurs in sectors (a-c) provide a "constant backdrop" to what occurs at (e), "a set of circumstances with multiple relevance that the elite can overcome, suppress, or exploit, but not ignore" (Hofferbert 1974, p. 233). On rare occasions, certain sectors will bypass the regular developmental sequence

[2]There is a rich literature examining crisis decision making. See, for example: Ole R. Holsti, Robert C. North and Richard A. Brody, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," in J. David Singer ed., Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence, (New York: The Free Press, 1968):123-158; Ole R. Holsti, *Crisis, Escalation and War*, (Montreal: McGill's-Queen University Press, 1972); Charles F. and Margaret G. Hermann, "An Attempt to Simulate the Outbreak of World War I," in James N. Rosenau ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, (New York: Free Press, 1969): 622-639; and Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfield, "Crises in World Politics," World Politics 34 (April, 1982): 388.

(which are denoted by the dotted lines within the funnel of Figure 4.2), and have a direct effect on an unattached

Figure 4.2



sector (e.g., (a-e)). That is why the direct bypass lines lie outside the funnel. Hofferbert's figure does not explicitly include a feedback loop, but he does recognize its importance in the text of his argument. Other analysts have found support for the relationships developed in this model. One study, by Mazmanian and Sabatier (1980), examined the decisions of the six regional and one state coastal commissions in California. The authors found that the five sectors of the funnel accounted for a substantial amount of the variation in the commissions' policy outputs.

Multiple Streams Approach

Another important element of this literature concerns the multiple streams approach. Several theorists have noted that the political system is skewed toward the upper-class (Dahl, 1959; Schattschneider, 1960; Lowi, 1969; Lindblom, 1977). Further, Robert Dahl asserted that in all large groups, "control over communication is so unevenly distributed that some individuals possess considerably more influence over the designation of the alternatives scheduled for voting than do others" (Dahl 1959, p. 72). Having the power to designate alternatives

requires money and common interest to create an organization capable of controlling communication (Schattschneider, 1960). The insights of these theorists led some to postulate that the deliberations and actions of the political system are determined by those who can set the government's agenda (Cobb and Elder, 1983).

The interaction of interest groups is one of the most important factors that structure the way in which the governmental agenda is set. In general, the level of conflict between interest groups will determine whether an item achieves agenda status, and whether it will be a general or specialized topic. Agenda topics associated with low levels of conflict will be confined to specialized governmental agendas (e.g., bureaucratic decisions), if they appear at all. Full-scale conflicts will appear on the agendas of the major institutional actors (i.e., the Congress and the President). The mobilization of interests around an issue changes over time, which allows it to appear on specialized agendas and governmental agendas (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).

Gaining access to the governmental agenda is, at least in part, a function of the institutional structure and the biases it creates. Organized interests are reliant upon governmental actors who act as gatekeepers in the agenda setting process. The institutional structure determines the amount and flow of the multiple policy processes occurring at any given time. The institutional gatekeepers will vary in their responsiveness, giving some interest groups easier access than others. Access can be explained in several ways, the first being that the governmental official owes political favors to the group or identifies with the issue. Through the course of organizing bias in their favor, candidates seeking election will take money from organized interests. This can create a sense of obligation to the agenda of the special interests. It is further assumed that candidates will ally themselves with interests with whom they agree. Second, variations in the resource levels needed to mobilize a conflict can affect access. Groups with more resources are assumed to have better access. Third, a group's strategic location within society can affect access. Finally, the dispositions of gatekeepers will vary within the institutional structure, thus providing groups with the opportunity to shop for a venue that will provide access. (Cobb and Elder, 1983).

Governmental institutions, organized interests, and the media are subject to general processes thought to be at work in agenda setting: problem recognition; generation of policy proposals and political events (Kingdon, 1984). First, problems or solutions that just seem to crop up can place an issue on the institutional agenda. Kingdon relates the example of a chance meeting between a government official and a policy analyst which led to a program that provided federal assistance for Health Maintenance Organizations (Kingdon 1984). The second process of agenda setting is more gradual. Here, the agenda is set by the gradual accumulation of ideas that forms a paradigm among specialists that culminates in reform. Technological changes are one force at work in this process. For example, the advent of copying machines led to some adjustments in the copyright laws. Besides technology, the force of ideas can lead to immediate agenda status. Finally, political processes can affect agenda setting. Elections, changes in public opinion and party realignments are several political processes that can affect agenda setting. For example, a change in administration can bring forth a wellspring of new initiatives to the government's agenda (Bunce, 1981). In sum, multiple factors must combine to create "windows of opportunity" for policy change (Kingdon, 1984).

The Advocacy Coalition Framework

The Advocacy Coalition Framework attempts to encompass all of the elements of change described above, and is based on four general premises. The ACF assumes that understanding policy change requires a long-term perspective of a decade or more, because policy formation, implementation and reformulation occur over a long period of time. Second, the framework assumes that the best point of analysis for understanding policy change is at the subsystem level. A policy subsystem can be defined as an aggregation of interests around a narrow set of issues, and will include a variety of public and private actors. The third premise is that public policies are based on implicit assumptions about a policy issue. These assumptions include values, perceived causal relationships and solutions that can be conceptualized in nearly the same way as belief systems (Sabatier 1988). The framework also assumes that policy subsystems will involve subnational governmental actors, but they are less likely to be involved in foreign policy subsystems (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).

Figure 4.3



The Advocacy Coalition Framework is depicted in Figure 4.3. The model asserts that there are two sets of independent variables that affect a policy subsystem. The system variables are assumed to be very stable (e.g., the governmental structure), while external events change more readily (e.g., a new governing coalition). The two sets of exogenous variables define the possibilities and constraints of a policy subsystem. The policy subsystem is divided into a number of coalitions comprised of people from organizations that share a set of beliefs and act together. Each coalition will advance a strategy that is congruent with their beliefs. Conflicting strategies are mediated by "policy brokers" who seek to keep any conflicts at a manageable level. The decisions made by the active political sovereigns yield the policy outputs depicted at the bottom of the policy subsystem. The policy outputs feedback into the policy subsystem and the external system, so the policy process can begin anew. This feedback allows for policy-oriented learning, which includes new information that must be processed by the various coalitions (Sabatier 1988).

The ACF assumes that policy-oriented learning can alter the beliefs of a coalition over time. The belief systems of policy elites are divided into three categories: a deep core of normative variables that define an individual's personal philosophy, a near core of strategies to achieve deep core beliefs, and a set of secondary aspects that include instrumental decisions and information searches necessary to implement the policy core in a

specific issue area. Deep core beliefs are less susceptible to change than secondary aspects. The basic strategy of the ACF is to use the structure of belief systems to predict changes in policy over time (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).

Several generalizations can be made about the policy process, based on the suppositions of the ACF. First, substantial controversies within a policy subsystem, where core beliefs are in dispute, lead to a stable lineup of allies and opponents over periods of a decade or so. Second, actors within an advocacy coalition will show substantial consensus on issues pertaining to the policy core, although less so on secondary aspects. Third, secondary aspects of a belief system will change before acknowledging any weakness in the policy core. This all means that the core (basic attributes) of a governmental program is unlikely to be significantly revised as long as the subsystem advocacy coalition that instituted the program remains in power. Fourth, policy change can have several sources. Changes in socio-economic conditions, system-wide governing coalitions, or policy outputs from other subsystems must occur before a policy is fundamentally altered. Marginal to moderate changes will generally occur with the accumulation of technical information. Finally, the ACF makes two important assertions regarding the behavior of important actors in the policy process. One is that elites of issue-oriented groups are more constrained in their expression of beliefs and policy positions than elites from material groups, because the latter have greater wealth and use it to achieve political goals. The other assertion is that administrative agencies will usually advocate more centrist positions than their interest group allies. In sum, the ACF assumes policy transformation occurs with the climax of several factors. Policies will be altered when new actors redefine the beliefs and interests of a situation, when social and economic conditions alter perceptions, and through policy-oriented learning (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993).

Critique of the ACF

The ACF includes many elements of the other theories examined above. The ACF incorporates pluralism's emphasis on interest group competition in shaping governmental institutions. The ACF's notion of advocacy coalitions include interest groups, but adds other actors like legislators, bureaucrats, and members of

the media. Sabatier's approach differs from pluralism in terms of how stability is maintained within the political system. While pluralism argues that stability is maintained by cross-cutting cleavages, the ACF argues that it is maintained by the social structure, policy brokers, and relatively stable belief systems. The Advocacy Coalition Framework incorporates the notion that institutions affect the way individuals act. Institutional rules are viewed as the product of strategies by advocacy coalitions over time. Sabatier does not include Lowi's notion that policy type is important to the policy process used to make collective choices. Hofferbert's assertions regarding socio-economic conditions are incorporated in the ACF, but it makes a distinction between policy subsystems and the overall political system that Hofferbert does not. Kingdon's notions of agenda setting are incorporated into the ACF, but it looks at the entire policy process, including implementation and reformulation. The "windows of opportunity" for major policy changes are considered to be exogenous to policy subsystems. In sum, the Advocacy Coalition Framework incorporates many theoretical elements of its predecessors, and represents the state of the art in terms of the policy process.

However, there are several problems with the ACF. First, all of the analyses done using the ACF fail to adequately operationalize the "External Events" segment of the ACF that impinges upon policy subsystems. This is surprising, given the fact that Sabatier argues that the source of major policy changes occurs outside the policy subsystem (Sabatier 1991). Instead, the ACF uses the structure of belief systems within policy subsystems to predict changes in policy over time. It seems that the Advocacy Coalition Framework suggests, however, that policy change is a function of macro and micro forces simultaneously. Changes in "external events" account for the macro changes, and policy subsystems account for micro changes. So, while the ACF may be adequate to account for incremental changes through "policy learning," it does not directly measure the changes caused by external events. Considering the fact that external events include everything outside a policy subsystem that significantly varies in stable political systems, it is unwise to ignore this aspect of the ACF. External events include socioeconomic conditions, the systemic governing coalition, public opinion and other policy subsystems. Changes in these variables can have a significant impact on the policy subsystem and should

be accounted for somehow. Take the Great Depression as an example. Both socio-economic conditions and a turnover in the systemic governing coalition led to substantial policy changes in many policy subsystems. FDR's court packing scheme, and the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) substantially altered the policy subsystems in place prior to his ascendency. Without pressure from a newly reelected activist president, no "switch in time that saved nine" by Justice Owen Roberts (who led the Supreme Court to support the New Deal) would have occurred. The TVA had a ripple effect through many policy subsystems, local and national. The creation of the TVA was a significant departure from the public-private relationship between the government and the rest of society at that time, so it affected many institutional relationships. In both cases policy changes occurred because economic conditions and new actors altered the political landscape (Carman, Syrett, and Wishy 1967; Leuchtenburg 1983; Sidey 1968; Wilson 1981). Increased predictive power can be gained by clearly defining the windows of opportunity created by the establishment of new governing coalitions.

The second problem is Sabatier's dismissal of the assertion that the policy process differs substantially between distributive, regulative, redistributive, crisis, strategic and structural policies. Sabatier argues: "Such differences may exist, but they are deemed not important enough to include in the ACF (Sabatier)." Lowi would disagree, and argue that the nature of the policy will determine, to an ample degree, the environmental conditions in which a policy subsystem works (Lowi 1972). For example, it is likely that a policy subsystem surrounding the issue of welfare faces substantially different external forces than those surrounding the procurement of defensive hardware. These differences can be accounted for by the fact that the former policy is redistributive, and the latter is distributive in nature. The ACF's failure to incorporate these insights stems from its inadequate operationalization of system events. Since policy type helps determine the environmental conditions of a policy subsystem, then the distinction is noteworthy in any theoretical framework.

Clear expectations about the policy process can be gained from establishing the constraints and resources available to actors in a policy subsystem. The resources and constraints depicted in Figure 4.3 are defined by who the actors are and how they will interact, based on the type of policy being modified. Ripley and Franklin

provide a workable summary of how policy subsystems work to transform public policies (Table 4.1). In comparison to the ACF, Table 4.1 develops expectations about how the stable parameters like the nature of the good (e.g., distributive), the institutions involved (e.g., the number of political sovereigns) and rules for interaction (e.g., presidential preeminence in foreign policy) will affect policy subsystems.

The strategic and structural policy types are especially noteworthy to explaining changes in U.S. IPP. Each process can bring changes to population programs, depending on the status of the systemic governing coalition. Generally, IPP is subject to the structural policy process in which congressional committees, bureaucratic agencies, and interest groups dominate the policy process. It is assumed that foreign policies will be subject to a strategic policy process when the systemic governing coalition changes, because new presidents will seek to put their imprint on foreign policy. For example, President Eisenhower's defense policy relied on nuclear weapons to contain the Soviet Union. When President Kennedy came into office, he changed to a policy of flexible response by building up conventional forces (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1986). While Table 4.1 suggests that the president and the executive agencies are the primary actors in the strategic policy process, this does not mean that Congress is incapable of initiating significant foreign policy changes. So, it is also assumed that leadership change (especially between parties) can lead to significant policy transformations (Asher and Weisberg 1974; Brady and Sinclair 1984).

Finally, the ACF fails to adequately outline what policy change actually entails. Perhaps it is self-evident to most, but some elaboration is necessary to clearly establish what is actually changing. There are at least three types of policy change that can be distinguished: budgetary, programmatic, and organizational. First, budgets are integral to policy change, because they set broad priorities and determine the degree to which programmatic goals can be achieved. Second, many analysts are referring to programmatic transformation when they use the

Table 4.1 **Political Relationships for Policymaking**

					INFLUENCE OF				
Policy Type	Primary Actors	Relationship Among Actors	Stability Of Relationship	Visibility Of Decision	President, Presidency, And Centralized Bureaucracy	Bureaus	Congress As A Whole	Congressional Subcommittees	Private Sector
Distributive	Congressional subcommittees and committees; executive bureaus; small interest grps.	Logrolling (Everyone gains)	Stable	Low	Low	High	Low (Supports subcommittees)	High	High(Subsidized groups)
Protective regulatory	Congressional subcommittees and committee; full House and Senate; executive agencies; trade associations	Bargaining; compromise	Unstable	Moderate	Moderately high	Moderate	Moderately high	Moderate	Moderately high (regulated interests)
Redistributive	President and his appointees; committees and/or Congress; peak associations	Ideological and class conflict	Stable	High	High	Moderately low	High	Moderately low	High (peak associations representing clusters of interest grps.
Structural	Congressional subcommittees and committees; executive bureaus; small interest grps.	Logrolling (Everyone gains)	Low	Stable	Low	High	Low (Supports subcommittees)	High	High (Subsidized groups and corporation)
Strategic	Executive agencies; President	Bargaining; compromise	Unstable	Low until publicized; then low to high	High	Low	high (often responsive to executive)	Low	Moderate (Interest grps., corporations)
Crisis	President and Advisers	Cooperation	Unstable	Low until Publicized, then generally high	High	Low	Low	Low	Low

term policy change. Programmatic change refers to any actions taken in regard to achieving stated policy goals, and includes actions like regulations, the dispensing of contraceptives, and a demographic analysis of a country's population. Finally, organizational changes can also determine the extent to which programmatic goals are achieved. Organizational change refers to the transformation of functional entities within an organization, and the rules by which they interact. For example, in the case of the former, there have been numerous changes in terms of the functional entities within AID that affect the United States ability to achieve its international population policy goals. In the case of the latter, the passage of Title X of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1967 earmarked funds specifically to support voluntary family planning programs overseas. As a rule, earmarking funds influenced how the functional entities within the Agency for International Development interacted with each other (Piotrow 1973). This research will examine why U. S. IPP has changed with regard to its budgetary, programmatic, and organizational elements.

In sum, the policy process is a combination of institutional, situational, technological, and economic conditions. The window of opportunity created by the confluence of these factors will set the government's agenda. Agenda setting yields to policy formulation and legitimation. Programs are implemented through various policy actions that impact the issue addressed. Feedback is derived from policy actions which closes the circle. A better understanding of how policies change can be gained by operationalizing how the relatively stable parameters and system events of the ACF define and redefine the policy subsystem. Several steps are required to achieve this purpose. First, it is important to reexamine U.S IPP in light of the theoretical discussion above. Second, it is necessary to establish a way to measure the ideas developed above. Finally, the analysis of the models should provide a clearer picture of policy change in particular, and the policy process in general. The remainder of this chapter will review U. S. IPP in regards to the theoretical discussion above. The other two questions will be examined in the next chapter.

Introduction

Despite its shortcomings, the ACF can be modified as suggested above to perform better. Analyzing both the internal and external factors that affect a policy subsystem will provide a clearer picture of what is really happening when a policy changes. Here it is important to establish a more generalized version of the historical account provided in Chapters Two and Three to connect what happened to U.S. IPP over thirty years to the modified ACF. This section achieves this by discussing the strategic and structural (i.e., budgetary, programmatic, and organizational) changes over the course of the study. I also consider the extent to which the history conforms to the expectations presented in Table 4.1 and offer revisions where necessary.

Strategic Policy Change in IPP

There were two major strategic outlooks in competition for control of the IPP subsystem over the course of the study. The dominant strategic policy has been the Basic Human Needs Mandate, which guided U. S. policy during the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter and Clinton Administrations. Even though population policies preceded the Basic Human Needs Mandate, it is clear that President Johnson understood what slower population growth could mean to the lives of people in the developing world.[3] The rival strategic policy, the Cornucopian Outlook, arose in response to the Basic Human Needs Mandate and questioned its assumptions. The Cornucopian Outlook was prevalent during the Reagan and Bush Administrations.

Modifications in strategic population policies arose primarily from changes in the systemic governing coalition. This point was demonstrated throughout the course of this study. Take the example of initiating U. S. international population policy. First, U. S. action was not possible until there was a consensus that population growth had to be checked and the technological capacity to do it existed. These preconditions for governmental action existed by the end of the Eisenhower Administration, but the President was unwilling to fight the political

[3]When he was signing legislation to bolster Public Law 480 Johnson noted: "The sound population programs, encouraged in this measure. . .are vital to meeting the food crisis, and to the broader efforts of developing nations to attain higher standards of living for their people" (Piotrow 1973, p. 117).

battle necessary to get a population policy up and running. Kennedy was reluctantly moving toward a population policy, but died before a clear legacy could be established. It wasn't until the advent of the Johnson Administration that the additional condition necessary for the initiation of IPP was added, a sympathetic ear at the highest levels of government. Johnson's numerous statements on population generated the attention necessary to make it a strategic priority of the United States. Congressional supporters were able to use presidential support to transform the issue into a policy (Piotrow 1973).

Another example of strategic change in the wake of changes in the governing coalition came with the Reagan Administration. The Cornucopian Outlook of the Reagan Administration was a sharp contrast to the Carter Administration and the Global 2000 Report. Population growth was a neutral phenomenon, but programs were necessary to provide couples the choice to determine the size of their family. The laissez-faire attitudes of the Reagan Administration led to changes in policy, namely an increased emphasis on private enterprise and lower expenditures (see Chart 4.1 below). In addition, the Reagan Administration's views on abortion led to the establishment of the Mexico City Policy, which became the greatest source of controversy in the course of the study.

Interest groups were important to the strategic process because they were a primary source of information for decision makers. The role of people like William Draper and Hugh Moore demonstrates the extent to which organized interests can affect the strategic policy making process. First, Draper was able to draw attention to the issue through his work on the Draper Committee. Draper's draft legislation in 1967 formed the basis for earmarking funds for population activities for the next thirty years (see Chapter Two). Hugh Moore, founder of the Dixie Cup Company, drew attention to the problem by mailing copies of Paul Ehrlich's The Population Bomb to 10,000 American leaders (Piotrow 1973). The attention created pressure for a public response, which, in turn, led public officials to rely on the expertise of interest groups like the Planned Parenthood Federation and the Ford Foundation. Over time, population activists were transformed from outside agitators to political

insiders directly making policy. Interest groups diversified, but remained important to the strategic policy process throughout the study period.

There was a never-ending stream of commissions and task forces created by successive administrations to examine foreign aid. Interest groups were active in this process by providing information and expertise to public officials searching for a better foreign aid formula. Proponents and opponents of foreign aid actively courted the government to varying degrees of success. The importance attached to international family planning by most political quarters shielded IPP from most attacks on the foreign aid program. For example, there were several cases in which the overall foreign aid program was cut while IPP funding was maintained or increased (especially during the Nixon and Ford Administrations).

IPP was not immune from attack, nor from being at the center of the controversy over foreign aid. The interest groups that opposed IPP, or certain aspects of it, were able to change the program. The Cornucopian outlook of the Reagan and Bush Administrations was conducive to critics who wanted to deemphasize IPP, increase the role of the private sector in family planning and tighten abortion restrictions. The changes that occurred in IPP during this period were the product of a combination of domestic and international political considerations. Domestic interest groups opposed to abortion, such as the American Life Lobby, Inc., actively courted the Reagan Administration to change U. S. policy. Groups such as the American Enterprise Institute sought to use the Mexico City population conference as a forum to attack centralized economies and promote free market economics.

The establishment of the Mexico City Policy under Reagan generated a series of political battles, because the normal strategic process of building consensus within the policy subsystem was bypassed. The work of bureaucracies like AID and the State Department was not considered when the White House sprung Mexico City Policy on the rest of the political community. AID had spent the first two years of the Reagan Administration drafting a population policy that reflected Reagan's laissez-faire attitudes, while maintaining the overall consensus that had existed. The State Department had worked on the draft statements for the conference based

on the consensus that existed prior to the abortion bombshell. The White House made no effort to court congressional approval before U. S. strategy was changed (U.S. House of Representatives 1984a). The discord created by the unilateral change led to a veto by President Bush when Congress tried to scrap the Mexico City Policy in 1989 (see Chapter 1, pp. 89-91).

Overall, the history of strategic IPP seems to conform to the expectations summarized in Table 4.2. Clearly, the president was crucial to strategic policy making. IPP would

Table 4.2 Strategic International Population Policymaking

					INFLUENCE OF				
POLICY TYPE	PRIMARY ACTORS	RELATIONSHIP AMONG ACTORS	STABILITY OF RELATIONSHIP	VISIBILITY OF DECISION	PRESIDENT, PRESIDENCY, AND CENTRALIZED BUREAUCRACY	BUREAUS	CONGRESS AS A WHOLE	CONGRESSIONAL SUBCOMMITTEES	PRIVATE SECTOR
Strategic	Executive agencies; President	Bargaining; compromise	Unstable	Low until publicized; then low to high	High	Low	high (often responsive to executive)	Low	Moderatly High (Interestgrps)

not have been initiated without substantial interest from President Johnson. Every president in the study sought to shape U. S. foreign aid policy by appointing a commission to study reform or by proposing new legislation. However, strategic policy making was not confined to the honeymoon phase as predicted by Bunce (1981), but could occur throughout the president's tenure in office.

This study, however, suggests that interest groups are more important to strategic policy making than assumed by Ripley and Franklin (1980). Interest groups were crucial to establishing IPP and to changing its nature during the Reagan Administration. Based on this influence, the designation of the private sector should change from moderate to moderately high. The influence of Congress was, as expected, high. While it is true that Congress was often responsive to strategic initiatives of the president, the legislature contributed to the strategic process in its own right. For example, the Gruening hearings were crucial to establishing a population policy. Also, there were numerous oversight hearings not covered in Chapters Two and Three that had strategic aspects. Overall, however, Congress was a reactive force in the strategic policy process. In sum, the historical overview of U. S. IPP supports the suppositions made by the revised ACF so far.

Structural Policy Change in IPP

Introduction

Ripley and Franklin's schema of structural policymaking (Table 4.3) must be changed in light of the revised ACF and the history of U. S. IPP. Since this analysis has argued that structural policy should be divided into budgetary, programmatic and organizational

Table 4.3 Structural Policymaking

					INFLUENCE OF				
POLICY TYPE	PRIMARY ACTORS	RELATIONSHIP AMONG ACTORS	STABILITY OF RELATIONSHIP	VISIBILITY OF DECISION	PRESIDENT, PRESIDENCY, AND CENTRALIZED BUREAUCRACY	BUREAUS	CONGRESS AS A WHOLE	CONGRESSIONAL SUBCOMMITTEES	PRIVATE SECTOR
Structural	Congressional subcommittees and committees; executive bureaus; small interest grps.	Logrolling (Everyone gains)	Low	Stable	Low	High	Low (Supports subcommittees)	High	High (Subsidized groups and corporation)

categories, it is necessary to modify Table 4.1 to conform to the characteristics of each type of structural policy (Table 4.3 summarizes the structural policy type). This section will recap the history of the structural aspects of IPP to outline the changes needed in Table 4.3.

Budgetary Changes

Budgetary changes are, perhaps, the most telling component of structural policymaking, because they determine the extent to which any organizational configuration can achieve programmatic goals. Budgetary proposals, bargains and outlays are made through a complex process that is driven by forces in and out of a policy subsystem. There were three primary actors in the foreign aid budget process: Congressional subcommittees and committees, the President, and the bureaus (i.e., AID). It is important to understand the role each actor played in the budget process and how changing political circumstances dictated the funding levels for U. S. IPP over time.

The Foreign Aid Budget Process

In order to understand how the budget process works, it is necessary to show the nexus between program development and budget requests. The overall foreign aid budget is a conglomeration of several programs and processes. The foreign aid program contains activities like military assistance, food transfers, and population

programs. The planning for these programs is performed by different bureaucracies (e.g., the Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for military assistance and AID is responsible for development assistance), which are later integrated into the State Department's overall budget submission to Congress. In terms of development assistance programs, the State Department is responsible for setting the long-range goals of U.S. foreign aid. There are three sets of bureaucracies developing policy in AID: the overseas missions, the regional bureaus, and the central bureaucracy in Washington, D.C. The State Department and AID work together to link long range goals to programmatic priorities.

Program development within AID generally follows three interrelated steps. First, Country Development Strategy Statements (CDSS) are developed to provide the conceptual framework for planning and review of AID activities. The CDSS establishes the goals for achievement within a country over a certain period of time (up to five years) and are prepared by the AID missions. Second, Annual Budget Submissions (ABS) are based on prior guidance provided by previous legislation and internal directives. The ABS justifies annual funds needed to meet CDSS objectives and reflects the consensus of the State Department and AID. The integrated budget is submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The OMB receives the ABS in September, when it is reviewed, changed, and approved. Generally, the budget is submitted to Congress in January or February (Guess, 1987).

The third process of program development pertains to project development and review. A large percentage of AID's work deals with developing Project Identification Documents (PIDs) and Project Papers (PPs). AID officials are constantly in the process of preparing or reviewing these documents that form the basis of CDSS. The programming process encourages the reversion to a numbers game in which schools constructed, seeds distributed, IUDs inserted become the means to demonstrate CDSS compliance. Program changes initiate a Byzantine process of PID development and review that inhibits innovation.

> Since debate . . .would (and does) raise serious questions about many ongoing AID programs (meaning endless revision of ABSs, CDSSs, PPs, PIDs, etc.), nearly every institutional incentive within AID

encourages business as usual. That is, commonsense deviations from past plans are viewed as threatening even during the programming phase when new information is supposed to be at a premium value (Guess 1987, p. 100).

Several processes can be used to disburse funds after the budget is submitted to Congress. First, Congress may expend funds through the regular authorization and appropriation process. In the regular process, the budget is submitted to the appropriate authorization committee for hearings and markups that eventually lead to the first budget resolution. The authorizing legislation provides authority to spend money for purposes outlined in the first budget resolution. The appropriations committees use the budget resolution as a guide, but the resolution must be reconciled with the revenue and expenditure estimates of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). This means that authorization and appropriation figures will often vary. The different perspectives of the appropriations committees also account for the variation.

Second, Congress may fund foreign aid through supplemental or continuing resolutions. The authorization process is bypassed when Congress passes supplemental or continuing resolutions. A continuing resolution is an appropriation that is closely based on the last authorization and appropriation resolutions passed by into law. A supplemental resolution may make changes in the law, but within certain limits. Continuing and supplemental appropriations generally represent a political impasse between the bodies of Congress, or between the Congress and President (Guess, 1987). The foreign aid budget was set through supplemental and continuing appropriations after 1986.

Funding for IPP followed the overall process described above, but earmarking allowed the Office of Population to largely bypass the normal budget process within AID until the end of Carter's administration. After 1978, however, the Office of Population began to lose control over IPP funds. Central bureaus within AID, like the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, were able to assert some measure of control over the Office of Population. Field Missions and Regional Bureaus within AID were increasingly able to create and

fund population activities without clearing it with the Office of Population. Despite this infighting, the budget process within AID was important to establishing the details of the budget.

Funding levels for population activities were set through the interchange between the executive and

Chart 4.1



legislative branches. Chart 4.1 displays IPP funding between 1965-1995 adjusted for inflation.[4] The chart also shows the level of funding for the UNFPA. One way to interpret this chart is to consider it in terms of the FYs of each presidential administration (Johnson 1965-1969; Nixon 1970-1975; Ford 1976-1977; Carter 1978-1981; Reagan 1982-1989; Bush 1990-1993; and Clinton 1994-1995). During the Johnson years population policy was new, so the earliest budgets were small until the program began to take hold in the bureaucracy. After that and into the initial years of the Nixon Administration the budget sought its own level. Funding levels continued to grow due to the high priority given to the program by the President and Congress, and as the AID bureaucracy became more amenable to population activities. The decreasing funding levels during the Nixon-Ford years reflected the Nixon Doctrine and America's retrenchment after the Vietnam War. The Carter years showed an upward trend

[4]The sources listed in Table 2.1 were used to compile Chart 4.1. The numbers were adjusted for inflation using federal non-defense chain-type price indexes for gross domestic product (U. S. President 1997).

until the economic problems that came in 1979. The struggle between Congress and the President is reflected in the Reagan and Bush years as demonstrated by the fluctuating funding levels and the end to funding for the UNFPA (also see Chart 4.2 below). Finally, the sharp increases of the early Clinton years came about through the consensus of a unified government. However, this does not mean that the President set the funding level unilaterally.

At different times each branch of government led the other in setting the overall funding level. The Congress was active in establishing the early trend for population spending. Earmarking funds was initiated and unilaterally set by Congress between 1967-1973. The President and Congress took turns in leading the budget higher or lower after population activities became a line item in the President's budget in 1973. Chart 4.2 shows the request made by the President in relation to the appropriation levels proposed by both houses of Congress

Chart 4.2



and the actual appropriations. Chart 4.2 demonstrates two theoretical points worthy of note. First, the power of the purse gave Congress a clear upper hand over the President in setting the final appropriation level. Presidential requests fluctuated dramatically in comparison to the appropriation levels proposed in the House and Senate in relation to the final appropriation figure.

Second, there is some support for the notion that partisan turnover in the major branches of government will lead to significant budgetary changes. Partisan changes in the Presidency had the most discernible effect on presidential requests. There appeared to be some clear breaks in the presidential requests made from one president to the next. The clearest indication of partisan turnover leading to budgetary change came with the changes from the Carter to Reagan Administrations and from the Bush to Clinton Administrations. There were major strategic turnovers that took place between these four presidents. The Carter and Clinton Administrations represent the prominence of the Basic Human Needs Mandate, while the Reagan and Bush Administrations represent the prominence of the Cornucopian Outlook. The Carter Administration increased population funding during the first two years, but was forced to level off spending in the wake of economic difficulties after 1979. The Cornucopian Outlook of Reagan-Bush led to a plateau in presidential requests made during these years. Chart 4.2 does not account for inflation like Chart 4.1, so in real terms Bush was requesting less money for IPP than Carter. The first real growth that occurred after Carter came with the Clinton Administration, excluding FYs 1986 and 1993. Both increases were due to Congressional actions, not the actions of Reagan or Bush, so there are clear breaks in funding based on partisan turnover in the Presidency (see Chart 4.2).

The relationship between partisan turnover in Congress and budget changes is less clear, because there was little partisan turnover in Congress. The House of Representatives was controlled by the Democrats for the entire study period, while the Senate was under Republican control during the 97th-99th Congresses (FY1982-1987). It is interesting to note the increased differences in proposed appropriations between the House and Senate during the years of divided control in Congress. The Democrats in the House consistently pushed for higher appropriation levels than Republicans in the Senate, so there may be some relationship between partisanship and the level of IPP funding. (see Chart 4.2).

The discussion above suggests several changes in the Ripley and Franklin schema that are depicted in Table 4.4. The primary actors in the budget process were the President, congressional subcommittees and committees and the executive bureaus. These actors had to bargain and compromise to reach a decision.

Table 4.4 **Budgetary Policymaking**

					INFLUENCE OF				
POLICY TYPE	PRIMARY ACTORS	RELATIONSHIP AMONG ACTORS	STABILITY OF RELATIONSHIP	VISIBILITY OF DECISION	PRESIDENT, PRESIDENCY, AND CENTRALIZED BUREAUCRACY	BUREAUS	CONGRESS AS A WHOLE	CONGRESSIONAL SUBCOMMITTEES	PRIVATE SECTOR
Structural (Budgetary)	President Congressional subcommittees and committees; executive bureaus;.	Bargaining; compromise	Low	Low until publicized; then generally high	High	Moderately High	Low to High (Supports subcommittees)	High	Moderate to Low (Subsidized groups and corporation)

The visibility of the foreign aid budget process fluctuated between low and high depending on the circumstances. There were times when high level disputes over foreign aid kept the government from passing a regular appropriation (e.g., in FY 1974) and even occasions when the foreign aid appropriation was vetoed because of the dispute over population issues (i.e., the Mexico City Policy). The last notable change in the schema applies to the level of interest group influence, which is changed from high to moderate to low. There were times when interest groups were able to influence the budget process (e.g., Draper in 1967 and the cutting of funds to the UNFPA), but overall there was only moderate influence noted during the course of this study. It is possible that interest groups in other policy subsystems enjoy greater influence in determining funding levels, but that influence can easily be washed away by actors outside a policy subsystem as the budget is approved by wider governmental circles. Therefore, the argument seems in favor of limiting this aspect to the moderate to low designation.

Programmatic Changes

Overall, there was a great deal of stability in the programmatic aspects of IPP policymaking. The range of actions taken by AID was largely fixed by the early 1970s and can be traced to the present day. The basic programmatic goals between 1968-1995 are illustrated in Chart 4.3 by percentage of budget.[5] The basic goals of U. S. IPP have been to develop demographic and social data about the world's population, help countries in the development of their population policies, conduct fertility research to improve contraceptive methods, provide contraceptives and other technical assistance (delivery systems), increase public awareness through information, education, and communication programs (IEC), and generate the manpower necessary to deliver population

[5]Sources for Chart 4.3: U. S. AID 1971-1973, 1976-1995a&b; and U. S. House of Representatives 1978a.

policies. Most of the money spent by the U. S. has gone to funding delivery systems averaging 54.4% of the IPP budget. This doesn't mean that more than half of IPP funds are going to buy contraceptives. Between FYs 1991-

Chart 4.3

U.S. IPP Goals by % of Budget



1995 AID devoted 20.8% of the budget to procuring contraceptives, so the U. S. probably spent less than 25% on birth control over the course of the study (U.S. AID 1991b-1995b). The second largest category of budget outlays was manpower development that averaged 12.7%, followed closely by fertility research that averaged 12.6% of the IPP budget. The IPP budget devoted an average of 8.1% of the funds to information programs. The rest of the funds were pegged for population policies (5.8%) and demographic data (5.5%).

Some caution should be exercised in interpreting Chart 4.3. For example, the accounting procedures for AID changed several times, making it very difficult to reconstruct where the money was going. The period under question is between FYs 1983-1989. The categories in Chart 4.3 were easy to follow between FYs 1968-1982, when AID stopped classifying projects by goal. Special care was exercised in reconstructing the goals by comparing the project numbers from previous years with the projects budgeted after FY 1982. Any new project

numbers were classified based on the title of the program, so it is possible that some project were misclassified.[6] Also, the chart shows that the demographic data category was zeroed out after FY 1992. AID still funds demographic research, but the category is no longer listed in this regard. The gray area at the top right of Chart 4.3 represents the "other" category, which primarily covers administrative costs (Felling 1999). Chart 4.3 still makes the overall point that the programmatic aspects of policymaking were stable over a long period of time.

The primary programmatic changes identified in Chapters Two and Three can be subsumed under one of the categories listed above. During the Reagan-Bush years the additional goal of promoting private markets to distribute contraceptives and provide family planning services can be categorized under service delivery. The goal of natural family planning was also added at this time. AID projects of this type were categorized under either research, or service delivery depending on the function described in the project title.

The history of IPP in Chapters Two and Three and the discussion above suggest several changes to Ripley's and Franklin's notions of programmatic policymaking that are listed in Table 4.5. Programmatic policymaking comes closest to resembling the ACF as used by Sabatier and others. The primary actors in programmatic policymaking are

Table 4.5 Programmatic Policymaking

					INFLUENCE OF				
POLICY TYPE	PRIMARY ACTORS	RELATIONSHIP AMONG ACTORS	STABILITY OF RELATIONSHIP	VISIBILITY OF DECISION	PRESIDENT, PRESIDENCY, AND CENTRALIZED BUREAUCRACY	BUREAUS	CONGRESS AS A WHOLE	CONGRESSIONAL SUBCOMMITTEES	PRIVATE SECTOR
Structural (Programmatic)	Bureaus; Subcommittees; interest groups;	Policy learning	Moderately High	Stable	Low to Moderate	High	Low (Supports subcommittees)	Moderately High	Moderately High

the bureaus, subcommittees, and interest groups. Officials within AID, like Reimert Ravenholt and Joel Bernstein, were responsible for the primary goals listed above. Interest groups and Congressional subcommittees were important through the latter's oversight functions. Interest group input came in the form of suggestions about and requests for certain population projects. Members of Congress were also active through

[6]A Freedom of Information Act request to AID was made to gather data on projects and other issues addressed by the study, but it was ignored.

the course of the numerous hearings that occurred throughout the study. Presidential influence was generally low, but there was evidence that the executive branch could become involved when it was so inclined. The incorporation of goals like natural family planning and privatization came from the White House. The White House was also active in operationalizing the programmatic aspects of the Mexico City Policy. Overall, however, Presidential interest in programmatic goals was low, so the influence of the President is only moderate and confined to periods when influence is sought.

Programmatic policy change occurs primarily through policy learning. The primary actors actively discussed lessons learned from previous population projects as new projects were developed. For example, the development of new contraceptives like the IUD and Prostaglandins came from information learned from social data gathered on user preferences. Policy learning implies that the relationships between the primary actors will be stable and cooperative, which can be seen in this study. Programmatic decisions generally fall into the low visibility category, because they are very detailed and draw only a limited number of interested parties.

There are times, however, when programmatic decisions can be highly visible, as was the case when it came time to operationalize the Mexico City Policy. Most parties felt that the regular policy making process had been bypassed and did not conform to the knowledge base of the participants in the subsystem. That is why there was a struggle over words in the various amendments cited in Chapter Three to change the language of the Mexico City Policy. Based on this, it seems that policy subsystems will be resistant to changes that do not conform to their level of policy learning.

Organizational Changes

The role of organizational change in public policymaking may seem minimal, but there was evidence that the organization of AID had an effect upon the development of U. S. international population policy. The overriding organizational factor of international population policy has been congressional earmarking. Earmarking has sustained population activities throughout its existence and has shielded it from attack by the leadership of AID that sought to end earmarking on several occasions during the initial phases of program.

Earmarking continued to sustain the program even after the battles over Title X funding faded, by serving as a benchmark of congressional priority that gave the Office of Population continued status within AID that could not be easily abridged.

One way to check the status of a program within an organization is to determine its significance with the structural framework. The many forms of AID between 1967-1995 are depicted in Organizational Charts 1-25 found in the appendix. The organizational charts include the organization for the International Development and Cooperation Agency (IDCA) between 1980-1996. The position of the Office of Population within the AID organizational tree is illustrated in Figure 4.4. These organizational charts reveal the rise and eventual fall of population issues in AID. Figure 4.4 demonstrates how the issue gained status especially during the period of the early 1960s. The height of freedom from outside interference and control over resources is reflected by Organizational Charts 6-9 which show that the population issue had gained bureau status. The fall of population in AID mirrors the fall of Reimert Ravenholt as Director of the Office of Population. After 1979, the Office of Population was subject to more of the constraints of the regular policy process described earlier and is reflected in the additional bureaucratic layer in 1983 (see Figure 4.4). Other entities within AID like the geographical bureaus and field missions were increasingly able to spend population funds without interference from the Office of Population (Donaldson 1990).

Another significant result revealed by the Organizational Charts is the constant tinkering that occurred over the course of the study. The number of changes reflected the never-ending stream of attempts to reformulate the foreign aid strategy of the United States. Each administration and nearly every AID administrator sought to put its imprint on the organization by making changes. To some extent these changes are superficial window dressing, but they also seem to suggest the continued turmoil surrounding the foreign aid program.

Organization Tree of the Office of Population, 1963-1995



Sources: Piotrow 1973; Office of the Federal Register 1968-1996;and Congressional Staff Directory, Ltd. 1983-1995.

The findings of this study in terms of organizational changes are very guarded, because of the lack of information available (see footnote 5). Unfortunately, information about the number of personnel working on the population issue was unavailable after 1972, but could have provided some indication of how the role of population activities within AID changed over time. The only figures available show a dramatic rise in the number of AID personnel working in this area (1965:3-1972:149). The lack of access to the principals is another reason to be tentative about the findings. Donaldson's work (1990) provided some insight into the politics occurring within AID, but more is needed before a more definitive understanding of the role of organizational factors can be determined.

This reservation should be considered as organizational policymaking is summarized in Table 4.6 below. The primary actors in organizational change are the executive agencies (AID and the State Department), the bureaus (the Office of Population), and the President. As Chief Executive the President is given wide latitude to organize the executive branch and is primarily active through various commissions appointed to strategic aspects of active through various commissions appointed to strategic aspects of foreign aid. Many if not all, commissions will consider how an administrative branch is organized when it is up for a strategic overhaul. The constant stream of new agency directors in the

Table 4.6 Organizational Policymaking

					INFLUENCE OF				
POLICY TYPE	PRIMARY ACTORS	RELATIONSHIP AMONG ACTORS	STABILITY OF RELATIONSHIP	VISIBILITY OF DECISION	PRESIDENT, PRESIDENCY, AND CENTRALIZED BUREAUCRACY	BUREAUS	CONGRESS AS A WHOLE	CONGRESSIONAL SUBCOMMITTEES	PRIVATE SECTOR
Structural (Organizational)	Bureaus; Executive Agencies; President	Bargaining Cooperation	Moderate to Low	Low until publicized and then only moderate	High	High	Low (Supports subcommittees)	Moderate	Moderate

State Department and AID are changing organizational structures to fit their particular management styles, while the bureaus act to protect or extend their span of control. Congressional subcommittees are mostly reactive to organizational changes during oversight, but can make important rules that will influence bureaucratic organization. Interest groups are moderately active in organizational decisions during the oversight phase and can provide important inputs during the strategic processes initiated by the President. For example, several university representatives receiving funds from AID offered suggestions on how to improve the organizational

relationship between AID and its university clients during an oversight hearing (U. S. House of Representatives 1978a).

The interactions of these actors lead to several additional points. First, bargaining and compromise is used to achieve a consensus on how a program is organized. Second, certain aspects of the organization will stay moderately fixed, while others change. In the case of population activities earmarking was a constant fixture, but it did not prevent the diminished control of the Office of Population that occurred after 1979. Finally, the visibility of organizational changes will vary depending on whether or not they are initiated by the President or by the agencies and bureaus. Organizational initiatives by the former will receive some visibility while initiatives by the latter will receive little if any visibility. The creation of the IDCA by President Carter in 1979 was covered in the press, while no media attention was given to the independence lost by the Office of Population at the end of Ravenholt's tenure.

Conclusion

In conclusion, there is ample evidence to suggest that a fully specified ACF will provide a clearer picture of policymaking than one that ignores the role of systemic factors and type of issue. The picture will be clearer because the model considers all of the significant factors that are theoretically responsible for policy change. Refining the Ripley and Franklin schema and including in the ACF provides clear expectations about the actors and their relationships in various policy settings. Distinguishing between different types of policy change also enhances the theoretical base by clarifying what is actually changing. The review of the historical change in U. S. IPP supports the revisions suggested. Clearly population policy changes were multidimensional and subject to different processes based on the historical evidence. Additional support for the theory is required using other analytical techniques. The next chapter will identify two analytical methods that are used to complete this examination of policy change.

5
Measuring Changes in IPP

When Speculation has done its worst,
two and two still make four
(Samuel Johnson: The Idler #36)

Introduction

Even though the previous three chapters support the idea of examining subsystem and systemic factors that lead to policy change, it is important to provide additional alimentation for the revised ACF. The evidence that is provided by the two models developed in Chapter Five supports the suggested revisions. The first part of the analysis examines the sources of budgetary change. Model One contains variables representing system events to examine IPP budgetary obligations through a regression analysis. The purpose of Model One is to demonstrate that systemic factors play a significant role in policy change and should be considered formally when using the Advocacy Coalition Framework. The second part of the analysis measures the changes that occurred between the UN population conferences in 1984 and 1994. The analysis focuses on the overall changes that occurred, the differences between the 1984 and 1994 delegations, and the role of partisanship in accounting for the changes. Model Two uses variables representing the belief systems of subsystem actors to examine the changes that occurred through a cluster analysis. The role of systemic factors and evidence of policy learning are also sought in the cluster analysis.

Model One

There is reason to believe that systemic factors play a significant role in policy change. The historical narrative in Chapters Two and Three indicate that turnover in the systemic governing coalition (e.g., new Presidents) leads to revisions in strategic policy. It is likely, then, that systemic factors will lead to policy changes in other areas like the budget. It is important to recall that David Obey argued that economic factors, like the budget deficit, affected the IPP budget through the adoption of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act see Chapter Three). So it is important to find additional support for the tentative findings developed in the last three chapters.

Perhaps the best place to look for that support is in budgetary policy change, because here is where political actors put their money where their mouths are. As a structural policy type, budgetary changes provide a fair testing ground to determine the role of systemic factors in policy transformation. This is the case because it would be fair to expect that a policy subsystem would have an important role in determining the budget in its issue area. In this particular case, however, outside forces were consistently shown to be active in determining the outcome of policy changes. Forces such as the G-R-H and the efforts of the Reagan and Bush Administrations to circumvent the authorization process reduced the role of the IPP subsystem. Model One should test these ideas in another bid to support the theoretical arguments discussed in Chapter Four.

Methodology

The data gathered suggests the use of a time-series regression analysis. The dependent variable in Model One is the total amount of money obligated for IPP between FY 1965-1995 in constant 1995 dollars. Several figures have been used here to describe the IPP budget (i.e., presidential requests; proposed and actual House and Senate authorizations; proposed and actual House and Senate appropriations; and AID obligations). AID obligations are used here because they most accurately reflect the amount being spent on population programs (see footnote 3 and Table 2.2 in Chapter Two for more information).

The first model contains six independent variables. The first three variables represent the systemic governing coalition by measuring the party control of the presidency, House of Representatives and Senate (Congressional Quarterly 1991, 1994). Many analyses of policy change rely on crude indicators like partisanship to operationalize the concept of elite beliefs (Weingast and Moran, 1983; Poole and Daniels, 1985). Model One will use this approach because partisanship is a good indicator of what is occurring with the systemic governing coalition and is viewed by some as an important indicator over long periods of time (Rhode, 1990). This study assumes that Republicans will tend to vote for smaller IPP budgets than Democrats do. The variable PRES measures the time a new president comes into office based on his party affiliation. A new Republican president is coded as -1 and a new Democrat president is coded as 1 when they offer their first budget for

consideration. PRES is coded as a zero when there is no new president. The variable is coded in this manner to reflect the discussion presented earlier regarding new leadership and the changes it brings. The variables for the House of Representatives (HDIFF) and the Senate (SDIFF) measure the margin of control by the political party for each year. Negative numbers represent Republican control and positive numbers represent Democrat control. The variable GRH measures the existence (0 or 1) of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. The initiation of the GRH should have a negative effect on the amount of money obligated to IPP.

The other two independent variables represent changes in economic conditions as perceived by the political sovereigns.[19] The percentage change in the gross domestic product (GDPLAG2 (1992=100)) will serve as a basic indicator of economic performance (Damay 1995). It is assumed that higher rates of growth in the GDP will lead to higher authorizations than little or no growth. The second economic variable is the gross federal debt in constant 1995 dollars (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1998). It is assumed that higher federal debt will have a negative influence on authorizations for discretionary programs like IPP. The logarithm of the debt (LOGDEBTLAG2) is used to remove the growth over time of the variance of the data (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1982). Each of the economic variables is lagged two years to account for the availability of the data to the decision makers and the timeframe of the budget process in which they work. The quantitative analysis should provide a broad explanation of budgetary changes in IPP, because systemic variables create the political backdrop to what occurs in the policy subsystem.

The Data

The data presented in Table 5.1 suggest that systemic factors are important in explaining the changes in the IPP budget. There are several points to notice when examining Table 5.1. First, the model is statistically significant with an F value of 8.80 (Prob > F= .000). Second, Model One accounts for nearly 69% of the

[19]Economic experts would suggest that a better measure of economic conditions would be to use the federal debt as a percentage of the gross domestic product. The two measures are kept separate here because I believe policy makers are more likely to consider these economic conditions independently, rather than calculating the debt as a percentage of GDP. The "economic model" is presented in the Appendix and shows that the debt as a percentage of the GDP (%dbtlag2) is positively associated with IPP obligations. The economic model would suggest that there is no association between economic conditions and the IPP budget. Model One, the political model if you will, is preferred because of the strength of the GRH variable and its consistency with arguments made by deficit conscious policy makers who cited individual economic factors like the budget deficit and the public debt as reasons for cutting the budget.

variation in the amount of money obligated to international population programs. These findings allow the null hypothesis that systemic factors play no role in accounting for the IPP budget to be rejected.

Table 5.1

Model One Results

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs=31
				F (6, 24)= 8.80
Model	356902.095	6	59483.6825	Prob > F= 0.0000
Residual	162198.232	24	6758.25966	R-squared=0.6875
Total	519100.327	30	17303.3442	Root MSE = 82.209

AID	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
PRES	16.90093	32.64422	0.518	0.609	-50.47343	84.2753
SDIFF	-2.811535	1.529075	-1.839	0.078	-5.96739	.3443213
HDIFF	-.4274196	.4423392	-0.966	0.344	-1.340363	.4855236
GRH	-144.681	72.32391	-2.000	0.057	-293.9503	4.588167
GDPLAG2	-3.769674	7.225135	-0.522	0.607	-18.68162	11.14227
LOGDEBTLAG2	-137.5579	44.84492	-3.067	0.005	-230.1133	-45.00256
_CONS	-1445.512	614.1481	-2.354	0.027	-2713.052	-177.9729

Another point to notice is that even though the overall model is statistically significant, several of the variables are not. PRES (t=0.518; P>|t|=.609), HDIFF (t=-0.966; P>|t|=.344), and GDPLAG2 (t=-0.522; P>|t|=.607) are not statistically significant at the .10 level. PRES and HDIFF are not significant due to the lack of variation in the variables. The Presidency and the House of Representatives were dominated by one of the parties throughout the period of the study. The Republicans dominated the Presidency 21 of the 31 years covered by the study. It is also important to note the support provided by Presidents Nixon and Ford to the program. Nixon supported the idea of earmarking foreign aid for the IPP when the foreign bureaucracy opposed it. Ford was frustrated by a lack of support and could not persuade Congress to loosen its purse strings (see Chart 4.2 for FYs 1975 and 1976). The Democrats dominated the House by an average of 87 seats for 30 of the 31 years and were firmly entrenched when the budget began to level off after 1971 (see Chart 4.1). So it seems that party control is not the best way to measure the changes in beliefs that occur when new leaders take power.

The fourth point is that the variables that are statistically significant at the .10 level are negatively correlated to IPP obligations. The only party control variable that was statistically discernible at the .10 level

was SDIFF (t=-1.839; P>|t|=.078). The negative sign in the correlation coefficient (-2.811) means that the budget did go down as more Republicans came to power in the Senate. Perhaps this finding suggests that another variable like ideology may more adequately measure the changes that occur with the turnover in the systemic governing coalition. Chapter Three noted the conservative turn that occurred in the Senate beginning in 1976. Political party as a variable does not make any distinction between the varying attitudes of Republican presidents like Nixon and Ford to Reagan and Bush. By the same token, there were many conservative Democrats from the South who were allied with Republicans on many issues in the 1980s (Stanley and Niemi 1994). The other two statistically discernible variables at the .10 level are GRH (t=-2.000; P>|t|=.057) and LOGDEBTLAG2 (t=-3.067; P>|t|=.005). The pressure to do something about the mounting public debt led political actors to seek an across-the-board solution like the GRH to deal with the problem and that would provide some political cover from the fallout of cutting a particular program like international family planning. The significance of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act that was created in response to the skyrocketing debt, suggests that political forces and economic circumstances outside of the policy subsystem affected the changes in the IPP budget.

These findings suggest that it is important to remember the contributions made to the ACF by its predecessors. The pluralistic configuration of the political institutions created an open system that allows organized interests to coalesce and create a policy subsystem, but that subsystem can be greatly influenced by larger outside political and economic forces. Research using the ACF up to now has neglected to account for the influence of outside political and economic forces as suggested by pluralism, the funnel of causality, and the multiple streams approach. The findings of Model One suggests that external system events must be operationalized to accurately portray policy change over time.

Model Two

The policy subsystem is analyzed by doing cluster analyses based on a content analysis (Model 2). The public documents analyzed are used to determine the changes that occurred in the policy subsystem between

1984 and 1994. The analysis focuses on three areas: the overall changes that occurred during the time period, the changes between the 1984 and 1994 U.S. delegations to the United Nations Conferences on Population (UNCP), and the role of partisanship in accounting for the changes. In the first case, examining the overall changes in the policy subsystem entails a comparison of the differences between actors in the policy subsystem with regard to their belief systems. The belief systems of policy elites are divided into three categories: a deep core of normative variables that define an individual's personal philosophy, a set of strategic beliefs to achieve deep core beliefs, and a set of instrumental beliefs necessary to implement the policy core in a specific issue area. The discussion of the ACF in the previous chapter suggested that core and strategic beliefs are less susceptible to change than instrumental beliefs, which was compared to data gathered here for verification.

The second issue to be discussed is the significant differences between the 1984 and 1994 delegations to the UNCP. A cluster analysis provides an ideal opportunity to explore the reaction of the IPP subsystem to the delegations to the population conferences, because it gives an occasion to delve further into the reactions of the actors in these situations and the reasons behind them. The ACF would argue that the changing belief systems in the subsystem and policy learning were two possible sources of change. The historical analysis in Chapters Two and Three suggests that the differences between 1984 and 1994 stem from the changes in the systemic governing coalition (i.e., the different Presidents' belief systems), rather than from policy learning.

Partisanship is another important variable to be tested in the cluster analyses. Advocates of the ACF tend to be skeptical of partisanship as an accurate indicator of belief systems, because it does not allow researchers to trace the reasoning processes behind elite preferences. Using partisanship makes elites appear less rational than they probably are, and makes it difficult to predict change over time (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993). A content analysis of government documents has several advantages over the concept of partisanship according to the advocates of the ACF. Content analyses permit a more detailed examination of belief systems than partisanship, and research is not limited to studying elites of public institutions (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993). On the other hand, examining belief systems may not be worthwhile if they tend to look the same from

one time period to the next. The cluster analyses discussed here should shed some light on the debate between using partisanship versus a detailed look at individual belief systems.

Methodology

Generating the data for the cluster analyses required several steps. First, a list of government documents was created by a keyword search in the Congressional Record Index and the Guides to U.S. Government Publications for 1983, 1984, 1993, and 1994. Any hearings conducted and statements made in the Congressional Record were identified and photocopied. Second, the photocopies were scanned into a computer and processed through optical character recognition (OCR) software (Text Bridge 1996). The size of the font and quality of the original paper led to a large number of errors generated by the OCR software that had to be corrected. Third, a coding form was developed based on the one detailed in Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), which can be found in the Appendix. Additional codes were developed to tailor the code form to the issues found in the IPP subsystem and form the instrumental beliefs section of the form. Fourth, the files created were imported into a qualitative analysis software package called Atlas/ti (1998). Atlas/ti was used to conduct the content analysis of the public documents. Fifth, the cases created from the content analysis were used to generate the dendrograms of the cluster analyses.

There are two major techniques employed in Model Two. The first is a content analysis of public documents. The purpose of a content analysis is to make "replicable findings and valid inferences from data to their context" (Krippendorff 1980, p. 21). Content analyses make inferences about theoretical issues like the trends in communication, the characteristics of the communicator based on the message sent, and the content of communication against certain standards. This technique can also be employed to infer methods of persuasion and the style of the communicator (Holsti 1969). In this case, the content analysis traces the trend (i.e., changes) in communication and determines the characteristics (i.e., belief systems) of the communicators. Critics of content analysis contend that the method is subjective because of the amount of interpretation involved. One way this issue is overcome is by having multiple coders coding the same data. Multiple coders allow some

assuredness that the interpretations are valid. Unfortunately the luxury of having multiple coders in this case could not be afforded. Atlas/ti assists in overcoming the problems associated with content analyses by allowing for an interactive approach that enables researchers to build and modify their theoretical constructs as the data are analyzed, and by providing data access for others to verify coding. In the first case, the code form found in the Appendix shows that 11 additional codes were added during the coding process. Atlas/ti made it easy to re-sift through the documents as new concepts emerged. In the second case, a copy of the database generated by Atlas/ti can be found in the Appendix, which allows others to scrutinize the coding for verification.

The second major technique employed is a series of cluster analyses, which require several steps. The first step is to obtain a data matrix, which was created from the output generated by Atlas/ti. Next the data is imported into a statistical software package to generate clusters called dendrograms that resemble tree branches (SYSTAT 8.0 1998). The distance between branches is based on a coefficient that is calculated to determine the degree of similarity between each pair of objects. There are two methods employed in this analysis, the single and complete linkage methods. The single linkage method measures the distance between the two closest members of different clusters and the complete linkage method measures the distance between the two most distant pairs of objects in two clusters (SYSTAT 1989). The third step is to execute the clustering method. Clustering methods include a series of steps that incrementally peel away at the resemblance matrix. A tree branch is formed as each layer is peeled away. A cluster is composed of a set of one or more objects that have similar attributes. The clusters created here are based on the percentage of similarities between the values of the variables clustered (Romesburg, 1984).

The Data

There were 151 cases generated from the content analysis. The characteristics of the data sources reveal a couple of interesting points. First, there were three types of documents gathered for the content analysis, including congressional hearings, statements and submissions in the Congressional Record, and State Department bulletins. Table 5.2 shows that the State Department played a more active role in 1994 than it did in

1984. One possible explanation for the increased activity is that the State Department favored the instrumental beliefs of the Clinton Administration rather than the Reagan Administration at the UNCP. It should be recalled that the State Department was ambivalent toward the Mexico City policies and did not even send its Population Officer to the conference. The second point revealed was the disparity in the number of cases between 1984 (113) and 1994 (38). It seems that there was more activity in the IPP subsystem in 1984 because of the way in which strategic policy lurched away from the overall consensus that existed up to that point. In 1994 there seems to have been less controversy, thereby drawing less interest to the issue.

Table 5.2 Number of Cases			
151			
Number of Cases by Year			
1984		1994	
113		38	
Number of Cases by Document Type (Number of Documents)			
Year	Hearings	Cong. Record	State Dept.
1984	34 (2)	79 (1)	0 (0)
1994	11 (1)	20 (1)	7 (7)

Another important fact to note about the data is the lack of it. There was a lot of missing data, because most of the actors examined during the content analysis took no position on an issue to give a complete portrayal of their belief systems. Sabatier (1993), Jenkins-Smith (1993) and others faced this problem, which was overcome by creating a set of composite variables representing the core, strategic and instrumental beliefs of the subsystem actors. The values for each composite variable are based on the sum of the variables combined. In this study for example, the variable Core Beliefs is the sum of variables B1-B13 listed in the code form found in the Appendix. The amount of missing data reveals an important point about the nature of the policy subsystem. The level of discussion in the IPP subsystem is very elemental and focuses on political rather than practical aspects of policy change. The rational expectation would be to find a subsystem of actors who focus on a lot more of the practical issues that surround successful policy making. For example, the instrumental beliefs section of the code form (C1-C21) contain the major programmatic efforts of the IPP program, namely variables C3-C8. There were only 22 of a possible 906 entries for these 6 variables. The supposition that perhaps these issues were not discussed because of the political furor of 1984 did not hold true in 1994, and there was little

evidence found for intensive programmatic oversight while examining other government documents to prepare the historical narrative. The emphasis, time and again, seemed to be on managing the political conflict that existed throughout the course of IPP development. The lack of data necessitates stressing the tentative nature of the findings described below.

Policy Change in the IPP Subsystem

The first issue to be examined is the amount of change in the belief systems of the actors that occurred between 1984 and 1994. Figures 5.1-5.16 portray the dendrograms for the beliefs of the actors in the IPP subsystem in 1984 and 1994. Figures 5.1-5.4 show the clusters for all three composite variables, Figures 5.5-5.8 show the clusters for the core beliefs composite variable, Figures 5.9-5.12 show the clusters for the strategic beliefs composite variable, and Figures 5.13-5.16 show the clusters for the instrumental beliefs composite variable. Each group of four clusters shows the single and complete linkage method for both years of the study. The overall impression left by these clusters is the remarkable lack of variation between 1984 and 1994 in all of the groups, despite the disparity in the amount of data between the two years. The argument of the ACF that core and strategic beliefs will remain nearly constant is supported by the data developed here. This suggests that there is a great deal of continuity in the beliefs of the actors in the subsystem over time. Even the instrumental beliefs of the actors, where changes would be expected, look the same from one year to the next. This finding indicates that something else is accounting for policy changes. This is not to say that new policies were not offered, because there were proposals offered like increasing the level of responsibility for men, promoting natural family planning, and developing the private sector for contraceptive distribution. But there was not much policy learning occurring in the IPP subsystem, because the primary topic of discussion was on political rather than practical issues. A lot of the discussion between 1984 and 1994 made it appear like the contending parties in the subsystem were talking past each other by making political points that satisfied an actor's political constituency, rather than a sober discussion of the issues on how to make the policy better. The lack of

variability in the belief systems of the subsystem actors from one year to the next calls into question the efficacy of examining them for the purposes of describing policy change.

The UN Conferences on Population

The second issue to examine is the changes that occurred regarding the United Nations Conferences on Population. Figures 5.17-5.20 depict the clusters for the variables (C10 A, B, and C) pertaining to the UNCP. The lack of data ruined any meaningful discussion of the changes that occurred surrounding the positions of the U.S. delegations to the UNCP. The largest groups in figures 5.17-5.20 represent no data on these variables, so the clustering method is of little use here. It still can be argued, however, that the changes that occurred between the two UN Conferences on Population were associated with changes in the systemic governing coalition, namely the President. Chart 5.1 shows the positions of the Reagan v.

All Three Composite Variables

Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Single linkage method (nearest neighbor)

Figure 5.1

1984



Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Single linkage method (nearest neighbor)

Figure 5.2

1994



Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Complete linkage method (farthest neighbor)

Figure 5.3

1984



Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Complete linkage method (farthest neighbor)

Figure 5.4

1994



REP- Representative
SEN- Senator
EXEC- Executive Branch

BUR- Bureaucracy
INT- Interest Group
MED- Media

Core Beliefs

Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Single linkage method (nearest neighbor)

Figure 5.5

1984



Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Single linkage method (nearest neighbor)

Figure 5.6

1994



Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Complete linkage method (farthest neighbor)

Figure 5.7

1984



Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Complete linkage method (farthest neighbor)

Figure 5.8

1994



REP- Representative
SEN- Senator
EXEC- Executive Branch
BUR- Bureaucracy
INT- Interest Group
MED- Media

Strategic Beliefs

Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Single linkage method (nearest neighbor)

Figure 5.9

1984



Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Single linkage method (nearest neighbor)

Figure 5.10

1994



Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Complete linkage method (farthest neighbor)

Figure 5.11

1984



Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Complete linkage method (farthest neighbor)

Figure 5.12

1994



REP- Representative
SEN- Senator
EXEC- Executive Branch

BUR- Bureaucracy
INT- Interest Group
MED- Media

Instrumental Beliefs

Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Single linkage method (nearest neighbor)

Figure 5.13

1984



Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Single linkage method (nearest neighbor)

Figure 5.14

1994



Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Complete linkage method (farthest neighbor)

Figure 5.15

1984



Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Complete linkage method (farthest neighbor)

Figure 5.16

1994



Delegation Variables

Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Single linkage method (nearest neighbor)

Figure 5.17

1984



Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Single linkage method (nearest neighbor)

Figure 5.18

1994



Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Complete linkage method (farthest neighbor)

Figure 5.19

1984



Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Complete linkage method (farthest neighbor)

Figure 5.20

1994



differences between Reagan and Clinton are most noticeable in terms of Strategic Beliefs. The Reagan Administration did not think that the U.S. should provide money to international population programs because population growth was a threat to human existence (variables B6, B8, B9, and B12), but a matter of personal choice (variable A2a). The Reagan Administration believed that there was a neutral relationship between population growth and economic development (variable B7). Any relationship that might exist between population growth and economic development was best dealt with by economic policy rather than population policy



(variable B7B). The Reagan Administration also favored changing the policy on abortion (variable C12). The Clinton Administration, by contrast, was very concerned about the threat of population growth (variables B6, B8, and B9) and opposed the Mexico City Policy (variable

C12). It seems that in this case an important political actor like the President changed international population policy because he had different strategic beliefs about the nature of the issue. President Reagan wanted to stress the Cornucopian Outlook of development policy and tighten the abortion policy, whereas Clinton wanted a status quo ante Reagan policy that embraced the Coale-Hoover thesis and the Basic Human Needs Mandate. An occasion like an international conference on population is an excellent opportunity for a Chief Executive to assert his prerogatives in terms of the government's strategic policies. It is also an excellent opportunity to circumvent and alienate the process and actors in a policy subsystem.

The Role of Party

The last issue addressed by the cluster analyses is the role of political parties in determining the political changes that occurred. It would be fair to expect some clear divisions in the way the political parties are clustered if the variable is to be considered important. Figures 5.21-5.24 show the three composite variables but they are identified by their party affiliation. The N/A entry represents the bureaucratic, interest group, and media actors that do not have a clear party affiliation. The four clusters, however, do not show any major differences between the political parties. There are Democrats and Republicans

Core, Strategic, and Instrumental Beliefs by Party

Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Single linkage method (nearest neighbor)

Figure 5.21

1984



Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Single linkage method (nearest neighbor)

Figure 5.22

1994



Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Complete linkage method (farthest neighbor)

Figure 5.23

1984



Distance metric is normalized percent disagreement
Complete linkage method (farthest neighbor

Figure 5.24

1994



in all of the major clusters that appear in the figures. The results do conform to the findings of Model, which rejected the significance of party in explaining budgetary changes. The party variable is just incapable of accounting for the convergence of ideological movements like the Moral Majority and Supply-side economics within the Reagan Administration. Thus, the role of party should be discounted as a way of explaining the process of policy change over time.

Conclusion

The formal analysis of policy change produced mixed results, but there is overall support found for the theoretical assertions made in Chapter Four. First, there is support for the notion that analyzing policy change requires the simultaneous examination of systemic factors and the policy subsystem within it. Model One suggests that systemic factors do play a significant role in IPP budgetary changes. Second, analyzing the changes within a policy subsystem can help to explain the different strategic policies advocated at the UN Conferences on Population. Overall the output generated by the cluster analyses was very disappointing considering the effort expended to create them, but they did show how the change in the belief systems of one actor can profoundly change the tone and level of activity within a policy subsystem. The change from the Reagan to the Clinton Administrations had a profound effect on the policy subsystem. Third, the cluster analyses also provide evidence about the level of the conversation that occurred in the policy subsystem over time. The clusters indicate that the level of discussion is pretty low in terms of the instrumental aspects of international population policy. These are the strengths of the formal analysis, but the weakness lies in the improper level of clout attached to political parties as an explanatory variable. Clearly party affiliation can not explain the differences that exist within the belief systems of the subsystem actors. It would be nice to blame the lack of data on the paucity of support for political parties, but there was enough data to

suggest that it doesn't make the grade. At least the evidence was consistent between Models One and Two regarding this matter. Additional research on policy change should try to incorporate ideology as an explanatory variable, because it may more readily account for the subtle changes that occur with political turnover in the systemic governing coalition.

6
Conclusion

It is a most mortifying reflection for
a man to consider what he has done,
compared to what he might have done.
(*Samuel Johnson: Life)*

There are several lessons to be drawn from this analysis. This chapter will take stock of those lessons and consider the possibilities for future research regarding policy change. The first part of this round-up will focus on the important factors that lead to policy change. The second section will consider the theoretical issues raised and assess the efficacy of using the Advocacy Coalition Framework. The final section will present ideas and suggestions that can guide further research.

Policy Change

The historical narrative provided in Chapters Two and Three highlighted many of the elements of policy change. A window of opportunity was necessary to create the conditions for an international population policy to be initiated. First, situational factors combined to frame that window. The problem first had to be identified in such a way as to make it salient. The issue of international family planning became salient when the Coale-Hoover thesis tied high population growth to the problems of economic and political development. Another situational factor that combined with problem identification was a technical remedy. New and more reliable methods of contraception were becoming widely available, and provided the technical capacity to deal with the issue.

Second, key institutions were necessary to be in a position to steer the issue through the political process and create policy change. Key institutions were important to every aspect of change deemed important in this study. For example, interest groups (as depicted by William

Draper) were crucial to lobbying the government to initiate and sustain an IPP. Also, the bureaucracy (as portrayed by Reimer Ravenholt) was able to transform a fledgling idea by providing a programmatic structure that has been largely maintained for more than thirty years. Congress was important to the establishment and maintenance of IPP by voting for Title X funding that earmarked money for international family planning. Important institutions like the Presidency entered the fray and upset the policy subsystem and made changes, as with Ronald Reagan and the Mexico City Policy.

Third, the turnover in the public institutions is another factor that brought change to the IPP subsystem. The inauguration of Bill Clinton led to the immediate demise of the Mexico City Policy. New presidents, however, brought the biggest changes in terms of strategic policy. Each new president had his own strategic perspective that led to changes. The Nixon Doctrine affected IPP by setting the precedent of having development assistance flow primarily through NGOs that had the expertise to deal with the problem. The Basic Human Needs Mandate and the Global 2000 Report are examples of a succession of strategic efforts to place the individual imprints of a president on the U.S. population policy. Most of the proposed strategic plans included organizational changes to the foreign aid structure. There was some evidence that the conservative swing that began in the Senate after 1976 complicated the budget process. The ascendancy of new leaders in the subsystem also changed IPP in important ways. David Obey had a profound impact on the foreign aid budget in the late 1980s and Chris Smith was a driving force behind the Mexico City Policy and the issue of abortion in the IPP subsystem.

Finally, systemic factors were important to policy change. The political struggle between the President and Congress in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and Watergate affected the ability of the IPP subsystem to pass a budget and began a downward trend in the budget.

Outside events affected the IPP subsystem. Frank Church's motion on the Senate floor to recommit the foreign aid budget in FY 1974 doomed IPP to be funded by continuing resolution, which meant fewer dollars for the program. Also, the financial situation of the government forced it to pass the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. The IPP budget suffered from the across the board cuts the act mandated. Also, the ability of the Reagan Administration to circumvent the authorization process severely curtailed the flexibility of the IPP subsystem to act with any independence in terms of setting its budget. So, the IPP subsystem is subject to systemic forces that can affect the course of policy making.

Theoretical Considerations

The analysis of the Advocacy Coalition Framework developed adequate evidence to support the use of the theory and its expansion. The ACF is capable of depicting the complexity of policy making. The framework is able to portray how policies maintain their continuity over time, as well as when and how they change. The problem with the literature on policy change is not that the ACF is deficient, but that it is not fully developed by those who use it. Too often, the studies conducted on policy change focus almost exclusively on the events that occur within the policy subsystem. The picture is incomplete without examining the systemic factors that can lead to policy change. The research presented here makes a good case for the notion that environmental factors that surround a policy subsystem will affect the changes that occur in profound ways. Model One in Chapter Five provided clear evidence that systemic factors are important to policy change. Model Two also confirmed the role systemic factors play in policy change. Overall, there was a sea of continuity in the belief systems of the actors between 1984 and 1994. The marked differences between the two years in the conditions of the policy subsystem are accounted for by the change in the belief systems of the President. The turnover

in this one key institution transformed the policy subsystem that was highly contentious in 1984 into one marked by an overall consensus. The Clinton Administration also changed the actual positions and policies of the U.S. with regards to reversing the Mexico City Policy and to renewing contribution to the UNFPA. Model Two may have been able to encompass the source of change in this strategic situation, but not other aspects of change like budgetary change. The systemic factors developed in Model One demonstrate the role they play in policy change. The potential criticism that a fully specified ACF is not parsimonious may be true, but parsimony should be foregone for the sake of accuracy.

This research has also suggested that it is important to classify the type of policy and change that is being explained. The ACF ignored the potential help these classifications provide. Classifying policy change into strategic and structural types allows the policy process to be depicted in its complexity. The typologies provide expectations for an actor's level of responsibility regarding policy change. Strategic policies tend to be dominated by the Presidency. The President's preeminent position in foreign policy gives him the ability to set the tone and tenor of strategic policy. The various structural policy types (budgetary, programmatic and organizational) work under different dynamics. No particular actor controlled budgetary matters, but they were subject to more systemic influences than the other policy types. Programmatic policy changes tend to be dominated by the bureaucracy. Other actors were able to add to the programmatic structure of IPP (e.g., increased private sector participation), but the types of activities undertaken by the AID program did not vary significantly over time. Organizational change was difficult to pin down, but this type of change seems to be managed by the executive branch and the bureaucracy. Clearly, it has been demonstrated that strategic and structural foreign policies are created through the interplay of numerous, but definable factors.

Future Research

There are several suggestions to be made regarding future research. First, there is plenty of other material to be examined in terms of the population issue. There are numerous other hearings and documents that could be examined to further test the ideas proposed here. Additional research on this topic, however, should focus on gathering additional sources of data to bolster the qualitative analysis. The research could be expanded to include correspondences between the participants and interviews of the actors to provide a more complete picture of their belief systems. Another untapped resource is the presidential library system, which could provide additional insight into the belief systems and activities of the president regarding population issues. Additional insight into organizational changes could also be gained from further research in these areas.

There are a couple of suggestions to be made regarding the future of research on policy change. There are other policy types that need to be examined to find additional support for the policy typology advanced here. Other areas of foreign policy like trade could be examined, as well as domestic distributive and redistributive policies. The use of ideological measures of the political actors in future endeavors could greatly expand the explanatory power of the suggestions made here. A good measure of ideology in future systemic analyses would be nearly analogous to the belief systems analyzed in a policy subsystem and would enhance the cohesiveness of a fully specified Advocacy Coalition Framework. Further use and development of the ACF will provide a clearer picture of policy change. Understanding policy change will continue to be important, because it will give us the ability to better predict and perhaps shape political outcomes.

Appendix

Organizational Chart 1

Agency for International Development, 1967-1968



Organizational Chart 2

Agency for International Development, 1968-1969



Organizational Chart 3



Organizational Chart 4



Organizational Chart 5

Agency for International Development, 1971-1972



Organizational Chart 6

Agency For International Development, 1973-1974



1 Includes Director of Equal Opportunity Programs

Organizational Chart 7



Organizational Chart 8



Organizational Chart 9



Organizational Chart 10



Organizational Chart 11



Organizational Chart 12



Organizational Chart 13



Organizational Chart 14



Organizational Chart 15



Organizational Chart 16



Organizational Chart 17

International Development Cooperation Agency, 1992-1993



Organizational Chart 18

International Development Cooperation Agency, 1993-1996



Organizational Chart 19

Agency for International Development, 1995-1996



Code Form

Ac. Actor Information(Note: . = No Data)

Ac1. Type of Actor
1. Representative 2. Senator 3. Executive Branch 4. Bureaucracy 5. Interest Group 6. Media

Ac2. Party Affiliation
. None Available 1. Democrat 2. Republican 3. Other

Ac3. Position
1. Chairperson 2. Member 3. Panelist/Submission

Ac4. Policy Domain
1. Subcommittee 2. Committee 3. Chamber/Committee As a Whole 4. Government Document

A. Core Beliefs

A1. Relationship Between Humans and Nature
1. Humans complete dominion 2. Wise steward 3. Humans as part of nature

A2. Priority of Values (rank each value separately)
1. not at all important 2. moderately important 3. very important

a. individual liberty	b. economic well-being
c. security	d. knowledge
e. happiness	f. sense of community

A3. Basic Criteria for Distributive Justice
1. egoist 2. only certain groups 3. greatest good

B. Policy Beliefs/Policy Core

B1. Ability of Technology to Solve Human Problems
1. optimism 2. mixed results 3. pessimism

B2. Scope of Governmental Activity vs. Private Activity
1. market only 2. mostly market 3. mixed 4. mostly government 5. gov't. only

B3. Basic Policy Mechanism for Governmental Intervention (rank each separately)
1. not at all important/Not Acceptable 2. moderately important 3. important 4. very important

a. information	b. incentives/grants
c. coercion	d. gov't. service
e. contraceptives	

B4. Democratic Accountability vs. Impartial Expertise
1. democracy stressed 2. balance 3. expertise stressed

B5. Role of US in International Affairs
1. not at all important 2. moderately important 3. important 4. very important

B6. Relationship Between Population Growth and Nature
1. Positive relationship 2. No/Negligible relationship 3. Unclear relationship
4. Some relationship 5. Negative relationship

B7. Relationship Between Population Growth and Economic Development

1. Positive relationship 2. No/Negligible relationship 3. Unclear relationship
4. Some relationship 5. Negative relationship

***B7A. Role of Government Planning and Population Growth on Economic Development**
1. Positive relationship 2. No/Negligible relationship 3. Unclear relationship
4. Some relationship 5. Negative relationship

***B7B. Economic Policy v. Population Policy in Leading to Economic Development**
1. All economic 2. Mostly economic 3. Equal mix 4. Mostly population 5. All population

B8. Salience of Threat
1. not at all important 2. moderately important 3. important 4. very important

B9. Magnitude of Threat
1. not at all important 2. moderately important 3. important 4. very important

***B10. Partisanship History**
1. Bipartisan 2. Partisan

***B11. Perceived Change in Partisanship**
1. Bipartisan 2. Partisan

***B12. Population Growth Leads to Social Unrest**
1. Positive relationship 2. No/Negligible relationship 3. Unclear relationship
4. Some relationship 5. Negative relationship

***B13. Reliability of Demographic Studies**
1. totally unreliable 2. Somewhat unreliable 3. Unclear reliability 4. Somewhat reliable 5. Totally reliable

C. Secondary and Instrumental Beliefs

C1. Overall Budget
1. significant decrease 2. decrease 3. keep the same 4. increase 5. significant increase

C2. Overall Program
1. no change 2. change emphasis of priorities 3. new priorities (list_____)

C3. Demographic and Social Data
A. Budget
1. significant decrease 2. decrease 3. keep the same 4. increase 5. significant increase
B. Program
1. no change 2. economic factors 3. technical factors 4. political factors

C4. Population Policy, Population Dynamics, and Fertility Behavior
A. Budget
1. significant decrease 2. decrease 3. keep the same 4. increase 5. significant increase
B. Program
1. no change 2. economic factors 3. technical factors 4. political factors

C5. Fertility Control Techniques
A. Budget
1. significant decrease 2. decrease 3. keep the same 4. increase 5. significant increase
B. Program
1. no change 2. economic factors 3. technical factors 4. political factors

C6. Delivery Systems

A. Budget
1. significant decrease 2. decrease 3. keep the same 4. increase 5. significant increase
B. Program
1. no change 2. economic factors 3. technical factors 4. political factors

C7. Information Systems
A. Budget
1. significant decrease 2. decrease 3. keep the same 4. increase 5. significant increase
B. Program
1. no change 2. economic factors 3. technical factors 4. political factors

C8. Manpower and Institutional Development
A. Budget
1. significant decrease 2. decrease 3. keep the same 4. increase 5. significant increase
B. Program
1. no change 2. economic factors 3. technical factors 4. political factors

C9. United Nations Fund for Population Activities
A. Budget
1. significant decrease 2. decrease 3. keep the same 4. increase 5. significant increase
B. Program
1. no change 2. economic factors 3. technical factors 4. political factors

C10. International Conference on Population and Development
A. Composition of Delegation
(1) 1. no input 2. some input 3. significant input
(2) 1. oppose delegation 2. oppose certain members 3. support delegation
B. Positions of Delegation
(1) 1. no input 2. some input 3. significant input
(2) 1. oppose positions 2. oppose some positions 3. support positions
*C. How Other Nation-States will Perceive Positions
1. Favorably 2. Both Good and Bad Aspects 3. Unfavorably

C11. Organizational Change
A. Functional Organization
a. increased efficiency b. increased oversight
c. increased effectiveness d. political reasons
B. Personnel
1. decrease 2. keep the same 3. increase

***C12. Policy Related to Abortion**
1. Less restrictive 2. No change 3. More Restrictive

***C13. Affect of Mexico City Policy on Rate of Abortion**
1. Decrease 2. Increase

***C14. Effect of Mexico City Policy on Overall Population Policy**
1. Negative 2. No effect 3. Positive Effect

***C15A. Counseling Should Encourage Abortion**
1. Unacceptable 2. Acceptable

***C15B. Counseling Should Offer Abortion as a Choice**
1. Unacceptable 2. Acceptable

***C16. What will happen to Money Withheld from Disallowed Programs**

1. Fewer Funds 2. Funds Reallocated Within Program

***C17. Status of Women**
1. significant decrease 2. decrease 3. keep the same 4. increase 5. significant increase

***C18. Male Responsibility**
1. significant decrease 2. decrease 3. keep the same 4. increase 5. significant increase

***C19. Natural Family Planning**
1. significant decrease 2. decrease 3. keep the same 4. increase 5. significant increase

***C20. Private Sector Initiative**
1. significant decrease 2. decrease 3. keep the same 4. increase 5. significant increase

***C21. Set Regional Goals**
1. significant decrease 2. decrease 3. keep the same 4. increase 5. significant increase

*Variables added during coding

Economic Model

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs=31
				F (5, 25)= 9.18
Model	336117.782	5	67223.5564	Prob > F= 0.0000
Residual	182982.545	25	7319.30179	R-squared=0.6475
Total	519100.327	30	17303.3442	Root MSE = 85.553

AID	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
pres	-29.27791	41.36795	-0.708	0.486	-114.4768	55.92099
hdiff	.0040309	.443955	0.009	0.993	-.9103114	.9183733
sdiff	-4.598002	1.589243	-2.893	0.008	-7.87111	-1.324895
GRH	-161.9599	77.84358	-2.081	0.048	-322.2818	-1.638062
%dbtlag2	68.23964	22.56731	3.024	0.006	21.7614	114.7179
_cons	279.1319	58.37532	4.782	0.000	158.9057	399.3581

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